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In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries
American judges' and legislators' obligation to do justice collided
with the South's race-based system of slavery. The statutes and
caselaw of this period reveal not only judicial and legislative
sanction of slavery, but also an effort on the part of lawmakers
and judges to bolster the system's effectiveness by enacting and
upholding a regime that rendered black slaves powerless before
the law.
In this Article A. Leon Higginbotham and Anne F. Jacobs
describe the inequities of the criminal law of colonial and ante-
bellum Virginia in prosecutions of slaves and free blacks.
Although Virginians led the infant nation in declaring the equal-
ity of every human being, the state was also in the vanguard of
efforts to subjugate blacks: over the years before the Civil War
the Commonwealth refined a legal system rooted in racial injus-
tice. Blacks in Virginia, as elsewhere, had the worst of both
worlds. The law deemed them less than human, failing to recog-
nize their fundamental rights whenever such treatment benefited
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the white establishment. Black criminal defendants were denied
the substantive and procedural protections that whites took for
granted. Upon conviction, blacks were punished more severely
than whites for commission of the same offenses, and were held
to account for behavior that for whites was not even criminal
Judge Higginbotham and Ms. Jacobs chronicle Virginia's
legacy of legal complicity with race-based slavery, providing nu-
merous examples of Virginia's explicit endorsement of a harsher,
fundamentally unjust criminal law for blacks. They point to ves-
tiges of such disparate treatment in the criminal law of the late
twentieth century, such as the documented fact that black de-
fendants tend to receive stiffer sentences than white defendants
for similar offenses. Judge Higginbotham and Ms. Jacobs con-
clude by exhorting modern Americans to strive to overcome the
remnants of injustice and unfairness that exist in the criminal
law today.
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I. THE DUALITY OF THE SLAVE: ALWAYS PROPERTY, SOMETIMES
A PERSON, AND NEVER A CITIZEN
Abolitionist William Goodell, lamenting the plight of American
slaves, wrote that the slave "can know law only as an eneray, and not as a
friend."' Goodell explained that
[t]he slave, who is but "a chattel" on all other occasions, with
not one solitary attribute of personality accorded to him, be-
comes "aperson" whenever he is to be punished! He is the only
being in the universe to whom is denied all self-direction and
free agency, but who is, nevertheless, held responsible for his
conduct, and amenable to law.... He is under the control of
law, though unprotected by law.2
This double standard of chattel and person lay at the heart of the
criminal laws that governed slaves in antebellum America and was exem-
plified by Chief Justice Roger Brook Taney's decision in United States v.
Amy.' Taney concluded that although slaves were not "citizens" under
the United States Constitution (as decided two years earlier in his opin-
ion in Dred Scott v. Sandford4 ), and thus were not entitled to its protec-
1. WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE 309 (photo. reprint 1969) (1853)
(emphasis added).
2. Id. Another scholar has described the duality as follows:
The nature of human slavery led to many strange legal complications. In law a slave
was a person who could commit a crime and be punished. He could under some
circumstances be himself the subject of a homicide or a larceny. At the same time a
slave was hardly a person at all but belonged legally in a classification of property.
JUNE P. GUILD, BLACK LAWS OF VIRGINIA 13 (1936).
3. 24 F. Cas. 792 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445) (Taney, Circuit Justice). Until the
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, United States Supreme Court
justices sat as circuit judges throughout the nation. Taney wrote Amy while sitting as a circuit
judge in the district of Virginia.
4. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the majority, said:
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tions, they nevertheless were "persons" within the public acts of the
United States who "may commit offences which society has a right to
punish for its own safety."'
Typical of the extensive case law and legislation about slavery in
colonial and antebellum Virginia,6 the Amy case highlights the predica-
ment of those engaged in the buying, selling, and ownership of human
[A]t the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of the
United States was framed and adopted[,] .... [public opinion] had for more than a
century... regarded [blacks] as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect ....
Id at 407. For the most insightful analysis of this case, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLmTcs 322-414 (1978).
5. Amy, 24 F. Cas. at 809, 810. Taney also wrote:
It has been argued in support of the motion that a slave, in the eye of the law, is
regarded as property; and, as the act of congress speaks only of persons, without any
reference to the property of the master, and makes no provision to compensate him
for its loss, it was not intended, and does not operate, upon slaves.
It is true that a slave is the property of the master, and his right of property is
recognized and secured by the constitution and laws of the United States; and it is
equally true that he is not a citizen, and would not be embraced in a law operating
only upon that class of persons. Yet, he is a person, and is always spoken of and
described as such in the state papers and public acts of the United States.
Id. at 809.
6. As to why one should focus on Virginia alone rather than randomly cite cases and
statutes from a variety of states, we believe that question has been answered in detail in an
earlier article:
Our premise is that it is better to provide a comprehensive view of the evolution of
the entire slavery jurisprudence and race relations law as it affected ... blacks in a
single state. Virginia, because it provided significant leadership for all the colonies, is
an excellent choice as a starting point. Virginia was the birthplace of American slav-
ery. Virginians played a major role in leading the American Revolution and in shap-
ing the destiny of the new nation after 1776. Yet, tragically, Virginia was also a
leader in the debasement of blacks by pioneering a legal process that perpetuated
racial injustice. Just as they emulated other aspects of Virginia's policies, many colo-
nies followed Virginia's leadership in slavery law.
Virginia's leaders were, on occasion, troubled by the contradiction between their
support for the ideals of freedom and equality in the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution and their opposition to those ideals for free blacks and slaves.
Patrick Henry lamented, "[w]ould any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my
own purchase! I am drawn along by ye general Inconvenience of living without
them; I will not, I cannot justify it." [Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants
(January 18, 1773), reprinted in GEORGE S. BROOKES, FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET
443 (1937)]. Thomas Jefferson expressed his fears about the possible repercussions of
the mistreatment of blacks, stating:
[Clan the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed
their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these
liberties are of the gift of God? ... Indeed I tremble for my country when I
reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot keep sleep forever .... The
Almighty has io attribute which can take side with us in such a contest.
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beings. The key to maintaining the slavery system and maximizing the
profits of the master was to keep slaves and free blacks7 as powerless and
[THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden ed.,
1955)].
But despite their misgivings about the harsh treatment of blacks, white Virgini-
ans enacted repressive legislation to protect their property interests in slaves and to
maintain their hegemony over free blacks. Whites were able to justify their oppres-
sion of free blacks and slaves because they presumed all blacks were inferior to them.
They recognized also that the oppression of all blacks was necessary to make the
slavery system function at maximum efficiency.
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free". Free Blacks in
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 17, 20-21 (1991) [hereinafter
Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free"] (citations reproduced in part in brackets,
omitted in part).
7. For purposes of this Article, we will use the term "black" as a synonym for the terms
"colored," "Negro," "Afro-American," and "African American." The semantic debate con-
cerning these terms is rooted in the problems of race in twentieth-century America. Booker T.
Washington, the Reverend Walter Brooks, and other early twentieth-century black activists
devoted considerable thought to the question of "the proper name for blacks." See GILBERT
T. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTmcTIoNs IN AMERICAN LAW 20-25 (1910). E.A. Johnson, pro-
fessor of law at Shaw University, claimed that:
The term "Afro-American" is suggestive of an attempt to disclaim as far as possible
our Negro descent, and casts a slur upon it. It fosters the idea of the inferiority of the
race, which is an incorrect notion to instill into the Negro youth, whom we are trying
to imbue with self-esteem and self-respect.
Id. at 22-23. Stephenson concluded that "'Negro' (with the capital 'N') will eventually be
applied to the black man in America." Id. at 24-25. See generally id. at 20-25 (discussing the
"proper name for black men in America").
In the New Deal era, a black newspaper commissioned a poll of readers to determine the
most popular choice of self-definition. The popular choice at that time was "colored" with
1,590 votes, followed by "negro" with 893 votes. See BALTIMORE AFRO-AMERICAN, Aug. 8,
1937 (Philadelphia ed.), at 1. It is yet to be seen whether the increased use of "African Ameri-
can" will replace "black" as the accepted term of public record and popular usage as "black"
replaced "negro" in the late 1960s. As A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. noted in a previous article,
however:
We recognize that it is impossible to use one phrase that satisfies everyone.
Sometimes the debate on semantics as to which term should be used diverts people
from the important substantive issue. The important issue is whether people are
being treated adversely because of their skin color. Discrimination is no less harsh if
one is identified as black, African-American or Negro.
Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free," supra note 6, at 17 n.4. The term
"black" has become increasingly controversial. See Laura B. Randolph, Interview with Justice
Thurgood Marshall, EBONY, Nov. 1990, at 216. Justice Marshall used the term "Afro-Ameri-
can" and the interviewer persistently used the term "black." Justice Marshall explained:
First, please note that I don't use the terms "Black" or "Negro." Instead I use the
term "Afro-American," because that term is a more respectful reflection of the con-
tributions that descendants from diverse and culturally rich African traditions have
made to the mosaic of American society.
Id. In another article in the same issue of Ebony, Higginbotham used the term "black." A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 45 Years in Law and Civil Rights, EBONY, Nov. 1990, at 82-86.
In 1910, Stephenson wrote in his chapters "What is a Negro" and the "Proper Name for
Black Men in America" that
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
submissive as possible. After studying "slavery jurisprudence" by read-
ing thousands of statutes and cases and innumerable articles and books
on American slavery, we submit that for Americans in power several
premises, precepts,8 goals, and implicit agreements defined the nature of
American slavery and directed how it should be administered. Some-
times these premises and goals were articulated precisely in statutes, judi-
cial opinions, and executive orders. At other times, because they
understood and supported these pernicious propositions, all in power un-
doubtedly agreed that it would be superfluous to announce or codify the
common understanding. Whether articulated as formal rules of law or
[t]hose who are anxious NOT to wound the feelings of that race speak of them as
"Colored People" or "Darkies"; while those who would speak contemptuously of
them say "Nigger" or "Coon." "Nigger" is confined largely to the South; "Coon,"
to the rest of the country. Again, one occasionally finds "Blacks" and "Black Men"
in contradistinction to "Whites" and "White Men."
STEPHENSON, supra, at 20-21 (emphasis added).
8. The term "precept" as used here is intended to encompass a broader understanding
than its occasional use in legal cases. This use is more consistent with the definition in Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary, which defines a "precept" as
a command or principle intended as a general rule of action (the dominance of his
party was the most important [precept] of his life--Carol L. Thompson): as a com-
mandment enjoined respecting moral conduct (observe the sixth commandment not
as a [precept] of divine law but as a counsel of profitable prudence-W.L. Sullivan)
WEBmER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1783-84 (4th ed. 1976).
In Adams v. Vose, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 51 (1854), the court stated that a precept is not to be
confined to civil proceedings and is not of a more restricted meaning than process. It includes
warrants and processes in criminal as well as civil proceedings. Id. at 58.
The United States Supreme Court often uses the term "precept" as a synonym for "princi-
ple" or a concept "in harnony with general principles." See United States v. Rodgers, 461
U.S. 677, 716 n.5 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1667 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("Today's casual embrace of taxation imposed by the
unelected, life-tenured federal judiciary disregards fundamental precepts for the democratic
control of public institutions."); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573, 591 (1989) ("Although 'the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause val-
ues can be eroded' are not susceptible to a single verbal formulation, this Court has attempted
to encapsulate the essential precepts of the Establishment Clause." (quoting Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))); Lingle v. Norge Div., 486 U.S.
399, 404 n.3 (1988) (" 'Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to be
formulated.., requiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 [of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act] to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy.'"
(quoting Teamsters v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962))); Pattern Makers' League of
N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 131 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court previously
has recognized that it violates precepts of voluntary unionism to bind a member to promises he
did not knowingly make."); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 289-90 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (indicating that a "fundamental precept" is analogous to a funda-
mental right or liberty).
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not, a broad consensus on these overriding principles or precepts led to
the legitimization of slavery and of racism.
We have attempted to distill the essence of the relevant colonial and
antebellum Virginia cases and statutes into ten basic, underlying precepts
that formed the legal and moral foundation of American slavery and
early race-relations law. Under our present formulation, the first three
precepts of American slavery were:
1. Inferiority: Presume, preserve, protect, and defend the
ideal of the superiority of whites and the inferiority of blacks.9
2. Property: Define the slave as the master's property, disre-
gard the humanity of the slave except when it serves the
master's interest, and deny slaves the fruits of their labor.10
3. Powerlessness: Keep blacks-whether slave or free-as
powerless as possible so that they will be submissive and depen-
dent in every respect, not only to the master, but to whites in
general. To assure powerlessness, subject blacks to a secondary
system of justice with lesser rights and protections and greater
punishments than for whites."
9. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Valarie Bowen, Whiteness the Nimbus of
Superiority, Blackness the Stigma of Inferiority: The Legal Sanctioning of Racist Ideology
(1991) (unpublished monograph, on file at University of Pennsylvania Law School) (discussing
in detail the precept of "inferiority").
10. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First, Hu-
manity Second: The Recognition of the Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 511, 514-34 (1989) [hereinafter Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity
Second] (discussing in detail the precept of "property").
11. Other precepts of slavery were:
4. Racial Purity: Draw an arbitrary racial line and preserve white purity as thus de-
fined. Tolerate sexual relations between white men and black women; severely punish sexual
relations between white women and non-white men.
5. Manumission and Free Blacks: Limit and discourage manumission; minimize the
number of free blacks in the state. Confine free blacks to a status as close as possible to slav-
ery.
6. Family: Recognize no rights of the black family; destroy the unity of the black
family; deny slaves the right of marriage; demean and degrade black women, black men, black
parents, and black children; then condemn them for their conduct and state of mind.
7. Education: Deny blacks any education, including a knowledge of their culture, and
make it a crime to teach those who are slaves how to read or write.
8. Religion: Recognize no rights of slaves to define and practice their own religion, to
choose their own religious leaders, or to worship with other blacks. Encourage them to adopt
the religion of the white master and teach them that God is white and will reward the slave
who obeys the commands of his master here on earth. Use religion to justify the slave's status
on earth.
9. Liberty-Resistance: Limit blacks' opportunity to resist, rebel, or flee by curtailing
their freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of expression. Deny blacks
the right to vote.
10. By Any Means Possible: Support any practice or doctrine from any source whatso-
ever that maximizes the profitability of slavery, legitimizes racism, and retaliates, frequently by
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This Article examines primarily powerlessness-the third precept of
slavery. Along with the precepts of inferiority and property, powerless-
ness constituted the foundation of the legal system of slavery.12 Propo-
nents of slavery recognized the truth of abolitionist and ex-slave
Frederick Douglass's admonition on powerlessness:
Beat and cuff the slave, keep him hungry and spiritless, and he
will follow the chain of his master like a dog, but feed and
clothe him well, work him moderately and surround him with
physical comfort, and dreams of freedom will intrude.... You
may hurl a man so low beneath the level of his kind, that he
loses all just ideas of his natural position, but elevate him a
little, and the clear conception of rights rises to life and power,
and leads him onward.13
This Article examines how Virginia's colonial and antebellum criminal
justice system helped maintain blacks' powerlessness and submissiveness
in order to ensure the dominance of the master and perpetuate slavery.
The Article analyzes how the Virginia legislature and courts most often
made the law "only an enemy" for blacks-and never a friend.14
As early as the seventeenth century, Virginia lawmakers had to de-
cide whether slaves would be treated like all other persons or whether
they would have a special and different status. The concept of deterring
criminal behavior through the use of fines was meaningless in the case of
slaves, who by definition were paupers.15 Moreover, several years of pe-
means of violence, against those of both races who dare to advocate abolition or who, by their
speech or actions, deny the inherent inferiority of blacks.
For a general discussion of these precepts, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten
Precepts of Slavery (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Higgin-
botham, Ten Precepts].
12. For a further explanation of the precepts of slavery and their consequences, see A.
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education, and Missouri Jurisprudence: Shelley v. Krae-
mer in a Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 673, 679-702 (1989) [hereinafter Higginbot-
ham, Missouri Jurisprudence]; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing Segregation
in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit of Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L.
Rlv. 763, 820-24 [hereinafter Higginbotham et al., De Jure Housing Segregation]; Higginbot-
ham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free," supra note 6, at 21 n.18; Higginbotham &
Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity Second, supra note 10, at 513-34; A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and
Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1969-2000 (1989) [hereinafter Higginbotham &
Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex]; and Higginbotham, Ten Precepts, supra note 11.
13. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 150
(photo. reprint 1962) (1845).
14. See GOODELL, supra note 1, at 309.
15. Regarding statutes forbidding stealing a letter from the United States mail, Chief Jus-
tice Taney stated:
It is true, that some of the offences created by this act of congress subject the party to
both fine and imprisonment, and it is evident that the incapacity and disabilities of a
[Vol. 70
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nal imprisonment, without compensation to the slave's owner, worked
against the master's economic interests. And the notion of parity in pun-
ishment, whereby individuals who had committed the same type of crime
would be punished with equal severity or equal leniency, was repugnant
to a racist system that viewed blacks as inferior to whites. 6
Although some modem historians and antebellum contemporaries
have alleged that Virginia was "the most humane of slave states in day-
to-day practice," 7 the Commonwealth also "maintained the most re-
pressive system of criminal law regarding slaves."'" Slaves could receive
the death penalty for at least sixty-eight offenses, whereas for whites the
same conduct either was at most punishable by imprisonment or was not
a crime at all.' 9 Because slaves were property, however, masters did not
want a criminal justice system capable of irrevocably damaging their
profitable investment in the slave. Thus, legislation was enacted that pro-
vided for reimbursement from the public purse to masters whose slaves
were condemned to death.20
In addition to its harsh criminal code, Virginia's emphasis on speedy
and efficient resolution of slave criminal cases meant that slaves had few
of the procedural protections and appellate rights granted to whites or
slave were not in the mind and contemplation of congress when it inflicted a pecuni-
ary punishment; for he can have no property, and is also incapable of making a
contract, and consequently could not borrow the amount of the fine; and a small fine,
which would be but a slight punishment to another, would, in effect, in his case, be
imprisonment for life, if the court adopted the usual course of committing the party
until the fine was paid. And we think it must be admitted that, in imposing these
pecuniary penalties, congress could not have intended to embrace persons who were
slaves, and we greatly doubt whether a court of justice could lawfully imprison a
party for not doing an act, which by the law of his condition, it was impossible for
him to perform; and to imprison him, to compel the master to pay the fine, would be
equally objectionable, as that would be punishing an innocent man for the crime of
another.
United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445) (Taney, Circuit
Justice).
16. For a detailed discussion of the lack of parity in the punishment of whites and blacks,
see infra notes 294-542 and accompanying text.
17. Daniel J. Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J.
S. HiST. 537, 546 (1974); see also GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING
TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 77-80 (photo.
reprint 1968) (1856) (arguing that of the Southern states Virginia adopted the most humane
attitude toward slaves in ordinary matters).
18. Flanigan, supra note 17, at 546.
19. STROUD, supra note 17, at 77-80; Flanigan, supra note 17, at 543. Commentators
differ on the number of offenses for which blacks could receive capital punishment but whites
could not. Stroud suggests 68; Flanigan states that there were "over seventy." STROUD, supra
note 17, at 77-80; Flanigan, supra note 17, at 543.
20. See infra notes 201-02, 543-45 and accompanying text.
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even to slaves in neighboring slave states.2 1 Rights considered funda-
mental to white Virginians-such as the right to trial by jury-had no
place among the rights of slaves.22
Virginia judges and lawmakers also faced the difficult task of defin-
ing the legal status of free blacks and mulattoes in the state's criminal
justice system. The evidence suggests that Virginia did not know quite
what to do with free blacks. In some instances they were treated as free
men, with the corresponding protections and punishments that whites
received; in other matters their legal status was largely indistinguishable
from that of the slave.23 In Virginia the free black was never a citizen,
but rather a bifurcated individual-part slave and part free; which of
these polar statuses would prevail at any time was never certain.24 As
one scholar has noted:
Free blacks would logically stand a greater chance of being
convicted for the same kind of behavior [as slaves] since they-
"slaves without masters"-suffered from racial subordination
in the courts yet did not have the benefit of owners' self-inter-
ested intervention.25
Perhaps the most profound example of free blacks' precarious and
unique legal status was the fact that as punishment for committing what
was for whites a noncapital crime, free blacks could be sold into slavery.
Such enslavement for whites was inconceivable. In those rare instances
when whites could be forced to satisfy debts with indentured servitude26
for a term of years, a black person born a free man could end up a slave
by virtue of the color of his skin.27
21. For discussions of the procedural protections and appellate rights granted to whites
and slaves in Southern states besides Virginia, see articles cited infra note 38.
22. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
23. See Higginbotham & Bosworth, "'Rather Than the Free," supra note 6, at 17-19.
24. Id.; see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, "Yearning to
Breathe Free": Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Colonial and Ante-
bellun Virginia 7-8 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Higgin-
botham & Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breathe Free"] (discussing slaves' limited
opportunities for obtaining their liberty and becoming free blacks).
25. PHILIP J. SCHWARZ, TWICE CONDEMNED: SLAVES AND THE CRIMINAL LAVS OF
VIRGINIA 1705-1865, at 317-18 (1988).
26. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 392-95 (1978) [hereinafter HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF
COLOR]; see also A.E. SMrH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE 18-21 (1947) (discussing generally the
role of indentured servitude in European migration to America and indicating its relatively
infrequent punitive application).
27. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 26, at 20-30; see, e.g., AR-
THUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 307-23 (1930). The former book
discusses the case of John Punch, in which the court imposed different sentences for the same
crime:
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Although a survey of statutes and cases offers significant revelations
of blacks' degraded status under the law, it simply cannot portray the
magnitude of the cruelty that confronted slaves and free blacks in their
daily lives. The inferences that can be drawn about the actual treatment
of slaves solely from an examination of cases and statutes are limited.
Most of the slaves' suffering happened on the plantations, outside the
realm of the courts-and thus beyond the purview of the modem legal
commentator. Actual cruelty to slaves on plantations was far worse than
that portrayed in the cases.
Philip Schwarz has highlighted the problem of concentrating solely
upon evidence from slave trials, stressing that masters often resorted to
private executions and beatings of slaves.2" Similarly, Eugene D. Geno-
vese has noted:
Despite the efforts of the authorities and the courts, masters
and overseers undoubtedly murdered more slaves than we shall
ever know. If the number did not reach heights worthy of clas-
sification as "statistically significant," it probably did loom
large enough to strike terror into the quarters. It could happen.
It sometimes did. And the arrests, convictions, and punish-
ment never remotely kept pace with the number of victims.2 9
Those whites who killed slaves usually "escaped without any punishment
at all."30 John Blassingame's account of plantation "justice" suggests
that assault which stopped short of murder was a regular occurrence:
"On numerous occasions, planters branded, stabbed, tarred and
feathered, burned, shackled, tortured, maimed, mutilated, crippled and
castrated their slaves."'31
There are, therefore, great dangers of underestimating the cruelty
that reigned on the plantations. Indeed, slave narratives provide a far
[O]ne called Victor, a dutchman, the other a Scotchman called James Gregory, shall
first serve out their times with their master according to their Indentures, and one
whole year apiece after the time of their service is Expired.... And after that service
... to serve the colony for three whole years apiece, and that the third being a negro
named John Punch shall serve his said master or his assigns for the time of his natu-
ral Life here or elsewhere.
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATrER OF COLOR, supra note 26, at 28 & n.20 (quoting MINUTES
OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 1622-32, 1670-76 (H.R.
McIlwaine ed., Richmond 1924) [hereinafter MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL
COURT]).
28. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 52.
29. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES
MADE 39 (1974).
30. KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH 222 (1956).
31. JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE AN-
TEBELLUM SOUTH 63-64 (1972).
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more accurate portrait of the injustice of the system than a mere reading
of appellate cases. The following narrative, recounted in 1937 by former
slave Ed Craddock, is likely more typical of what could, and did, happen
to slaves: "Stories told me by my father are vivid .... One especially,
because of its cruelty. A slave right here in Marshall angered his master,
was chained to a hemp-brake on a cold night and left to freeze to death,
which he did."32 Nevertheless, like the study of a cancerous cell through
32. Interview of Ed Craddock, in 11 GEORGE P. RAWICK, THE AMERICAN SLAVE: A
CoMPosrrE AUToBIOGRAPHY 96 (2d ed. 2d prtg. 1975) (interview set out in Vol. 10, Missouri
Narratives, at 96-97). For a discussion of slave narratives, see Higginbotham, Missouri Juris-
prudence, supra note 12, at 688-93. The exhaustive research of scholars John Blassingame and
George Rawick has provided a wealth of information on slave conditions in Virginia and
throughout the South. Blassingame includes an 1841 newspaper narrative from England of a
Virginia slave who had escaped to Canada and had subsequently visited the British and For-
eign Anti-Slavery Society in London. SLAVE TESTIMONY: Two CENTURIES OF LETrERS,
SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 217-25 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1977).
His name, ironically, was Mr. Madison Jefferson, and he provides a very detailed account of
plantation "justice":
At Beaconove Saitwicks, where he was hired out for some time, a man received five
hundred lashes, this was for striking his master, whom he fought till he was overpow-
ered-the master and two sons punished this poor wretch successively with the cow
hide, which is a strip of raw hide cut the whole length of the ox, and twisted while
moist until it tapers to a point; when it has become dry and hard, it has somewhat the
appearance of a drayman's whip, but the sharp edges projecting at every turn cut the
flesh at every stroke; it is indeed a dreadful instrument of punishment. Another case
of severe punishment occurred during the period of his stay at this last named es-
tate-a slave was caught in the act of running away, and on being brought back was
whipped severely: he threatened to revenge himself by killing his master, and this
having been told the latter, he had him seized whilst in the very act of lying in wait;
he was again most severely whipped, and then chained in the coal bank to dig coal,
being fed on a small allowance of bread and water; in a week afterwards he was
found dead. Another method of punishment is called "bucking:" the hands are tied
together and passed over the knees, and a stick is then passed between the arms and
knees, and the poor victim is thus left helplessly to roll about while under the inflic-
tion of punishment. On a neighboring estate, belonging to a person named Lewis, he
has seen a man staked with a cat tied on his back, which they whipped to make it bite
and scratch the quiverin' flesh-and sometimes the cat is drawn from the shoulders
to the hips. Surely an ingenuity more than human is exhibited here; well may it be
said, that, "if the influence of slavery on the minds of the slaves is brutalising, on the
minds of the master it is infernalising."
Id. at 220-21 (footnote omitted).
In George Rawick's collection of the 1930s Works Progress Administration slave narra-
tives, former slaves and their children recounted their experiences of slavery. One Minnie
Fulkes described the punishment of her mother who had resisted the sexual advances of an
overseer; in plantation justice such resistance was clearly a crime.
Honey, I don't like to talk 'bout dem times, 'cause my mother did suffer misert.
You know dar was an' overseer who use to tie mother up in the barn with a rope
aroun' her arms up over her head, while she stood on a block. Soon as dey got her
tied, dis block was moved an' her feet dangled, yo' know, couldn't tech de flo'.
Dis ol man, now, would start beatin' her nekkid 'til the blood run down her
back to her heels. I took an' seed th' whelps an' scars for my own self wid dese here
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a microscope, examining the cases and statutes on slavery can reveal
much, though not all, of the system's pathology.33 As George Stroud has
so aptly stated:
In representative republics... like the United States, where the
two eyes. ([It] 'was a whip like dey use to use on horses); it wuz a piece of leather
'bout as wide as my han' from little finger to thumb. After dey had beat my mama
all dey wanted another overseer. Lord, Lord, I hate white people and de flood waters
gwine drown some mo. Well honey dis man would bathe her in salt and water.
Don't you kno' dem places was a hurtin'. Um, um.
I asked mother, what she done for 'em to beat and do her so? She said, "nothin,
tother than she refused to be wife to dis man."
Interview of Minnie Fulkes (March 5, 1937), in 16 RAWICK, supra (interview set out in Vol.
17, Virginia Narratives, at 11-12).
Charles Crawley, a child during slavery, noted that his master and mistress were "good to
me as well as all us slaves," but then goes on to account for the punishment of runaway slaves:
There was a auction block, I saw right here in Petersburg on the comer of Syca-
more street and Bank street. Slaves were auctioned off to de highest bidder. Some
refused to be sold. By dat, I mean, "cried." Lord! Lord! I done seem dem
young'uns fought and kick like crazy folks; child it was pitiful to see 'em. Dem dey
would handcuff an' beat 'em unmerciful. I don't like to talk 'bout back dar. It brun'
a sad feelin' up me. If slaves 'belled, I done seed dem whip 'em wid a strop cal' "cat
nine tails." Honey, dis strop wuz 'bout broad as yo' hand, from thum' to little finger,
an' 'twas cut in strips up. Yo' done seen dese whips dat they whip horses wid? Wel
dey was used too.
Interview of Charles Crawley (Feb. 20, 1937), in 16 RAWICK, supra (interview set out in Vol.
17, Virginia Narratives at 7-9).
33. In a similar context, one of the authors has written:
I am aware that an analysis of cases, statutes, and legal edicts does not tell the
whole story as to why and how this sordid legal tradition managed to establish itself.
Nevertheless, there is merit in abolitionist William Goodell's statement: "no people
were ever yet found who were better than their laws, though many have been known
to be worse."
While I recognize that a view of slavery from the perspective of the law does not
make a complete picture, I join in the conclusions of Winthrop D. Jordan when
writing on the Colonial period and C. Vann Woodward when writing on the Recon-
struction period. Jordan has advised us:
While statutes usually speak falsely as to actual behavior, they afford prob-
ably the best single means of ascertaining what a society thinks behavior
ought to be: they sweep up the felt necessities of the day and indirectly
expound the social norm of the legislators.
And C. Vann Woodward has stated:
I am convinced that law has a special importance in the history of segrega-
tion, more importance than some sociologists would allow, and that the
emphasis on legal history is justified.
While I do not represent what I put forward here as a complete picture of the prac-
tices of the society, that canvas will never be painted unless someone first treats ade-
quately the interrelationship of race and the American legal process.
HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 26, at 7-8, 406 nn.16-17 (quoting
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 588 (1968) and C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW xiii (3d ed. 1974)).
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popular voice so greatly influences all political concerns, ... the
laws may be safely regarded as constituting a faithful exposition
of the sentiments of the people, and as furnishing, therefore,
strong evidence of the practical enjoyments and privations of
those whom they are designed to govern.34
Just as some may disagree about the fairness of the plantation sys-
tem's treatment of slaves, scholars sharply disagree about how fair
Southern appellate courts were in slave cases. At one end of the spec-
trum, historian Ulrich Phillips and political scientist A.E. Keir Nash
generally have lauded the fairness of the Southern courts, which they say
"minimized the impact of admittedly harsh codes."35 In contrast, we
believe that the courts more often than not served as the judicially robed
enforcers of a vicious, inhumane system. In our view, the few times ap-
pellate courts chose to spare a slave's life are not particularly noteworthy
in light of the reality that the slave courts legitimized, gave credence to,
and placed their imprimatur upon the cruelty of slavery.
The underlying difficulty for scholars examining antebellum slave
law is determining how much esteem to bestow upon the virtues of the
judicial system during slavery. Michael Hindus was undoubtedly correct
when he argued that the southern court's primary purpose was not to be
just:
These trials demonstrate why the notion of justice for slaves
may be self-contradictory. On the one hand, the trials show
that the master's authority was indeed limited. Slaveowners
could not exercise unfettered dominion over their own or any-
one else's slave. On the other hand, the function of the law was
to circumscribe permissible behavior and to ostracize and pe-
nalize the unacceptable. It was to regulate, but not supersede
or even interfere with the relationship between master and
slave.3 6
More than eighteen years ago, one of us criticized 37 a scholar who had
written a flurry of then-recent articles that were generally laudatory of
the "State Supreme Courts of the Old South ' 38 and their treatment of
34. STROUD, supra note 17, at v.
35. See MICHAEL S. HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE AND AU-
THORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 130 n.3 (1980).
36. Id. at 160-61.
37. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism and the Early American Legal Process, 1619-
1896, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 1-17 (1973) [hereinafter Higginbotham,
Early American Legal Process].
38. A.E. Keir Nash, A More Equitable Past? Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection
of the Antebellum Negro, 48 N.C. L. REV. 197 (1970); A.E. Keir Nash, Fairness and Formal-
ism In the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REv. 64
(1970) [hereinafter Nash, Fairness and Formalism]; A.E. Keir Nash, Negro Rights, Unionism,
[Vol. 70
1992] RACIAL POWERLESSNESS 983
slaves and free blacks. 39 This Article reflects the insights we have accu-
mulated in this field over the last two decades. We hope that the Article
will offer a fresh perspective that brings into question earlier scholarship
about the alleged fairness of the plantation system and the Southern ante-
bellum appellate courts."
and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary Chief Justice John
Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C. L. REv. 141 (1969).
39. In an earlier article, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., said that Professor Nash had re-
viewed "a relative paucity of cases." Higginbotham, Early American Legal Process, supra note
37, at 9 (emphasis added). In all fairness, he should have deleted the phrase, "relative pau-
city," but the rest of his analysis he affirms unequivocally:
I am not unmindful that there are some antebellum cases where the courts im-
posed some limitation on the extent to which blacks could be beaten, mutilated, pros-
ecuted, and killed. Professor A.E. Keir Nash has written a series of articles generally
extolling the treatment of blacks by the "State Supreme Courts of the Old South."
After reviewing a relative paucity of cases, he was so impressed that he said:
Yet, it is not quixotic to ask whether the black's existence was better aided
by the judicial fairness and integrity of [antebellum] judges such as Pearson
and Green minus the mandate of the fourteenth amendment than by that
mandate unaided by judicial compassion.
My answer to Professor Nash is: even with their degraded status after the ter-
mination of slavery and the impotence of the Fourteenth Amendment, blacks were
inestimably better off than in their prior existence when slavery was a way of life and
a few southern appellate judges made the chains a bit less cutting. It seems strange
that one hundred years after the emancipation some scholars have to be reminded of
Professor Litwack's comment that "the inherent cruelty and violence of Southern
slavery requires no further demonstration.... ." The denial of marriage, the denial
of the right to own property, the debasement of a man and his children living as
slaves in perpetuity cause Professor Nash's findings to have minuscule significance in
evaluating the justice in slavery. With millions enslaved and denied the above rights,
there is only slight solace in Professor Nash's findings that a few southern appellate
courts were concerned about procedural fairness to the relatively few slaves who
were charged with crime or in the relatively few cases where whites-usually stran-
gers-were prosecuted for brutalizing slaves. Further, as to the fate of the masses of
slaves, Stroud seems far more persuasive than Nash when the former stated in 1856
that even when the applicable law prohibits certain violence by the master:
The evil is not that laws are wanting, but that they cannot be enforced; not
that they sanction crime, but they do not punish it. And this arises chiefly,
i[f] not solely, from the cause which has been more than once mentioned,-
the exclusion of the testimony, on the trial of a white person, of all those
who are not white.
Higginbotham, Early American Legal Process, supra note 37, at 9-10 (quoting Nash, Fairness
and Formalism, supra note 38, at 99-100, and STROUD, supra note 17, at 55) (footnotes
omitted).
40. Our study of South Africa during the last fifteen years, see A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., Racism in the American and South African Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U.
L. Rav. 479 (1990); Higginbotham et al., De Jure Housing Segregation, supra note 12, has
impressed us as to the folly of lauding the "independence" or "fairness" of judges who by their
position and authority are providing "formalism" for laws that are neither just nor fair, but are
fundamentally oppressive.
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II. THE SLAVE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
Characterizing the judiciary's treatment of slaves and free blacks as
a "system of justice" is almost a semantic illusion. Free whites were
guaranteed an elaborate system of procedural rights and protections, but
blacks suffered under an equally elaborate regime of injustice and harsh
penalties. The result was implicit justice for whites and explicit injustice
for blacks. White Virginians implemented this bifurcation in the legal
system by denying slaves and, during some periods, free blacks the basic
legal rights they themselves took for granted.
A. No Right to Trial by Jury
Perhaps the most fundamental right white Virginians held was the
right to a jury trial:
Trial by Juries is the Englishman's Birthright, and is that
happy way of Trial which, notwithstanding all Revolutions of
Times, hath continued beyond all memory to this present Day;
the Beginning whereof no History specifies, it being contempo-
rary with the Foundation of the State, and one of the Pillars of
it, both as to Age and Consequence.41
This sacred birthright, however, applied only to free white men. In 1692,
the Virginia legislature decided that the elaborate system of procedural
protections developed for free white men need not apply to the slave.
42
For all offenses punishable by death "or loss of member" (dismember-
ment), a special slave court was created.43
The White man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts and accuses us,
and he sits in judgement over us.
It is fit and proper to raise the question sharply what is this rigid colour-bar in
the administration of justice? Why is it that in this courtroom I face a White magis-
trate, confronted by a White prosecutor, and escorted into the dock by a White or-
derly? Can anyone honestly and seriously suggest that in this type of atmosphere the
scales of justice are evenly balanced?
Why is it that no African in the history of this country has ever had the honour
of being tried by his own kith and kin, by his own flesh and blood?
NELSON MANDELA, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM 127 (1965). It is impossible to distinguish
the role of "fair" South African judges vigorously enforcing apartheid from that of Southern
appellate judges enforcing the slavery laws.
41. RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE, EX-
PLAINED AND DIGESTED UNDER PROPER TITLES 233 (Williamsburg, 1774).
42. See Act of April 1692, Act III, in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLEC-
TION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN
THE YEAR 1619, at 102, 102-03 (William W. Hening ed., 1819-23) [hereinafter HENING'S
STATUTES AT LARGE] (act "for the more speedy prosecution of slaves committing Capitall
Crimes").
43. See id.
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Transporting prisoners to the general court in Williamsburg to
stand trial was a burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive process.
44
The General Assembly determined that, with respect to slaves, "[t]he
expense and delay involved were ... unnecessary to secure substantial
justice, and ...accordingly provided that the Governor should issue
commissions of Oyer and Terminer for the trial of any slaves accused of
capital offenses."' Entitled "An act for the more speedy prosecution of
slaves committing Capitall Crimes," the law provided that "a speedy
prosecution of negroes and other slaves for capital offences is absolutely
necessarie," and that henceforth, slaves were to be tried "without the
sollemnitie of jury" by commissions of oyer and terminer, which were
county courts consisting of at least five justices of the peace whom the
Governor appointed.4 1 "Without the sollemnitie of jury," a slave ac-
cused of a capital offense was simply delivered up to the court, the
charges against him were placed on the record, and the trial proceeded.47
A challenge to this system was brought in 1857, when an attorney
argued that the prosecution of one slave for the murder of another vio-
lated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution
44. For a description of the Virginia state court structure in the relevant period, see
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 131-32 (William Peden ed., 1955).
In the early republican and antebellum periods, Virginia had three "superior courts": the high
court of chancery (consisting of three judges), the general court (five judges), and the court of
admiralty (three judges). The high court of chancery and the general court received appeals
from the county courts and had original jurisdiction when the amount in controversy equalled
or exceeded 10 pounds sterling, or when the cause in action concerned title to, or the bounda-
ries of, land. The admiralty court's jurisdiction was entirely original. The high court of chan-
cery and the general court held their sessions in the capital (Williamsburg, and later
Richmond) at stated times, the chancery court twice each year and the general court four
times per year (one civil term and three criminal terms). Id.
Virginia's supreme court, known during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the
"supreme court of appeals," originally consisted of the judges of all three superior courts and
assembled twice a year in the capital. By the first decade of the nineteenth century the
supreme court of appeals had acquired a bench all its own, and its judges-among them Spen-
cer Roane, St. George Tucker, and Edmund Pendleton-were praised for their erudition
throughout the country. The supreme court of appeals originally had jurisdiction over civil
appeals only, but the Virginia legislature eventually expanded its jurisdiction to criminal ap-
peals as well. Id.
45. Id. at 45-46; Flanigan, supra note 17, at 544.
46. Act of April 1692, Act III, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at
102, 102-03 (act "for the more speedy prosecution of slaves committing Capitall Crimes").
Oyer and terminer courts originated in England as a means of ensuring a speedy trial. ScoTT,
supra note 27, at 45 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *270). The present
federal speedy prosecution statute is predicated on assisting the defendant, in contrast to the
concern about speedy trials in early Virginia, which, at least in part, aimed to keep jail costs
down and to lessen the chance of escape. Id. at 57.
47. See, e.g., GUILD, supra note 2, at 168 (citing Act of 1848, ch. XXVI, § 1, 1847-48 Va.
Acts 162, 162 (providing that trial of slaves "shall be without a jury, upon a charge entered of
record and not by presentment, information or indictment")); SCOTT, supra note 27, at 72-73.
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because there had been no grand jury indictment or trial by jury. The
Appomattox County oyer and terminer court rejected the argument and
sentenced the slave, Reuben, to hang.48
B. The Pretrial Procedural Nonrights of Slaves
As a consequence of Virginia's special system of "justice," slaves
were denied not only a jury trial, but also, in whole or in part, certain
pretrial procedural rights. Free blacks and whites were arrested on war-
rant 9 and brought to court for both a preliminary hearing and an exami-
nation before a justice of the peace, at which witnesses testified and other
preliminary evidence could be presented. 0 The State formally charged
free men either by grand jury indictment, by presentment, or by informa-
tion. 1 Those bound over for trial were either released on bail or de-
tained in the county jail, 2 because certain offenses such as treason,
murder, manslaughter, and arson were not bailable offenses. 3 Judges
also denied bail to whites who married blacks or mulattoes. 54 Appar-
ently, Virginia considered interracial mixing at least as serious as mur-
der, manslaughter, treason, and arson.55
As for the "process" due slaves, they were sometimes arrested on a
warrant, but often were not. For example, no warrant was necessary for
jailing runaway slaves.5 6 After 1824 any slave could be jailed without
process.5 7 As one court later explained, a warrant was unnecessary be-
cause "the arrest of the slaves did not touch the liberty of the master. '58
48. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 290.
49. ScOrr, supra note 27, at 53.
50. Id. at 55-58, 59-62.
51. "A presentment was an accusation made by members of the grand jury, or other
persons specially appointed by law; primarily, this was to be based on personal knowledge,
thus differing from an indictment." Id. at 71. An "information" was brought either exclu-
sively by the attorney general or the King's attorney or by an individual together with the
King's attorney. Id. at 72.
52. Id. at 60.
53. Id. at 62.
54. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XLIX, § XIX, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 447, 453-54 (act "concerning Servants and Slaves").
55. Indeed, miscegenation was a criminal offense in Virginia until 1967, when the United
States Supreme Court declared Virginia's antimiscegenation statute unconstitutional. See Lov-
ing v. Virginia,. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). For cases involving the "crime" of miscegenation in
colonial Virginia, see ScoTr, supra note 27, at 281-83; see also Higginbotham & Kopytoff,
Racial Purity and Interracial Sex, supra note 12, at 1989-2007 (discussing attempts to discour-
age voluntary interracial sex).
56. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 54.
57. GUILD, supra note 2, at 82-83 (citing Act of 1824, ch. 35, §§ 2-3, 1823-24 Va. Acts 37,
37-38).
58. Abrahams v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. (I Rob.) 675, 683 (1842).
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Before patrols could enter a slave's quarters, however, they had to obtain
a search warrant because masters feared the destruction of their slave
property by overzealous patrols. 59
It is unclear whether slaves were entitled to bail prior to 1835. But
in that year the Virginia legislature recognized slaves' limited right to
bail:
Whereas, doubts have arisen whether slaves are bailable, it is
enacted that slaves shall be let to bail who are apprehended for
crimes not punishable with death or dismemberment, and if the
crime be so punishable and only a light suspicion of guilt fall on
the party, he shall be bailable. No slave shall be bailed after
conviction of any felony.6°
Slaves were of course incapable of posting their own bail and thus de-
pended on a free person to secure their temporary release until a commis-
sion of oyer and terminer could be convened.
Inability to obtain bail could have serious consequences for one
forced to endure the cruelties of the county jail. Some slaves died be-
cause of harsh jail conditions.6' Many suffered from frostbite,62 which
caused the death of at least one slave.63 In another case a jailed slave
who had been condemned to die but was recommended for a pardon
"was under the Necessity, from the Inclemency of the Weather, of hav-
ing his right Leg and left Foot cut off."64
59. Daniel J. Flanigan, The Criminal Law of Slavery and Freedom, 1800-1868, at 81
(1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University).
60. GUILD, supra note 2, at 163 (citing Act of 1835, ch. 63, 1834-35 Va. Acts 45, 45).
61. Scor, supra note 27, at 203 n.35. An 1863 statute mentions a slave who died in jail,
although the cause of death was not indicated: "The governor is directed to deliver to B.B.
and J.W. Cooley, an infant child of the slave Harriet, who was condemned to be hung, but who
died in the jail at Richmond before execution of sentence." See GUILD, supra note 2, at 92
(citing Act of 1836, ch. 87, § 1, 1835-36 Va. Acts 115, 115).
62. Scor, supra note 27, at 203 n.35.
63. Id. at 310 n.65.
64. Id.; see also Higginbotham, Ten Precepts, supra note 11 (discussing the ninth precept
of slavery, which provides: "Deprive blacks of any freedom of movement, freedom of associa-
tion, and any opportunity to resist, rebel, or flee."). White fear of slave insurrection and the
need of slaveowners to exert complete control over their property combined to produce scores
of legal restrictions on blacks' freedom of movement. The authors have noted at least 81
legislative acts concerning runaways alone in the Virginia statutes.
The early legal record of Virginia appears relatively color-blind in its attempt to control
runaways. See GUILD, supra note 2, at 37 (citing Act of 1642, Act XXII, in 1 HENING'S
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 254, 254-55 (not specifying race as a factor in the
branding (with an "R") of runaways)). By 1680, however, the movements of blacks were, to
paraphrase Justice Thurgood Marshall speaking of a later period, increasingly "single[d] out
... and give[n] ... special treatment" in the Virginia legal system: "No negro... or slave may
... go from his owner's plantation without a certificate and then only on necessary occasions;
the punishment twenty lashes on the bare back, well laid on." Id. at 46 (citing Act of 1680,
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In Dabney v. Taliaferro65 a slaveowner brought suit against the
sheriff and jailor, Dabney, to recover the value of his slave, Bartlett, who
had been jailed as a runaway. 6 It seems that the "slave was rendered
entirely useless to his master, by neglect of duty, on the part of the de-
fendant.., in not furnishing [in the middle of winter] diet, fire, and bed
covering."67 As a result Bartlett "became diseased and frost-bitten from
cold, crippled and maimed. ' 6' The supreme court of appeals affirmed the
judgment for the slaveowner in the amount of $400.69 Of course, the
irony in this case is that the person who actually endured the pain and
suffering because of the frostbite had no right for damages under the
law-only his master did.
Jail conditions were so horrible that in 1823 the Virginia legislature
was prompted to enact a statute providing that when jailed slaves were
not receiving adequate clothing, it was the jailor's duty to supply them
with "proper Negro clothing or other necessaries."' " As Dabney illus-
trates, however, such legislative enactments did not necessarily protect
the slave.
C. The Pretrial Procedural Nonrights of Free Blacks
Lest it be assumed that procedural deprivations were based on the
slave's bonded status as opposed to his race, a bill passed in 1832 re-
moved all doubts. The legislation provided that free blacks and mulat-
toes were thereafter to be tried in the same manner as slaves except in
cases of homicide and other capital offenses.71 Thus, in noncapital felony
and misdemeanor cases, free blacks and mulattoes were no longer tried in
the white man's court and became, in the eyes of the criminal law, indis-
tinguishable from slaves. Scholars have suggested that this legislation
was enacted in the aftermath of the Nat Turner rebellion,72 out of fear or
Act X, in 2 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 481, 481-82); HIGGINBOTHAM,
IN THE MATrER OF COLOR, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting Justice Thurgood Marshall).
By 1832, in the wake of the Nat Turner rebellion, discussed infra note 72, restrictions on
the movements of slaves were extended to "free" blacks and mulattoes. See GUILD, supra note
2, at 107-08 (citing Act of 1832, ch. XII, 1831-32 Va. Acts 21, 21-22).
65. 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 256 (1826).
66. Id. at 256.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 259, 263.
70. GUILD, supra note 2, at 81 (citing Act of 1823, ch. 30, § 13, 1822-23 Va. Acts 31, 34).
71. Id. at 106 (citing Act of 1832, ch. XXII, § 11, 1831-32 Va. Acts 20, 22); see also Act
of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. XXVI, § 1, 1847-48 Va. Acts 162, 162 (act "to reduce into one the
several acts concerning crimes and punishments, and proceedings in criminal cases").
72. Nat Turner was born in Southampton County, Virginia in 1800. A literate man, well-
versed in the Bible, he considered himself a prophet to whom the Holy Spirit had given in-
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revenge.73
As for bail,74 an 1848 statute extended to free blacks and mulattoes
essentially the same bail terms applicable to slaves: "If the offense be a
felony and the party charged a slave or free Negro, except in the case of
free Negroes charged with felonious homicide, or any offense punishable
with death, the magistrate shall bail or commit him for trial at the next
succeeding court." 75 Notably, this same statute-which provided that
slaves and free blacks be tried "without a jury, upon a charge entered of
record and not by presentment, information or indictment" 76 -also pro-
vided that "[c]riminal proceedings against Indians and persons of Indian
descent shall be the same as against white persons." 7  The statute drew
clear racial lines separating black people from all others.
The 1832 legislation was devastating indeed for free blacks and mu-
struction to begin a slave rebellion in 1831. After delaying the uprising for a number of weeks,
Turner and five fellow slaves killed five members of his master's family. Aided by 60 other
slaves, Turer's uprising killed 55 whites in the space of 48 hours, but an attempted march on
the county seat of Jerusalem was thwarted by the local militia. Although Turner himself was
not captured and executed until several weeks later, the immediate response of whites was
swift and brutal. In one day, over 120 blacks were lynched and many more were maimed and
beaten in a "reign of terror." John W. Cromwell, The Aftermath of Nat Turner's Insurrection,
5 J. NEGRO HisT. 208, 209-12 (1920).
Philip J. Schwarz has shown that Turner's actions, while dramatic in their scope, were not
unique in early nineteenth-century Virginia. Between 1800 and 1834, 66 blacks were executed
and another 34 transported out of the Commonwealth for "conspiracy and insurrections."
SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 248; see also id. at 255-60 (describing several insurrections and the
trials that followed).
73. The extension of slaves' legal handicaps to free blacks and mulattoes expressed whites'
deepening hostility toward all blacks in the aftermath of Nat Turner's rebellion. See supra
note 72. Elements in the Virginia House of Delegates and Governor John Floyd sought the
forcible removal of free blacks from the Commonwealth. Although after lengthy debate no
such act was passed, the Virginia legislature in 1833 appropriated $18,000 a year, payable to
the American Colonization Society, to encourage the removal of free blacks to Liberia. See
Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free," supra note 6, at 32. The migration of
free blacks into the Commonwealth was also prohibited by an Act of 1834. See GUILD, supra
note 2, at 109-10 (citing Act of 1834, ch. 68, §§ 1-12, 1833-34 Va. Acts 77, 77-81).
Cromwell also cites the fears of Virginia delegates that free blacks would be more suscep-
tible to Northern abolitionists' pressures than would slaves. Accordingly, the House of Dele-
gates removed the "indulgent kindnesses" and "many instances of solicitude for their welfare"
which Governor Floyd perceived were accorded to free blacks under Virginia law. See Crom-
well, supra note 72, at 218-30 (quoting Gov. John Floyd's Annual Message). For indications
that such "kindness" and "solicitude" were little in evidence prior to the Turner rebellion, see
Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free," supra note 6, at 17.
74. For a fuller discussion of the denial of bail to slaves and free blacks, and to whites who
married blacks or mulattoes, see supra notes 54, 60-64 and accompanying text.
75. GUILD, supra note 2, at 168 (citing Act of 1848, ch. XXVI, § 1, 1847-48 Va. Acts
162, 162).
76. Id. (quoting Act of 1848, ch. XXVI, sec. 1, 1847-48 Va. Acts 162, 162).
77. Id. at 167 (quoting Act of 1848, ch. XI, § 27, 1847-48 Va. Acts 121, 124).
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lattoes because it removed important procedural rights. Ten years ear-
lier, in. Commonwealth v. Tyree,78 the general court recognized the
fundamental importance of being tried as a free man. John Tyree, a
black man, was sent by the examining court to a superior trial court to
stand trial on the charge of raping a woman.79 (Her race was not speci-
fied.) The following day one William Tompkins went before the superior
court and claimed that Tyree's real name was Armistead and that Armis-
tead was his runaway slave.80 Tompkins petitioned to have the indict-
ment quashed on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to try his
slave.8' The case was adjourned to the general court due to the novelty
and difficulty of the issue.82
The general court, in an opinion by Judge Brockenbrough (with
Judge Daniel dissenting without written opinion), held that if an examin-
ing court, after inquiring into a black defendant's status as a slave or free
man, sent the defendant to trial as a free man and he was indicted as
such, the superior court could address the issue of his status as free man
or bondsman only if the defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the
court by a plea in abatement.83 A jury then would decide whether he
was a slave or a free man, which would determine the manner in which
he was to be tried. 4 If, however, the prisoner did not plead in abatement
the jurisdictional issue, no evidence intended to show his status as a slave
was admissible.85
Judge Brockenbrough distinguished Tyree's case from capital cases
in which the court would inquire whether the accused was non compos
mentis (mentally incompetent), 86 or "mute from obstinacy, or from the
visitation of God."8 7 In those cases the trial of the accused was to be
suspended.88 Here, in contrast, "the consequence of sustaining the objec-
tion to the jurisdiction.., would be, that instead of punishing him [as a
free black] in the Penitentiary, he might be condemned [as a slave] to lose
his life."8 9 Thus, whereas an examination of a mentally incompetent per-
son would operate in favorem vitae (in favor of liberty), an examination
78. 2 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 262 (1821).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 262-63.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 264.
83. Id. at 266-67.
84. Id.
85. Ird. at 267.
86. Id. at 266.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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to determine whether a slave was posing as a free man would operate
against life. Judge Brockenbrough concluded: "The Court cannot,
therefore, convert a principle dictated by humanity into an instrument of
cruelty."9
Tyree was a curious decision, because a slave posing as a free man
presumably would never expose his status as a slave and challenge the
court's jurisdiction to hear his case. The superior court left the burden of
establishing a black person's status as a free man or slave to the examin-
ing court. If the examining court decided that the defendant was a free
man, then essentially, the inquiry was at an end.
This case shows the importance of one's status as a free man-to be
free could mean life, whereas to be enslaved could mean death. Subse-
quent Virginia legislation also reflected the value of this characterization.
Twenty-five years later, the Virginia legislature provided as follows:
Whenever a colored person is charged with any crime, as a free
person, any person who claims such person of color may assert
his claim and a jury must determine the claim.
If any person of color shall be confined in the jail or peni-
tentiary under sentence as a free person, the question whether
the person is or is not the slave of a petitioner shall be tried by a
jury; the Commonwealth's Attorney shall act as counsel for the
prisoner, as well as for the Commonwealth. If the person is
found to be a slave, he shall be delivered to the owner, who
shall give bond conditioned to have the slave delivered for pros-
ecution, unless he is fairly sold at public auction and removed
from Virginia.91
Two other statutes highlight the precarious legal status of slaves who
sought freedom. A 1786 act had allowed that "[o]ne being detained in
slavery, and suing for his freedom, shall be tried in the same manner as a
free man. No person having an interest in a slave shall sit upon the trial
of such a slave." 92 An act of 1840, however, stated that "[s]laves entitled
to their freedom, after a term of years or after the death of another per-
son, shall be tried as slaves."93
Even during the period when free blacks were allowed trial by jury,
the law precluded a jury of one's peers because blacks could not serve as
90. Id.
91. GUILD, supra note 2, at 115 (citing Act of 1846, ch. 95, § 1, 1845-46 Va. Acts 67, 67).
92. Act of 1786, ch. LVIII, § I, in 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at
345, 345, quoted in GUILD, supra note 2, at 158.
93. GUILD, supra note 2, at 165 (citing Act of 1840, ch. 61, § 2, 1839-40 Va. Acts 51, 51-
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veniremen.94 In light of the lynch-mob mentality that often
predominated at the trials of blacks accused of crimes against whites, it is
unclear which fate was worse: to be deprived of a jury trial, or to be tried
by a panel of angry and hostile jurors."
D. No Right to a Unanimous Judgment of Conviction
Since before the American Revolution, the right to a unanimous
verdict in criminal cases has been a fundamental right in American juris-
prudence.96 The requirement of a unanimous jury verdict guaranteed
this right to free Virginians.97 Because slaves and, at certain times, free
blacks, were denied the right to a jury trial,98 a logical alternative would
have been to require that they be convicted and sentenced to death only
upon the unanimous judgment of the justices. At first, however, slaves
did not even have that protection.99 A 1772 statute provided that "sen-
tence of death shall not be passed upon a slave unless four of the court,
being a majority, shall concur."" 0 Thus, a slave could be hanged, dis-
membered, or whipped based on a mere majority vote of the judges.
In 1786 the law was amended to require unanimous judgments for
94. See Act of Aug. 1734, ch. VII, §§ II-III, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 403-04 (act "for better regulating the trial of criminals, for Capital Offences").
95. As to whether free blacks benefitted from being tried by a jury composed of white
men, see Ball v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 726 (1837), in which a jury convicted a free
black woman of murdering a white man, despite the trial court's belief that the evidence was
wholly insufficient to support the verdict. Id. at 727-31. To the same effect is Grayson v.
Commonwealth, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 712, 713-24 (1849), subsequent appeal, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.)
613, 615-19 (1850), discussed infra notes 585-603 and accompanying text. Cf Commonwealth
v. Fells, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 613, 615-20 (1838) (jury unable to reach verdict in the trial of a free
black accused of assaulting a free white with intent to kill, an offense punishable by death).
96. In federal criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous verdicts for con-
viction. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that it is universally understood throughout the history of Sixth Amendment adjudica-
tion that a unanimous verdict is an essential element of a jury trial); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (unanimity is one of the indispensable features of
federal jury trial); see also Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) ("[U]nanimity in
jury verdicts is required where the Sixth... Amendment appl[ies]."); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (same); United States v. Smedes, 760 F.2d 109, 111 (6th Cir. 1985)
(unanimous verdicts required in federal criminal trials); United States v. Pachay, 711 F.2d 488,
494 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J., concurring) (same).
97. ScorT, supra note 27, at 101.
98. For a discussion of slaves' jury trial rights, see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying
text.
99. Act of Oct. 1786, ch. LVIII, § I, in 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 345 (act "directing the method of trying Slaves charged with treason or felony"); see also
Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. XXVI, § 4, 1847-48 Va. Acts 162, 162 (act "to reduce into one the
several acts concerning crimes and punishments, and proceedings in criminal cases").
100. GUILD, supra note 2, at 157 (citing Act of 1772, ch. IX, in 8 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 42, at 522-23).
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conviction whenever slaves were charged with treason or felony.101 Six
years later the legislature again changed the law to provide that in all
slave trials, the judgment of conviction had to be based on a unanimous
verdict.1"2 Not until 1748 werefree blacks entitled to a unanimous ver-
dict of guilt in all criminal trials: "The trial of a Negro shall be on con-
fession or oath of one or more witnesses, but if the court is of divided
opinion, the Negro shall be acquitted."10 3 Not until 1819 was the law
amended to provide that slaves could not be condemned to death unless
the justices were unanimous."° Moreover, by an 1848 act, slaves could
not be executed, nor free blacks sentenced to the penitentiary, unless all
the trial justices agreed. °10
E. Restrictions on the Right to. Testify in Court
Perhaps one of the most basic procedural deprivations that blacks,
enslaved and free, suffered was their preclusion from testifying against
whites and, during certain periods, from testifying against other blacks,
mulattoes, and Indians.1 1 6 With one stroke of the pen, the slave was
denied the right to be heard, to call witnesses on his behalf, and to con-
front the witnesses against him. 10 7
101. Id. at 158 (citing Act of 1786, ch. LVIII, in 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 345).
102. Id at 160 (citing Act of 1792, ch. 41, in I THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA
122, 122-30 (Samuel Shepherd ed., Richmond 1835-36)).
103. Id at 155 (citing Act of 1748, ch. XXXVIII, § 6, in 6 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 42, at 104-06); see ScoTr, supra note 27, at 46.
104. Our research has failed to uncover this statute; however, the general court referred to
this legislation in its opinion in Elvira, A Slave, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 561, 562-63 (1865), dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 170-81.
105. GUILD, supra note 2, at 168 (citing Act of 1848, ch. XXVI, 1847-48 Va. Acts 162,
162).
106. Concerning the competence of mulatto witnesses, see Dean v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.
(4 Gratt.) 541, 541-43 (1847), discussed in Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Inter-
racial Sex, supra note 12, at 1980.
107. This restriction applied not just to slaves, free blacks, and mulattoes, but to Indians as
well. In contrast to Virginia's preclusion of a slave's right to speak in his own defense, the
Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. In consideration of the fundamental value of the right to speak in one's
own defense, the Supreme Court has found that the right of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion is an essential and fundamental component of a fair criminal trial. See, eg., Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); Parker v.
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-65 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
The right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him is essential to the interest of
fairness, so that the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the accusers and to ensure
the integrity of the fact-finding process. See, eg., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-20 (1988);
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). In a depar-
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Originally, a 1705 statute prohibited all blacks, slave or free, from
giving evidence of any kind under oath. 108 Blacks accused of criminal
acts, some punishable by death, had no right to testify under oath in their
own defense.' 09 Although a court might permit them to speak, their
words were considered wholly unreliable, as their testimony was un-
sworn.I" The original rationale for this legislation was that blacks, mu-
lattoes, Indians, and others who had not been Christianized were
heathens who could not be sworn to tell the truth: "[P]opish recusants
convict [Roman Catholics], negroes, mulattoes and Indian servants, and
others, not being christians, shall be deemed and taken to be persons
incapable in law, to be witnesses in any cases whatsoever." ''
Then, in 1723, the testimony of blacks, mulattoes, and Indians, bond
and free, was permitted, but only against slaves accused of capital of-
fenses, and only with "pregnant circumstances"-that is, with independ-
ent proof of their veracity." 2 In addition, those who were Christians
ture from the common law, the Supreme Court has held that the defendant in a criminal trial
has the right under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to take the stand and testify
in his own defense. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 43, 49-52 (1987).
In addition, the right to confrontation is deemed to be so essential to a fair trial that even
the absence of the defendant from the trial may violate the right to confrontation and due
process. See, eg., United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985); Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
Despite the acknowledged fundamental nature of the right of confrontation, however, the
right is not absolute. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990); United States v. Beau-
lieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990). Yet the standard of
exception may be stringent. See, e.g., Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020, 1022 (holding that use of a one-
way mirror which permitted the defendant to see the witnesses, but did not permit them to see
the defendant, was a violation of defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights). But
cf Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166-67 (upholding Maryland procedure pursuant to which child testi-
fied on one-way closed circuit television).
108. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XIX, § XXXI, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 287, 298 (act "for establishing the General Court, and for regulating and settling the
proceedings therein"). At some point early in Virginia's existence as a colony, sworn testi-
mony of blacks (Christian blacks, at least) apparently was permitted. See MINUTES OF THE
COUNCIL AND GENERAL COURT, supra note 27, at 33 (citing Re Tuchinge (Va. Gen. Ct. 1624)
(taking the sworn testimony of "John Phillip A negro Christened in England 12 yeers since" in
the trial of a white man)).
109. As Schwarz has stated, "their forced silence before the bench made true justice impos-
sible." SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 51.
110. For an example of a case in which a slave was permitted to give unsworn testimony in
his own defense, see the synopsis of the trial of the slave Will, discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 139-42.
111. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XIX, § XXXI, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 287, 298 (act "for establishing the General Court, and for regulating and settling the
procedings therein"); see SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 51; STROUD, supra note 17, at 46-47; see
also Winn v. Jones, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 74, 75 (1835) (finding that free black called as a witness on
behalf of plaintiff, a white man, was not competent to testify).
112. Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § III, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at
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were permitted to serve as witnesses in the general court." 3 In 1732,
however, the legislature determined that even the testimony of Christian
blacks, mulattoes, and Indians would not be allowed.' 4 The legislature
decided to prohibit these individuals from testifying, notwithstanding
their Christian status, because their "base and corrupt natures [meant
that] their testimony cannot certainly be depended upon."1 15  Hence-
forth, they could testify only at capital slave trials, and there only if ac-
companied by pregnant circumstances." 6 Thus, while their testimony
was considered too untrustworthy to be admitted at the trial of free per-
sons, it nevertheless could be admitted in the trial of slaves subject to
death or dismemberment.
In 1748, the Assembly again amended the law to provide that blacks
could testify in general only in capital slave trials, but that free Christian
blacks, Indians or mulattoes could testify against or between other
blacks, Indians, or mulattoes, slave or free." 7 According to Oliver
Chitwood, an early twentieth-century historian of colonial Virginia, the
effect of precluding such testimony was to relieve free blacks, Indians,
and mulattoes from satisfying their debts "because they could not be
proved in the court.""..8 Hence, the amendment permitting these groups
to testify was intended to insure that they would not escape payment of
their debts. 1 9 Even though they could testify, however, they rarely were
126, 127 (act "directing the trial of Slaves, committing capital crimes; and for the more effec-
tual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better government of Ne-
gros, Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free").
113. OLIVER P. CHrrwOOD, JUSTICE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 98 (1905).
114. Act of May 1732, ch. VII, § V, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at
325, 326-27 (act "for settling some doubts and differences of opinion in relation to the benefit
of Clergy; for allowing the same to Women; and taking away of Reading; and to disable certain
Persons, therein mentioned, to be Witnesses").
115. Id. at 327.
116. Id. § II, at 325.
117. Act of Oct. 1748, ch. XXXVIII, § XI, in 6 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 104, 107 (act "directing the trial of Slaves committing capital crimes, and for the
more effectual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better government
of negroes, mulattoes, and Indians, bond or free").
118. CHITWOoD, supra note 113, at 99.
119. In 1806, George Wythe, a Virginian who had signed the Declaration of Independence,
had been Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, and had been described by Thomas
Jefferson as "the most salutary influence on the course of my life," see DUMAS MALONE,
JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805-1809, at 137 (1974), was poisoned. Three
of Wythe's freed black servants also were poisoned. Two weeks after the poisoning, Wythe,
who was 81, and one of his servants, Michael Brown, died. IMOGENE E. BROWN, AMERICAN
ARISTIDES: A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE WYTHE 284-96 (1981).
The preliminary hearings of the case suggested strongly that Wythe's grandnephew,
George Wythe Sweeney, had administered the poisonings. Sweeney had amassed considerable
gambling debts, had forged six bank checks in his granduncle's name, and, along with Brown
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considered credible witnesses.
A 1785 legislative amendment precluded black or mulatto testimony
except in actions against blacks or in civil cases in which blacks were
parties.12 In 1801 the law was changed yet again to provide that blacks,
whether slave or free, could testify in "pleas of the Commonwealth for or
against Negroes, bond or free, or in civil pleas when free Negroes shall
alone be parties." '121 And by an 1818 law, no black, mulatto, or Indian
could testify except against or between blacks, mulattoes, or Indians.
122
This appears to have remained the law regarding such testimony until
the post-war enactment of 1866, which even then continued to restrict
blacks' testimony:
Colored persons and Indians shall, if otherwise competent, and
subject to the rules applicable to other persons, be admitted as
witnesses in the following cases: in all civil proceedings, where
a colored person or an Indian is a party; in all criminal pro-
ceedings in which a colored person or an Indian is a party, or in
which the court is of the opinion that there is probable cause to
believe that the offense was committed by a white person in
conjunction with a colored person or Indian.
The testimony of colored persons shall in all cases be given
ore tenus and not by deposition.1 23
One year later blacks finally were given the full and unrestricted right to
testify in Virginia. 2
Slaves and free blacks who were permitted to testify faced severe
penalties for perjury that were far harsher than any penalty imposed on
whites for the same offense. 121 Legislation provided that blacks or Indi-
ans who were not Christians and who were found to have perjured them-
and Wythe's other servants, was the main beneficiary of George Wythe's will. Arsenic powder
was found in the jail where Sweeney had been detained and arsenic-blotted papers were found
in his room and in the Wythe outhouses. Nevertheless, when placed on trial, Sweeney was
found not guilty of the poisonings primarily because the most telling evidence against him
"was gleaned from negroes, which is not permitted by our laws to go against a white man."
BROWN, supra, at 297 & n.2 (quoting RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Sept. 9, 1806).
120. GUILD, supra note 2, at 158 (citing Act of 1785, ch. LXXVII, in 12 HENING'S STAT-
UTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 182-83).
121. Id. at 161 (quoting Act of 1800, ch. 70, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA,
supra note 102, at 300, 300-01).
122. Id. at 163 (citing Act of 1818, ch. L, § 3, 1817-18 Va. Acts 66, 66).
123. Id. at 170 (citing Act of 1866, ch. 24, § 1, 1865-66 Va. Acts 89, 89-90).
124. Id. (citing Act of 1867, ch. 62, § 1, 1866-67 Va. Acts 81, 81 ("At the extra session it is
enacted that hereafter colored persons shall be competent to testify in this state as if white.")).
125. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 1748, ch. XXXVIII, § IX, in 6 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 42, at 104, 106-107 (act "directing the trial of slaves committing capital crimes; and
for the more effectual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better
government of negroes, mulattoes, and Indians, bond or free").
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selves were, "without further trial," to have their ears nailed to the
pillory and then chopped off, and, in addition, were to receive thirty-nine
lashes.126  Whites, on the other hand, were imprisoned or fined. 127
Hence, blacks, who were regarded as too "base and corrupt" to tell the
truth, were nevertheless held to a higher standard of truthfulness and
punished more severely than whites who, in light of their perceived
moral superiority, presumably should have known better.
F. No Right to Appeal
Slaves had no right to appeal a conviction from the oyer and termi-
ner courts, to petition for a new trial, or to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. 128 Whites, on the other hand, had such rights. 129 The inability
126. The charge to "every Negro, Mulatto, or Indian, not being a Christian," was as
follows:
You are brought hither as a witness; and, by the direction of the law, I am to tell you,
before you give your evidence, that you must tell the truth.... and that if it be found
hereafter, that you tell a lie, and give false testimony in this matter, you must, for so
doing, have both your ears nailed to the pillory, and cut off, and receive thirty-nine
lashes on your bare back, well laid on, at the common whipping-post.
Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § V, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 126,
127-28; see also Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § IV, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 126, 127 (act "directing the trial of Slaves, committing capital crimes; and for the
more effectual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better government
of Negros, Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free"). Such harsh punishments also were inflicted
on whites in the very early years of Virginia's existence, but as the legal system developed and
law enforcement became more systematic, Virginia repealed these Draconian measures---at
least with respect to whites. CHrrwaOD, supra note 113, at 83. These penalties, however,
continued to be meted out to blacks.
127. Act of Oct. 1789, ch. XXVI, § 2, in 13 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 34, 34-35 (act "against such as shall procure or commit wilful Perjury, and against
Embracery").
128. Act of Apr. 1692, Act III, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 102,
102-03 (act "for the more speedy prosecution of slaves committing Capitall Crimes"). Slaves
and free blacks could appeal misdemeanor convictions to the next term of lower courts with no
further right of appeal. Id
The slave's inability to appeal is significant for two reasons. First, it meant that there
were no reported appellate cases regarding slave crimes. One therefore might assume incor-
rectly that few if any cases were decided adversely to slaves rather than recognizing that there
were no reported adverse cases because of the system's total preclusion of appeals. Accord-
ingly, a scholar reviewing only the appellate cases might assume that there were no significant
injustices to blacks because of the absence of cases. To the contrary, the very absence of cases
demonstrates racial bias because of the system's total preclusion of appeal. Some scholars may
have been too laudatory of the appellate system because they were unaware of the inability of
blacks to file appeals. See our discussion of A.E. Keir Nash, supra note 39, and sources cited
therein.
129. See ScoTr, supra note 27, at 106-07, 112-21. The Habeas Corpus Act was extended
formally to Virginia in 1710. Id. at 78. The writ, however, was rarely used. Id. at 58-59. By
case law, free blacks had the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Commonwealth v.
Jones, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 558, 559-60 (1845); DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 438, 449
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to appeal meant that the judgments of the slave courts, presided over by
local county justices, were shielded from scrutiny by higher Virginia
tribunals. 130
These local county justices were commonly regarded as unlearned in
the law, susceptible to local pressures and prejudices, and capable of
committing grave legal errors. Therefore, many people believed that
these local judges should not be entrusted with deciding cases involving
life and limb.1 31 This belief, however, applied to whites only; these same
judges composed the commissions of oyer and terminer that presided
over capital slave trials. 32 Slaves were therefore doubly damned: not
only were they deprived of trial by jury but, in addition, they were tried
by county justices deemed too inept and unlearned to preside over white
people's capital cases.
Procedural and technical errors, as well as substantive legal errors,
were commonplace. These "var[ied] from the admission of improper evi-
(1836). When slaves petitioned for their freedom, however, habeas corpus was not the appro-
priate route. See Higginbotham & Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breathe Free," supra note 24,
at 7-49.
In Cropper v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 849 (1843), a "free woman of colour" was
tried and convicted of simple larceny by a court of oyer and terminer and sentenced to five
years in the penitentiary (based on a prior conviction for petit larceny). Id. at 879. The wo-
man petitioned the general court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that by statute, see
Act of 1832, ch. XXII, § 9, 1831-32 Va. Acts 20, 22, blacks or mulattoes, whether free or
enslaved, were to be tried by a justice of the peace when charged with simple larceny valued at
$20 or less. Cropper, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) at 879-80. The general court granted the writ because
the court of oyer and terminer lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 881.
130. The slave's inability to appeal severely limited the number of reported cases. Slave
cases did not reach the high court except when slaves were the victims, rather than the perpe-
trators, of criminal acts. As Philip Schwarz has shown, such cases involving black victims
were themselves rare as court officials "knowing how easily the attempt to prosecute a white
person for killing a slave could end in acquittal or with a pardon ... may rarely have bothered
to bring charges." SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 79. Schwarz's recent study of slaves and the
criminal laws of Virginia has substantially supplemented the earlier studies of Arthur P. Scott
(1930), see ScoTr, supra note 27, and Daniel Flanigan (1973 & 1974), see Flanigan, supra
notes 17 & 59. By sifting through years and years of records and primary sources, Flanigan,
Scott, and Schwarz have provided a treasure-trove of information concerning the slave's status
in the Virginia criminal justice system.
Scott argued that it is impossible to determine exactly how many slaves were tried for
murder, because the records are incomplete. ScOTT, supra note 27, at 204 n.37. He con-
cluded, however, that even where they are complete, there were only a few trials. Id. at 204.
Slave trials averaged about one per year for each county, and most of those were for stealing.
Ia at 312 nn.70 & 72. Schwarz accepted that there were relatively few trials in the 17th and
early 18th centuries but that the comprehensive slave code enacted in 1805 and the rapid rise
in the slave population thereafter led to a substantial increase. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 38-
39.
131. See Flanigan, supra note 59, at 86-91.
132. Id.
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dence to ignorance of substantive criminal law." '33
In one case, though the witness who procured the slave's ad-
missions acknowledged that he thought them inadmissible, and
though the record itself revealed that the confession was ob-
tained through promise of favor, the court still allowed it to go
to the jury. In another case not only was the slave offered a
lesser punishment in exchange for his confession but he had
endured a whipping from his master before he confessed. 34
In another case,
[o]ne lawyer complained that the court had convicted a slave
through a misunderstanding of the legal definition of burglary.
Another attorney contended that the court had handed down
an unauthorized sentence-death where the law called only for
sale and transportation. The Princess Anne County Court, ac-
cording to one petitioner, permitted the master "frequently to
interrupt the prisoner's counsel, during his arguments. This ex-
ample was followed by the witnesses. The latter, in defiance of
the remonstrances of the prisoner's counsel[,] interrogated each
other. What a child (who was too young to be admitted as a
witness) was heard to say was received in testimony; and (per-
haps improperly) evidence of the character of the accused was
admitted." '35
The fallibility and biases of the justices of the peace were so great that
one lawyer, petitioning on behalf of a slave convicted of murder, was
prompted to say that" '[but for the excitement which prevailed, I could
not have conceived such a sentence possible, by a reflecting court.' ""36
Similarly, Schwarz recounted the case against the slave Robin:
[I]n a December 9, 1724 trial, the Lancaster County oyer and
terminer judges could not secure a guilty verdict on the first
vote. Rather than record a verdict of not guilty, as most other
133. Flanigan, supra note 17, at 544. For a more comprehensive discussion of these proce-
dural, technical, and substantive errors, see Flanigan, supra note 59, at 98-99.
134. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 98 & n.52 (citing Archives of Virginia, Richmond, Va.,
Executive Papers, Letters Received [hereinafter Va. Archives], Petition accompanying Com-
monwealth v. Harry (Jan. 11-21, 1828 folder); id., Letter from Jacob Swoope to Governor,
Sept. 11, 1829; id., Petitions, n.d. (1834 M-Z folder)). Since 1936 the United States Supreme
Court has held that state convictions of murder that rest solely upon confessions extorted by
torture are void under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279, 285 (1936).
135. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 98-99 & n.53 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Letter
from M.M. Patton to Governor, June 12, 1828 (June 1-10 folder); id., Letter from J.N. Baker
to Governor & Executive Council, Oct. 5, 1828 (Oct. 1-10 folder); id., Letter from Everard
Hall to Governor & Executive Council, Sept. 30, 1829).
136. Id. at 116 & n.83 (quoting Va. Archives, supra note 134, Letter from Everard Hall to
Governor & Executive Council, Sept. 30, 1829).
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justices would have done, those in favor simply delayed pro-
ceedings until the next day, when other hanging judges joined
them to form a majority against Robin.1 17
This is not to suggest that these judges were wholly incapable of
fairness. There were instances in which the justices recommended that a
slave be given mercy. Sometimes the justices even acquitted slaves de-
spite the testimony of white men. 3 In Negro Will his Tryall,13 9 for ex-
ample, a slave was accused of "breaking Gaol"-or breaking out of
jail.1" The slave pleaded not guilty, and upon his trial, the jailer testified
under oath that Will had escaped from the jail and was absent for several
days.14' The court heard what the slave Will had to say in his own de-
fense, even though, as discussed previously, slaves were precluded from
giving sworn testimony. 142 Despite the jailer's testimony, the court
found Will innocent. 143 He also was acquitted of robbery, the underlying
offense for which he was jailed."4 Will had pleaded not guilty to that
offense as well, and the victim did not come forward to give evidence. 145
From the sparse account of the case, it is impossible to determine
why the court acquitted the slave of breaking out of jail. Perhaps the
court considered the underlying charge of robbery unwarranted and un-
just, causing the judges to empathize with Will for trying to escape pun-
ishment for a crime he did not commit-a crime punishable by death. 146
The record of the case neither indicates why the court rejected the jailer's
testimony nor describes what the slave said in his own defense.
In the 1734 case of Negroe Peter and Beshoof's Tryal,147 two slaves
were acquitted of murdering one John Shaw. 141 Shaw's race was not
specified; he was referred to merely as "one of our Lord the King's Liege
People."' 49 The two slave defendants were acquitted even though the
137. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 76 n.19.
138. See 10 AM. LEGAL RECORDS., CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA,
RICHMOND COUNTY 1710-54, at 18, 151, 215 (Peter C. Hoffer & William B. Scott eds., 1984)
[hereinafter RICHMOND COUNTY PROCEEDINGS].
139. Id. at 16-18.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 106-27 and accompanying text.
143. RICHMOND COUNTY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 138, at 17.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XI, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at
269, 269.
147. RICHMOND COUNTY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 138, at 150.
148. Id.
149. Id. The term "liege" at one time meant "vassal," but during this period of time sim-
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court heard the testimony of four witnesses against them."'
In a rather unusual case, an oyer and terminer court recommended
that a slave convicted of burglary be given mercy by the Governor, "it
appearing to this court that it is the First Offence of this Kind by him
Committed and Seeming to them for the circumstances of the case
Doubtfull Whether he was Sensible of the crime for which he is Sen-
tenced."'5 Yet these occasional displays of mercy did not negate the
fact that slaves were placed at substantial risk of life in being tried by
local judges, without recourse to an appeal.
In 1823 a slave attempted to appeal his conviction to the general
court in the case of Peter, "'a slave," v. Commonwealth.'52 A commission
of oyer and terminer for Hampshire County had found Peter guilty of
murder and sentenced him to hang.' 53 Peter had applied for a writ of
error to the appellate court, and the application was denied.' 54 He then
attempted to appeal the superior court's decision through an application
to the general court for a writ of error.'55 In an opinion by Judge White,
the general court noted the novelty of the slave's attempt to appeal, as no
such appeal had occurred in the 150 years that slave trials had taken
place in Virginia.' 56 The court held that the legislature had never in-
tended "that the judgment of these Courts of Oyer and Terminer should
be submitted to the revision and correction of any other Legal Tribu-
nal .... [T]he only relief which that Law leaves to the convict, is to be
sought from the Executive."' 57
ply meant "citizen" or "loyal subject." See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 1305-06 (4th ed. 1976).
150. RICHMOND COUNTY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 138, at 151. In a third case of this
kind, a slave named Samson was acquitted of breaking and entering and stealing a gelding
worth 10 pounds sterling despite the testimony of the gelding's owner. Id. at 215. Unfortu-
nately, the record of the proceedings of the Richmond County court of oyer and terminer
contains only a brief summary of each case, giving the charge and the outcome. No explana-
tion of the court's ruling is set forth. Id.
151. Id. at 228. "'Sensible' meant compos mentis; idiots or a madmen [sic] could not be
held to have intended to commit a felony because they could not control their own acts. Gov-
ernors could pardon insane persons for lesser felonies; the king pardoned, upon the governor's
application, in murders and treasons." Id. at 228 n.146; see also SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at
24 (discussing dismissal of charges against a slave named Will on the ground that "he was a
Lunatic & not in his proper Senses").
152. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 330 (1823).
153. Id. at 330.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 330-31.
157. Id. at 331 (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. 803, 805, 5
Leigh 740,742 (1835) (holding that "a writ of error does not lie to the judgment of a county or
corporation court sitting as a court of oyer and terminer for the trial of a free negro or mu-
latto"); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. 747, 749, 4 Leigh 693, 696 (1834) (holding that a
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In the 1854 case Ex parte Morris5 the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals implicitly acknowledged the importance of being able to appeal
a conviction. William Morris, a free black, was tried and convicted by
the mayor of Richmond for violating an 1849 law prohibiting free blacks
from returning to the Commonwealth after having travelled to a non-
slaveholding state.'59 He was required to give a bond for $500-a huge
sum of money in those days-providing that he would leave the state
within ten days. 6' Morris attempted to appeal the mayor's decision to
the county court. The mayor refused to permit the appeal 61 despite
Morris' insistence that he had an absolute right to appeal from a misde-
meanor conviction by virtue of a Virginia statute providing that "[i]n the
case of a negro convicted, of a misdemeanor, by a justice, there may be
an appeal from the decision to the county or corporation court, by the
negro, if free, or if he be a slave, by his owner."' 62
Morris then applied to the circuit court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the mayor to allow the appeal, but the circuit court refused to
issue the writ. 6 a It was only upon applying to the highest court in the
state for a writ of supersedeas, which the court allowed, that Morris's
right to an appeal was recognized.' In an opinion by Judge Lee, the
court remarked: "Unless his right to the appeal be asserted, there will be
a failure of justice ... .""' Thus, Morris, a free black, was able to cir-
cumvent this recognized failure of justice that had denied slaves a right
of appeal for approximately 200 years.
Morris is also a classic example of most of the precepts of slavery.' 66
By ordinance, Morris was "powerless" to travel to any "nonslaveholding
state."' 167 If he did travel to a free state, such as Pennsylvania or Ohio,
he could not return to visit his family-and for the offense of entering a
nonslaveholding state, a free black upon return would be imprisoned in-
writ of error does not lie from the general court to a judgment of the county or corporation
court sitting as a court of oyer and terminer). For a discussion of executive clemency, see infra
notes 187-216 and accompanying text.
158. 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 292 (1854).
159. Id. at 292.
160. Id. at 292-93.
161. Id.
162. 2 THE CODE OF VIRGINIA, WITH THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITU-
TION OF VIRGINIA, tit. 55, ch. CCXII, § 15 (Richmond, William F. Ritchie 1849).
163. Morris, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) at 293.
164. Id. at 295.
165. Id. at 296.
166. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
167. Morris, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) at 292.
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definitely if he could not post a $500 bond.16
It was not until 1865, when the War Between the States was fast
approaching its end, that the supreme court of appeals (which had re-
placed the general court as the highest court in Virginia), 69 permitted a
slave to challenge a conviction by the county court. Elvira, A Slave, 70
concerned a slave woman accused of attempting to poison her master's
family. In a remarkable demonstration of judicial activism, the supreme
court of appeals proceeded to rule on the merits in favor of the slave,
without deciding the important jurisdictional question presented, and or-
dered that she be discharged and returned to her master.17' Elvira, who
belonged to one C. Ford, had been tried by a commission of oyer and
terminer. Four of the five justices presiding found her guilty and sen-
tenced her to sale and transportation beyond the Confederate States.' 72
One justice dissented.173 Curiously, it was Elvira's master who applied to
the judge of the circuit court of the city of Petersburg for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the conviction was illegal because only four of
the five justices concurred in the judgment.'7 4 An 1819 statute provided
that no slave tried for a felony could be condemned unless all of the
justices sitting agreed that the slave was guilty.'75 The circuit court al-
lowed the writ but concluded that the judgment of the majority of the
court was legal and thus upheld the conviction.' 76 The slave's master
then applied on her behalf to a judge of the supreme court of appeals for
a writ of error, which was allowed.' 77
Justice Moncure, writing for the court, chose to ignore the jurisdic-
tional issue whether the circuit court and his own court had the authority
and power to entertain the writs: "It is unnecessary to express any opin-
ion on the question arising in this case as to the jurisdiction, as well of
this court as the court below; this court being equally divided in opinion
on that question, and being therefore unable to decide the case on that
168. Id. at 292-93.
169. See HELEN T. CATTERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY
AND THE NEGRO 75 (1926). For a more detailed discussion of the structure of the Virginia
courts in the period covered by this Article, see supra note 44.
170. 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 561 (1865).
171. Id. at 570-71.
172. Id. at 562, 564-69.
173. Id. at 561.
174. Id. at 561-62.
175. Id. at 562 (citing 1 REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, ch. 111, § 32, at 421,
428-29 (Thomas Ritchie, Richmond 1819)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 565.
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ground." 178 Consequently, the court proceeded to rule that in any trial
in which a slave is accused of an offense punishable by death, the judg-
ment of guilt must be unanimous. 179 Because Elvira had been charged
with an offense punishable by death, the fact that she was sentenced in-
stead to sale and transportation did not negate the requirement of una-
nimity. 180 The court held that, based on the lack of unanimity as to
Elvira's culpability, she in effect had been acquitted. The court ordered
that she be discharged and returned to her master.18 1
The Elvira case stands in stark contrast to an earlier, 1829 case, in
which Lieutenant Governor O.V. Daniel reprimanded the county court
of Goochland for sentencing a slave to death despite a nonunanimous
conviction by the court.18 2 The Lieutenant Governor declared "the de-
tention of the slave from the day of the trial [to be] tortious and
illegal." 18 3
It is, at the very least, ironic that it was not until 1865 that a slave
was able to obtain appellate review of a conviction by the court of oyer
and terminer. Within a matter of months, the Confederacy, the separate
system for trying slaves, and even slavery itself, would cease to exist. No
one can know what prompted Justice Moncure and his brethren first to
sidestep the important jurisdictional issue and then to rule in favor of the
slave Elvira.184 Perhaps the decision was prompted by the recognition
that the South was losing the war and a consequent, implicit acknowl-
edgement that this system of trying slaves could no longer be justified
and legitimized. The decision is significant not only because the supreme
court of appeals was unanimous on the merits but also because, as al-
ready noted, half the court agreed that the slave had the right to obtain
appellate review of the lower court's conviction. 8 5 Of course, the result
may simply be explained by the willingness of.Elvira's master to petition
on her behalf to have the appeal granted, thus suggesting his belief in her
innocence. Whatever the reasons for the decision, its impact was negligi-
ble: "Until this aberrant decision, which benefited only one person, Vir-
ginia slaves, at least as far as the judiciary was concerned, were at the
mercy of overriding local prejudice and the plentiful possibilities of error
178. Id. at 562.
179. Id. at 566.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 571.
182. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 99.
183. Id.
184. See Elvira, A Slave, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 561, 561-65 (1865), discussed supra notes 170-
81 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying note 178.
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by justices of the peace too often deficient in legal knowledge." ' 6
G. Executive Clemency
Because slaves had no meaningful right to an appeal and because at
least sixty-eight capital offenses applied to slaves,' 87 the possibility of a
grant of clemency from the governor was critically important to slaves as
a means of escaping the death sentence. By statute, the governor had the
authority to commute a slave's death sentence,' and the courts of oyer
and terminer were required to send the governor a record of the trial
proceedings and testimony in every case in which a slave was condemned
to death. 8 9 The governor also was authorized by statute to sentence
slaves, in lieu of the death penalty, to "sale and transportation"-the
governor could contract with any person for the sale and purchase of
condemned slaves, so long as they were transported out of the United
States. 190 Although these slaves were then supposed to be sold into slav-
ery "beyond the limits of the United States," evidence suggests that slave
traders often sold them into other slave states. 19 1
Scholars have suggested that the governor sometimes showed mercy
to slaves to alleviate the harshness of the Virginia slave code and its en-
forcement in the courts.'92 One study found that two-thirds of the slaves
condemned to death from 1790 to 1864 were sentenced by the governor
to "sale and transportation" instead.' 93 In fact, whites sometimes peti-
tioned the governor to grant clemency to slaves sentenced to death. In
186. Flanigan, supra note 17, at 544.
187. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
188. See, eg., GUILD, supra note 2, at 86 (citing Act of 1841, ch. 61, 1840-41 Va. Acts 70,
70).
189. Flanigan, supra note 17, at 544.
190. Act of Dec. 1801, ch. 4, § 1, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note
102, at 314, 314 (act "empowering the governor to transport slaves condemned when it shall
be deemed expedient"); Act of Dec. 1800, ch. 70, § 4, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 300, 300-01 (act "to reduce into one the several acts concerning
slaves, free negroes and mulattoes"); see GUILD, supra note 2, at 70 (citing Act of 1801, ch. 43,
in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 344, 344-45).
191. Both the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and the annexation of Florida in 1818-19 se-
verely limited the potential destinations of transported slaves. The abolition of slavery in the
British and French West Indies in the 1830s and 1840s further encouraged the transportation
of reprieved slaves to the Deep South states. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 28-29.
192. Flanigan, supra note 17, at 543.
193. Ulrich B. Phillips, Slave Crime in Virginia, 20 AM. HIST. REv. 336, 339 (1915) (dis-
cussing the voucher system of reimbursing masters whose slaves were condemned). Schwarz
notes that "nearly nine hundred" Virginia slaves were transported out of the Commonwealth
between 1801 and 1865. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 28. During this period 454 slaves were
executed. Id. at 29.
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one example of such intervention, a man named William Ramsey peti-
tioned the governor in 1792:
A young negro, a valuable tradesman in this town, is con-
demned to die on the tenth of next month. His master em-
ployed no attorney, and it is the general opinion he has a much
greater regard for the high value set upon his negro than for
life. From our long friendship I petition you to pardon him. 194
The petition was supported by many signatures from the townspeople,
and the sentence was commuted. 195
In a case from Patrick County, a group of citizens petitioned the
governor to spare the life of a fifteen-year-old slave sentenced to death for
rape. 196 They requested that the boy be transported from the colony be-
cause "[h]e had not understood the enormity of the crime and thought it
punishable only by corporal punishment." 19 7 The petitioners themselves
thought the offense was punishable by castration rather than death. 198
The race of the victim was not specified. It would be helpful to know
whether the victim was black or mulatto, or perhaps a white woman of
"questionable moral fiber," since it is highly unlikely that a black man
would be forgiven for raping a white woman. 199
By contrast, in some instances citizens petitioned for severity rather
than mercy. For example, citizens from two counties urged the governor
to approve the death sentence for one slave convicted of arson. Accord-
ing to these citizens,
[flire in the hands of this ignorant and misguided portion of our
population has become an alarming source of mischief. The
amount of property that has been consumed in the last few
years by this devouring element and by the instrumentality of
194. Letter of William Ramsey of Alexandria, Virginia to Governor, reproduced in Phil-
lips, supra note 193, at 339.
195. Id.
196. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 16.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 16 & n.28 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Petition of Sundry Citizens of
Patrick County, n.d. (July 12-20 folder)).
199. Although the mere accusation of rape by a white woman virtually ensured conviction
of a black man, appeals for executive clemency were often sought if the "character" of the
white woman was in doubt. In one case in 1833, a jury appealed for executive clemency for a
free black man whom they had convicted for the rape of a white woman from a family of
"exceedingly disreputable character." JAMES JOHNSTON, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA &
MISCEGENATION IN THE SOUTH, 1776-1860, at 262-63 (1970). As the woman's mother had
"long entertained negroes," the family was perceived to be "below the level of the ordinary
grade of free negroes." Id; see Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex,
supra note 12, at 2012-19 (discussing the issue of consent); see also SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at
206 (same). For a discussion of how the Virginia courts treated alleged rape, see infra text
accompanying notes 503-42.
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this wicked and miserable people.., has been immense. We
are in danger of having our dwellings lighted over our own and
families['] heads. We hold our property by a tenure which is
completely at their mercy. Many of our citizens have been
doomed to witness in one night, nay in one hour, the destruc-
tion of a year[']s labour by the hands of the midnight
incendiary[.]2'
When the governor did order the transportation of slaves out of the
state, factors other than compassion may have motivated his decision.
By statute, the state was required to compensate slaveowners for the
value of their condemned slaves.201 According to Schwarz, the intention
of this provision was to persuade slaveholders not to conceal their slaves'
offenses for fear of economic injury.20 2 Some slaveowners preferred the
money rather than the return of a troublesome slave; this was particu-
larly true in the case of runaway slaves.20 3 Hence, from the governors'
perspective,
[t]ransportation saved the state great expense. Since the state
reimbursed masters when their slaves were put to death, execu-
tions of slaves were inordinately expensive. For example, from
1820 through 1831 the state paid almost $125,000 to masters
whose slaves were condemned to death. Sale and transporta-
tion gave the state an opportunity to recoup its losses.2°
Even when the governor exercised his power of clemency, he had no
authority to grant a new trial.20 ' The slave, therefore, had no chance for
complete exoneration. 20 6 The general court recognized the limitations of
200. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 48-49.
201. See, e.g., Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XI, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 269, 269-70 (act "for the speedy and easy prosecution of Slaves, committing Capitall
Crimes"). Masters were also entitled to compensation from the government when their run-
away slaves were killed in the course of being apprehended. See, eg., Act of Apr. 1691, Act
XVI, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 86, 86-88; GUILD, supra note 2,
at 50 (citing Act of 1705, ch. XLIX, §§ XXXVIII, XXXIX, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 42, at 447, 461); id. at 156 (citing Act of 1748, ch. XXCXVIII, § 21, in 6
HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 104, 110).
202. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 20.
203. ScoTT, supra note 27, at 302; see also supra note 64 (discussing runaway slaves).
204. See Flanigan, supra note 59, at 66.
205. Id.
206. Flanigan, supra note 17, at 545. The governor could not pardon a condemned slave
except by express legislative enactment. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1861, ch. 169, § 1, 1860-61
Va. Acts 255, 255 (authorizing the governor to pardon a slave and restore him to his master);
see also Act of Apr. 2, 1861, ch. 171, § 1, 1860-61 Va. Acts 256, 256 (same); Act of Feb. 16,
1861, ch. 170, § 1, 1860-61 Va. Acts 255, 255-56 (same). The legislature also could authorize
the commutation of a sentence. See, eg., GUILD, supra note 2, at 89 (citing Act of 1851,
Resol. No. 22, 1850-51 Va. Acts 411, 411 ("A Negro slave, William, a felon, convicted in
Fauquier [County] and his punishment commuted to transportation has since become lunatic
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a pardon from the governor:
The remedy of a pardon, as a substitute for a new trial, falls
short of complete justice to the prisoner, as well as to the pub-
lic. To the prisoner, a pardon is not equal to an acquittal, to
which the case supposes he is entitled. His reputation and
character are much more affected by the one than the other. A
pardon discharges from punishment; an acquittal from guilt.
Pardon may rescue him from the penitentiary or a halter; but it
cannot redeem him from the infamy of a conviction.0 7
Some slaves might even have preferred death to sale and
transportation. °8
In the mid-nineteenth century the Virginia legislature amended the
state's law to allow the courts to impose sale and transportation on slaves
as a third class of punishment for certain offenses. 209 As the general
court observed in Elvira, a slave,210 the reviser's note in the legislative
reports of 1849 read:
Instead of having for slaves but two classes of punishment, a
third at least should be recognized by law. There should.., be
a designation of offences too serious to be punished by stripes,
yet not sufficient to be punished by death, in which the sentence
should be that the slave be sold to be transported beyond the
limits of the United States. That might be the sentence of the
court in a considerable number of cases. Even then the sen-
tence of death would still be pronounced in many cases in
which the executive should have the power of reprieving for
transportation.21
Sale and transportation could apply as an alternative sentence for those
offenses that, if committed by whites, would not be punishable with
and unsalable, is ordered to be removed from the penitentiary to the Eastern Lunatic Asylum
for reasons of humanity as well as other considerations.")); see also id. at 115 (citing Act of
Mar. 19, 1847, ch. 286, § 1, 1846-47 Va. Acts 234, 234) ("The sentence of Jane Hailstock,'a
free woman of color, found guilty of arson, is ordered commuted.").
207. Ball v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 727, 728 (1837).
208. As Schwarz observed,
The punishment that could cause the most lasting pain to the Virginian slave was
being "sold to Georgia." This private, unregulated action presented bondspeople
with the uncertainties of new surroundings and owners at best, and at worst with
separation of families and the lifelong specter of working under the harsh and some-
times brutal conditions of gang labor on a West Indies sugar plantation or later on a
cotton or sugar plantation in the Deep South.
SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 11.
209. Act of March 14, 1848, ch. XXVI, § 1, 1847-48 Va. Acts 162, 162.
210. For a discussion of Elvira, see supra text accompanying notes 170-81.
211. Elvira, A Slave, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 561, 564-65 (1865) (citing reviser's note).
[Vol. 701008
RACIAL POWERLESSNESS
death.212 The choice lay in the discretion of the court.213
For those slaves not fortunate enough to escape a death sentence, a
1748 statute provided that a slave could not be executed until ten days
had elapsed after conviction, except in cases of conspiracy, insurrection,
or rebellion. 214 The waiting period was later increased to thirty days.215
This statutory requirement was not always followed, however. One such
incident of speedy justice occurred in 1751 in the James City County
court of oyer and terminer: "[A] felony [committed] last [night], the
felon tried, sentenced and [executed] this afternoon." 216 The most dan-
gerous aspect of such a hasty disposition was that it compounded the
injustice by trying, convicting, and executing a slave while the commu-
nity's passions were most inflamed, and precluded the possibility of clem-
ency from the Governor.
Aside from the governor's power to grant clemency, two additional
features of Virginia's criminal justice system served as a buffer of sorts
against the harsh criminal slave code: the benefit of clergy and the assist-
ance of counsel.
H. Benefit of Clergy
Benefit of clergy originated in medieval England as a means of spar-
ing those who had mastered the ability to read.217 Under this doctrine,
convicted felons were able to plead benefit of clergy for crimes other than
murder, rape, treason, arson, horse stealing, burglary, and robbery.218 If
212. Id. at 565.
213. Id.
214. Executions of free persons were to be carried out within two to three weeks. Act of
Oct. 1748, ch. XXXVIII, § VIII, in 6 HENING'S STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 104,
106 (act "directing the trial of Slaves committing capital crimes; and for the more effectual
punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better government of negroes,
mulattoes, and Indians, bond and free"); see ScoTr, supra note 27, at 123 (citing Act of May
1722, ch. V, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 106 (act "for amending the
act concerning Servints and Slaves; and for the better government of Convicts imported; and
for the further preventing the clandestine importation of persons out of this colony")).
215. See GUILD, supra note 2, at 158 (citing Act of 1786, ch. LVIII, § 1, in 12 HENING'S
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 345); id at 155 n.3 (citing Act of 1792, ch. 41, in I
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 122, 122-30).
216. ScOrr, supra note 27, at 123 n.244 (citing Diary of John Blair, 8 Wm. & MARY C. Q.
HIsT. MAG. 12 (1899)).
217. Id at 103. The term "clergy" in this context simply meant scholarship-that is, the
ability to read and write-and could apply to laymen as well as ecclesiastics. See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 491 (1st ed. 1933).
218. CHrrwoOD, supra note 113, at 69; ScoTr, supra note 27, at 103. At various times,
additional offenses were outside the benefit of clergy. See, e.g., GUILD, supra note 2, at 54
(citing Act of 1732, ch. VI, §§ I-II, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at
324, 324-25 (penalty for stealing a slave is death without benefit of clergy)); id. at 160 (citing
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granted clergy, the defendant was branded in the hand ("burnt in the
hand" '219) as proof that he had been given clergy, which was granted only
once in an individual's lifetime.220
In a 1732 act the Virginia legislature extended the benefit of clergy
to women, blacks, and Indians.221 Arthur Scott described the impetus
for this change in the law:
The law probably grew out of a case described by Governor
Gooch in a letter to the Bishop of London in 1731. A negro-
woman slave was being tried by Commission of Oyer and Ter-
miner for stealing, and the Governor had a lawyer raise the
point for her that she was entitled to clergy, being a Christian.
The Court was divided, and Gooch "had the case adjourned
into the General Court." In spite of the Attorney General's
opinion that clergy should be granted, the General Court di-
vided six to six. The case was referred to England with "polit-
ical reasons for and against it."
222
The Crown approved; clergy was extended to women, blacks, and Indi-
ans, and the reading requirement was eliminated.223 Under this law,
"benefit of clergy was assured to slaves convicted of felonies ... except
for manslaughter and breaking and entering with theft of more than 5
[shillings] worth of goods (crimes which were clergyable when commit-
ted by a free person), murder, treason, burglary, and robbery. ' 224 Man-
Act of 1792, ch. 41, in I THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 122, 122-
30 (penalty for stealing or selling as a slave a free person is death without benefit of clergy)).
219. GUILD, supra note 2, at 154 (citing Act of 1732, ch. VII, §§ I, III-VI, in 4 HENING'S
STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 325-27).
220. CHITWOOD, supra note 113, at 69.
221. Act of 1732, ch. VIII, §§ I, III-VI, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 325-27.
222. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 104-05.
223. See GUILD, supra note 2, at 154 (citing Act of 1732, ch. VII, §§ I, III-VI, in 4 HEN-
ING'S STATUES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 325-27).
224. RICHMOND COUNTY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 138, at 138. The exception for theft of
goods over five shillings was later increased to 20 shillings. CHITWOOD, supra note 113, at 69.
At various times, other slave crimes also were held by statute to be outside the benefit of
clergy. See, eg., GUILD, supra note 2, at 164 (citing Act of 1837, ch. 71, 1836-37 Va. Acts 49
(ravishing or attempting to ravish a white woman)); id. at 164 (citing Act of 1836, ch. 72, §§ 1-
2, 1835-36 Va. Acts 48, 48) (disturbing or obstructing railroad)); id. at 155 (citing Act of 1748,
ch. XXXVIII, §§ III-XXVI, in 6 HENING'S STATUES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 104, 105-
12) (administering medicine)).
It is unclear whether some blacks might have been entitled unofficially to benefit of clergy
prior to the passage of the 1732 statute. One bit of evidence suggesting that clergy was indeed
available was a 1723 law providing that "if any number of Negroes exceeding five conspire to
rebel, they shall suffer death, and be utterly excluded the benefit of clergy." Id. at 52 (citing
Act of 1723, ch. IV, § II, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 126). This
implies that some offenses were indeed clergyable.
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slaughter was later made a clergyable offense for slaves, 225 but "the
burgesses restrained themselves in the interest of white safety and
supremacy. Benefit of clergy would be available only to slaves convicted
of manslaughter for killing a slave. ' 226
Benefit of clergy was abolished for free persons in 1796227 but con-
tinued to apply to slaves for certain offenses until 1848.228 It might seem
strange that free men were deprived of a procedural protection which
slaves still enjoyed. This seeming aberration is explained by the fact that
under the same act that abolished benefit of clergy for free persons, it was
declared that "[t]he death penalty for all crimes, except murder in the
first degree committed by free persons is abolished."229 Since the death
penalty would apply only to first-degree murder, and since this crime was
not a clergyable offense, benefit of clergy was no longer needed for free
persons. Slaves, however, continued to be subject to the death penalty
for numerous offenses.23°
L Assistance of Counsel
The final protection for slaves in the Virginia justice system was the
assistance of counsel. In 1705 the Virginia legislature passed a law re-
quiring slaveowners to appear in their slaves' defense "as to matters of
fact" in capital cases. 231 According to Scott, "[t]his was somewhat of a
novelty, but the reason was obvious: Slaves were too valuable to be
hanged without due deliberation. ' 232 Although the government compen-
sated masters when their slaves were condemned to die, in some in-
225. GUILD, supra note 2, at 157 (citing Act of 1765, ch. XXVI, § 1, in 8 HENING'S STAT-
UTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 136, 137-38).
226. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 21 (emphasis added).
227. Act of Dec. 15, 1796, ch. 2, § 13, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra
note 102, at 5, 8; see SCOTT, supra note 27, at 105.
228. Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. XI, § 22, 1847-48 Va. Acts 121, 124; Act of Dec. 15, 1796,
ch. 2, § 13, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 5, 8 (act "to
amend the penal laws of this commonwealth"); see ScoTT, supra note 27, at 105.
229. GUILD, supra note 2, at 161 (citing Act of 1796, ch. 2, § 13, in II THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 5, 8).
230. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 26 (noting that death penalty was applicable to slaves
convicted of "non-clergyable" offenses). Even when benefit of clergy was abolished for slaves
in 1848, slaves were still subject to the death penalty not just for first-degree murder but addi-
tional offenses as well. See GUILD, supra note 2, at 167-68 (citing Act of 1848, ch. XII, §§ 2-5,
1847-48 Va. Acts 125, 125 (providing that slave also shall receive death penalty for attempted
rape of white woman, conspiracy to rebel, and assault with intent to kill white person)).
231. GUILD, supra note 2, at 152 (citing Act of 1705, ch. XI, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 42, at 269-70); see SCOTT, supra note 27, at 46.
232. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 79.
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stances the compensation was inadequate.233 Many of the slaves
possessed valuable skills and were not easily replaced. Hence, the master
as property owner might have preferred the return of the slave rather
than his execution. To this end, over time, slaveowners began hiring at-
torneys to represent their accused slaves.234
In 1792 slaves were given the right to court-appointed legal counsel,
with a fee of five dollars to be paid by the master.235 Moreover, a 1795
statute provided that "a person conceiving himself to be detained as a
slave illegally may make complaint in court [and] the petitioner shall be
assigned counsel who without fee shall prosecute the suit., 236
At first glance, one could conclude that the provision of counsel to
slaves was based on the Virginia legislature's humanitarian concern that
due process be afforded blacks. Unfortunately, the preface to the statute
indicates that the legislature had less honorable motives. In the preface,
the legislators expressed concern about the "voluntary association of in-
dividuals in other states of this union" who were claiming that certain
blacks were free, and thus by their acts were "depriving masters of their
property and slaves."'237 The voluntary associations they despised were
groups of abolitionists. After their preamble, noting these primary con-
cerns, the legislators then stated
to the end that an easy mode may be pointed out by law for the
recovery of freedom when it is illegally denied, it is enacted that
a person conceiving himself to be detained as a slave illegally
may make complaint in court; the petitioner shall be assigned
counsel who without fee shall prosecute the suit.23
Other nonhumanitarian aspects of the 1795 statute were intended to con-
strain advocacy for the rights of blacks. The statute provided, for exam-
233. Id. at 46; see also Phillips, supra note 193, at 336 ("[R]ates of compensation to the
masters... varied widely.").
234. As Schwarz has observed, "This development was natural in a society whose property
owners increasingly relied on professionals to protect all their property in courts." SCHWARZ,
supra note 25, at 23-24.
235. GUILD, supra note 2, at 160 (citing Act of 1792, ch. 41, in I THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 122, 122-30). The law subsequently was amended to
reimburse appointed counsel at a fee of $25. Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. XXVI, § 3, 1847-48
Va. Acts 162, 162 (act "to reduce into one the several acts concerning crimes and punishments,
and proceedings in criminal cases").
236. GUILD, supra note 2, at 67 (citing Act of 1795, ch. 11 (misnumbered II), in I THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 363, 363-65); see also id. at 198 (citing
Act of 1818, ch. LI, § 5, 1817-18 Va. Acts 71, 71-72 ("Slaves who conceive themselves illegally
held may make complaint; the petitioner shall be assigned counsel.")).
237. Id. (citing Act of 1795, ch. 11 (misnumbered II), in I THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 363, 363-65).
238. Id. (citing Act of 1795, ch. 11 (misnumbered II), in I THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 363, 363-65).
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pie, that if any person aided a slave in prosecuting a freedom suit and if
the claim were not "established," the aider would forfeit $100 to the
owners of the slave.239
Interestingly, whites had no corresponding right to court-appointed
counsel in criminal cases. Whites were allowed, in nonfelony cases, to
retain counsel, although they rarely took advantage of this right.2" In
capital trials, however, whites were not even entitled to hire counsel un-
less some difficult point of law was at issue.241 Over time, this rule
changed, but it was not until after 1830 in England that the full right to
retain counsel in felony cases was recognized for whites.242 As Scott has
noted, "[t]he first explicit reference to the right of persons accused of
felony to have counsel is 'declared: That in all trials of capital offences,
the prisoner, upon his petition to the court, shall be allowed
counsel.' "243
As with the right to benefit of clergy,2 " it might seem curious that
slaves had the right to court-appointed criminal counsel yet whites did
not. One explanation may be that by the rule of law slaves had no prop-
erty of their own and thus had no money with which to hire legal coun-
sel. This theory is consistent with an 1818 statute, which provided that
indigent persons also were entitled to assigned counsel in prosecuting
civil suits "against any person within the Commonwealth."245
It also has been suggested that slaves were provided with counsel
because they were wholly ignorant of their rights under the criminal law.
Abolitionist Charles Goodell, for example, believed that because slaves
could not read they had no way of knowing what conduct was pro-
scribed.2 46 But other scholars, such as Philip Schwarz, assert that slaves
were well aware of the punishments that were meted out to fellow
slaves; 247 serious crimes were rare enough that everyone in the commu-
nity knew when a slave had been executed. The more likely explanation
as to why slaves were provided counsel is that they "were too valuable to
239. Id. at 68 (citing Act of 1795, ch. 11 (misnumbered II), in I THE STATUTES AT LARGE
OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 363, 363-65).
240. Act of Aug. 1734, ch. VII, § III, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 403, 404 (act "for better regulating the trial of criminals, for Capitall offences").
241. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 77.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 79 (quoting Act of Aug. 1784, ch. VII, § III, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE, supra note 42, at 403, 404).
244. See supra notes 217-30 and accompanying text.
245. GUILD, supra note 2, at 198 (citing Act of 1818, ch. LI, § 5, 1817-18 Va. Acts 71, 71-
72).
246. See Flanigan, supra note 59, at 20.
247. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 45-46.
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be hanged without due deliberation.""24
Another reason for providing counsel to slaves may have been that,
unless required by law to hire counsel for their accused slaves, some
slaveowners preferred to receive reimbursement from the government for
their executed slaves.24 9 The legislature was most likely aware of the
harshness of the slave code, the opportunity for inept judges to commit
grave error, the desire of slaveowners to be rid of troublesome slaves and
still be reimbursed, and the potentially heavy financial burden to the
state. The legislature's motivation was probably more economic than hu-
manitarian, believing that in the long run Virginia needed some safe-
guard to prevent the slaughter of healthy and valuable slaves and to
avoid reimbursing the owners.
In some situations, the slave had no one but his lawyer to protect
him.25° In one notorious case the prosecutor of a slave told the governor
that "'there is not a human being in this county (his counsel excepted)
who is sufficiently interested in his fate to make the least exertion on his
behalf.' ,251 Although some have argued that these lawyers were in
league with the slaveholders,25 2 Flanigan takes another view:
Cases of incompetence and neglect must have occurred, but it
was remarkable how many court-appointed attorneys in Vir-
ginia took an interest in the slave's fate after conviction and
petitioned the governor for commutation of death sentences to
sale and transportation. On occasion these men risked the good
will of white citizens. One lawyer wrote that the people of the
county "admonish me to be silent .... " Another [lawyer] was
told "that should I defend the prisoner, it would conflict with
my future prospects at the bar. '253
In light of the fact that slaves received some limited procedural pro-
248. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 78-79.
249. For a discussion of the right of masters to receive reimbursement for their executed
slaves, see supra notes 201-02, infra notes 543-45 and accompanying text.
250. Young lawyers, such as future-president John Tyler, used slave trials to hone their
legal skills. Tyler, who at that time was also a congressman, defended a slave, Stephen, who in
1819 was on trial for the alleged assault and robbery of a free black man. SCHWARz, supra
note 25, at 243. Tyler was unsuccessful, however, and Stephen was convicted and executed on
Christmas Eve, 1819; this was the only case in the first three decades of the nineteenth century
when a slave was hung for the robbery of a non-white. See id. at 235, 243.
251. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 119 & n.94 (quoting Va. Archives, supra note 134, Letter
from Matthew Dunbar to James N. Fry, Feb. 3, 1834).
252. Id. at 118 (discussing assertion by Frederick Douglass).
253. Id. at 119-20 & n.95 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Letter from M.M. Patton to
Governor, June 12, 1828 (June 1-10 folder); id., Letter from Richard K. Craler to Governor,
April 2, 1827; id., Letter from Everard Hall to Governor & Executive Council, Sept. 30, 1829;
id., Letter from Wilson Flarnoy to Governor, April 2, 1839; id., Letter from J.N. Baker to
Governor & Executive Council, Oct. 5, 1828).
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tections such as benefit of clergy and appointment of counsel, arguably
slaves in colonial and antebellum Virginia fared relatively well in the
criminal justice system. But the truth remains that slaves and free blacks
were in a far worse position than whites. Whites, for example, never lost
their right to a jury trial or to an appeal. 254
Without the limited safeguards of executive clemency, benefit of
clergy, and appointed counsel, the consequences for blacks would have
been devastating. While in some instances individual judges, governors,
and citizens may have shown some measure of compassion towards the
slave, these gestures, when they occurred, were probably in large part a
response to the unnecessary severity of the criminal slave code. The few
procedural benefits theoretically belonging to slaves were motivated
largely, if not entirely, by a desire to protect the economic interests of the
master and the state rather than the humane interests of the slave.
255
An examination of the separate system established for the prosecu-
tion of slaves indicates that Virginia's emphasis was on speedy justice-
but not in any benevolent sense, like the modern right of criminal defend-
ants to a speedy trial.256 Rather, the antebellum brand of speedy and
efficient justice was an attempt to punish slaves as quickly and summarily
as possible while still assuring that the master's property interests were
protected. The elaborate system of justice provided for free whites had
no place in the life of an accused slave. In some instances, individual
actors in the criminal justice system were willing to spare a slave's life,
though not necessarily his limbs, ears, or genitals. Occasional gestures of
mercy, however, were relatively insignificant when measured against the
ruthless and merciless legal system that was established for trying slaves.
As Flanigan has stated, "no other slaveholding states adopted procedural
systems that consistently weighed so heavily against accused slaves as
those of Virginia and South Carolina."2 7 These rare reprieves were de-
ceptive, presenting a false veneer of justice and mercy.
The next section explores how the Virginian slaves' inability to ap-
peal, to be sworn as a witness (even in one's own defense), or to be tried
by a jury of one's peers ("the birthright of every Englishman") was cou-
pled with the harshest substantive criminal slave code known to the
254. For discussion of the right to jury trial, see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text;
for discussion of slave appeals at oyer and terminer courts, see supra notes 128-86 and accom-
panying text.
255. As Schwarz has noted, "Virginia's white authorities did provide some due process
protection for slave defendants, or at least for masters whose slave property faced court action.
Their intention, however, seems to have been to control all slaves and to defend slavery."
SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 14.
256. See supra note 46.
257. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 100.
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American slave states. This double-edged sword ensured that blacks in
colonial and antebellum Virginia would remain completely powerless
and at the mercy of the white slaveholding society.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL CODE OF VIRGINIA
Any government that imposes a tyrannical system against many of
its people always must live with the persistent fear that the victims of
oppression may someday revolt, break their chains, and, if necessary,
even slay their oppressors. Shakespeare understood the dynamics of vic-
tims' response to villainy. As he wrote in The Merchant of Venice:
He hath disgrac'd me ... scorn'd my nation ... cool'd my
friends, heated mine enemies; and what's his reason?... If you
prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If
you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we
not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you
in that.... The villainy you teach me, I will execute, and it
shall go hard but I will better the instruction.258
Virginia slaveholders always feared that the villainy they imposed
on their slaves might someday be replicated with the fulfillment of Shake-
speare's prediction that "[t]he villainy that you teach me I will execute,
and it shall go hard, but I shall better the instruction." The following
section discusses how the substantive criminal law imposed villainy on
blacks and how it was used to preserve and perpetuate slavery.
A. The Preservation of Slavery by the Abolition of Freedom of Speech
and Press
The degree to which the Virginia slaveowning establishment sought
to preserve the "peculiar institution" through the criminal law is appar-
ent in an 1836 statute, entitled "An Act to suppress the circulation of
incendiary publications, and for other purposes." '2 5 9 In their preamble
the legislators noted that "attempts have been recently made by certain
abolition or anti-slavery societies and evil disposed persons, being and re-
siding in some of the non-slaveholding states, to interfere with the rela-
tions existing between master and slave in this state.""26 They viewed
these antislavery efforts as attempts "to excite in our coloured population
a spirit of insubordination, rebellion and insurrection, by distributing
among them, through the agency of the United States mail and other
258. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 1, 11.51-69 (David
Bevington ed., Scott, Foresman & Co. 1967).
259. Act of Mar. 23, 1836, ch. 66, §§ 1-4, 1835-36 Va. Acts 44, 44-45.
260. Id. pmbl., at 44 (emphasis added).
1016 [Vol. 70
9RACIAL POWERLESSNESS
means, certain incendiary books, pamphlets, or other writings of an in-
flammatory and mischievous character and tendency."26 To thwart
such dangers, they decreed:
That any member or agent of an abolition or anti-slavery soci-
ety, who shall come into this state, and shall here maintain, by
speaking or writing, that the owners of slaves have no property
in the same, or advocate or advise the abolition of slavery, shall
be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor.262
The 1836 act further provided that anyone inciting "persons of col-
our" to rebel or "denying the right of masters to property in their slaves"
shall, if a slave or "other person of colour," be punished by stripes and
sold and transported beyond the United States, and if a free person, be
deemed, guilty of a felony and imprisoned for two to five years.263 As in
Hitler's Third Reich, any books, pamphlets, or other writings advocating
the prohibited activity were to be burned. 26
The legislature's concern about suppressing slave revolts and pre-
cluding even nonviolent critiques of the slave system produced a series of
ironies. As Henry Steele Commager noted, the Virginia Bill of Rights
was the "most famous of the Declarations of Rights of the original state
constitutions"; it was "adopted with slight changes and two additions, by
the Virginia Convention of 1776. It exerted a wide influence not only in
this country but in France. ' 261 Paradoxically, however, when it came to
issues of slavery, the Old Dominion prohibited the freedom of press that
Virginians had long praised and insisted was "one of the great bulwarks
of liberty [that] can never be restrained but by despotick
governments. 266
When Patrick Henry rose before a Richmond congregation on
March 23, 1775 to plead so eloquently his cause on behalf of white prop-
erty owners opposed to taxation without representation, he declared, "Is
261. Id.
262. Id. § 1, at 44.
263. Id. § 2, at 44.
264. Id. § 3, at 44-45; see Commonwealth v. Barrett, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 665, 665-66 (1839)
(holding that to sustain prosecution under § 1 of this act, the accused must be a member or
agent of an abolition or antislavery society).
265. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 103 (Henry S. Commager ed., 8th ed. 1968).
The article on religious freedom in the Virginia Bill of Rights was drafted by Patrick Henry. 1
WILLIAM W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 430-35
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons 1891). For discussion of the Virginia Bill of Rights, see B.
FAY, REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT IN FRANCE AND AMERICA 263 (1927); HUGH B. GRIGSBY,
THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1776, at 18-20 (photo. reprint 1969) (1855); KATE M. Row-
LAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1892).
266. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS cl. 12 (1776), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
supra note 265, at 104.
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life so dear or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and
slavery? Forbid it, almighty God. I know not what others may wish, but
as for me, give me liberty or give me death. '26 7 Yet in Patrick Henry's
Virginia, advocating any semblance of liberty for blacks or the ultimate
abolition of slavery was a crime for which one could be fined and sent to
prison.268
Virginia preened itself on its special contribution to assuring free
speech and free press for the nation. The First Amendment, which
Virginians drafted, prohibited Congress from making any "law ...
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. ' 269 Yet during this same era Virginia's lawmakers passed
statutes that were the antithesis of guarantees of freedom of speech and
of the press. On the issue of abolition, Virginia legislators would deny
totally all freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble,
and freedom to petition the government for a redress of grievances.270
In 1850 the general court had an opportunity to construe the 1848
version of this statute, which punished "[a]ny free person who, by speak-
ing on or writing, shall maintain that owners have not right of property
in their slaves. '2 71 Offenders could be imprisoned for up to twelve
months and fined up to $500.272 In Bacon v. Commonwealth273 a minis-
ter named Jarvis C. Bacon, "a free person," was convicted under this
statute. The evidence showed that he made the following statement to
his congregation: "If I was to go to my neighbor's crib and steal his
corn, you would call me a thief, but that it was worse to take a human
being, and keep him all his life, and give him nothing for his labour,
except once in a while a whipping or a few stripes."274 Bacon's counsel,
in moving for a new trial, argued that the minister had not denied any
master's legal right to property in his slave but merely counseled that it
was a sin, an action which was the minister's right under the Virginia
267. 1 HENRY, supra note 265, at 266.
268. See Act of Oct. 1785, ch. LXXVII, § IV, in 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 182. Note that the Virginia statute did not merely prohibit speech or articles that
constituted an immediate threat, or a "clear and present danger" to the overthrow of the
government.
269. U.S. Co sT. amend. I.
270. See Act of 1795, ch. 11 (misnumbered II), in I THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIR-
GINIA, supra note 102, at 363, 363-65.
271. Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. X, § 24, 1847-48 Va. Acts 113, 117 (act "to reduce into one
the several acts concerning crimes and punishments, and proceedings in criminal cases").
272. Id.
273. 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 602, 602 (1850).
274. Id. at 603.
1018 [Vol. 70
RACIAL POWERLESSNESS
Constitution's guarantee of free speech.275
The general court, reviewing the case, agreed that "[a]ny statute
tending to restrain the exercise of the freedom of speech ... should be
strictly construed by the Courts."276 The court held, therefore, that "[t]o
dissuade a member of a Christian flock from merchandizing in slaves, or
taking and keeping human beings in slavery, may be done by a pastor,
without any denial of the right of owners to property in their slaves. 27 7
The general court held that Jarvis was entitled to a new trial because the
evidence did not support conviction.278
It was most certainly to the defendant's benefit that he was a minis-
ter who had made his indirect but stirring attack upon slavery in the
context of a religious sermon. The deference that the court placed on
religious speech was evident in its opinion. In discussing the duty of the
courts to interpret narrowly any statute tending to restrain free speech,
the court added: "This should more especially be the case when the exer-
cise of that freedom has for its object matters of religious doctrine and
discipline."279
In this unique and special context, the court declined to uphold the
conviction of a minister for preaching freedom from sin to his congrega-
tion.280 In another context, however, the accused might not have been so
fortunate. Although a preacher might escape conviction, an abolitionist
who dared to speak out against slavery as morally wrong was probably
more vulnerable to prosecution and conviction. Indeed, the court did
not hold that the statute, either on its face or as applied to the minister's
conduct, was violative of the Constitution; it merely held that the
preacher's conduct did not fall within the prohibitions of the statute.281
275. Id. at 604-06.
276. Id. at 607.
277. Id. at 608.
278. Id. at 612.
279. Id. at 607.
280. While there is no mention of Reverend Bacon's color-he is referred to as a "free
person"--it seems highly unlikely that he was black. See id. at 602. There had been a scatter-
ing of black preachers who commanded mixed-race congregations during the Second Great
Awakening of the late eighteenth century, but by the 1820s this practice had ended. At the
same time, black preachers whose congregations were black were placed under the close super-
vision of white pastors. ALBERT RABOTEAU, SLAVE RELIGION: THE "INVISIBLE INSTITU-
TION" IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 128-40 (1978). Furthermore, in the wake of the Gabriel
and Nat Turner rebellions, white Virginians were particularly fearful of the use of Christian
religion as an incitement to slave resistance. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 271-75. In this
context, and since Judge Lomax's opinion makes clear that some of the congregants were
themselves slaveholders, there can be little doubt that the "free person" whose freedom of
speech is debated in such eloquence and detail by the court was white.
281. Bacon, 48 Va. (7 Gatt.) at 602.
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B. Exclusion of Abolitionists from Jury Trials and Prohibitions on
Teaching Blacks How to Read and Write
In addition to prohibiting speech critical of slavery, Virginia
adopted a series of laws which provided that any active assistance of
slaves seeking freedom would be severely punished. One law, for exam-
ple, made it a capital offense for free persons to conspire with slaves to
rebel. 8 2 Anyone "harboring or entertaining" a slave without the
master's consent was subject to a fine. (Free blacks not able to pay were
subject to thirty-nine lashes.)2" 3 Numerous laws of this sort ensured that
any efforts to help slaves secure their freedom were quickly squelched.28 4
Even something as seemingly innocuous as reading and writing was
banned. Teaching blacks to read or write was strictly prohibited as a
criminal offense.28 In the early colonial period, however, Virginians felt
little concern about the potential danger to white society of educating
blacks, slave or free.28 6 Indeed, in the immediate post-revolutionary pe-
riod, benevolent and religious workers were allowed access to slaves and
free blacks to assist in their education.28 7 Then, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, a series of laws was passed that banned the assembly of free blacks
for the purpose of teaching them reading and writing 8 8 and that prohib-
ited free blacks from attending supposedly free public schools.28 9 Slaves
were not allowed to attend schools, either. The willingness of Virginia
lawmakers to uphold these restrictions on black access to education was
made clear in the 1853 prosecution of Margaret Douglass for opening a
school for free black children.2 90 Douglass, who was not an abolitionist,
was jailed for one month.291
It is not surprising that a society so paranoid about abolitionists
speaking their mind would be equally fearful if opponents of slavery were
on a jury. Thus, in 1798, the following statute was passed: "In all cases,
wherein the property of a person held as a slave demanding freedom,
282. GUILD, supra note 2, at 68 (citing Act of 1797, ch. 4, §§ 1-2, in II THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 77, 77-79).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 107-08 (citing Act of 1832, ch. XXII, § 7, 1831-32 Va. Acts 20, 21-22).
285. Act of Mar. 15, 1848, ch. X, § 39, 1847-48 Va. Acts 113, 120 (act "to reduce into one
the several acts concerning crimes and punishments, and proceedings in criminal cases").
286. CARTER WOODSON, THE EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO PRIOR TO 1861, at 2-9 (1919).
287. Id.
288. Act of Apr. 7, 1831, ch. XXXIX, §§ 4-5, 1830-31 Va. Acts 107, 107 (act "to amend
the act concerning slaves, free negroes, and mulattoes").
289. Act of Feb. 19, 1845, cl. 26, § 10, 1844-45 Va. Acts 19, 32 (act "to establish a system
of free schools in the county of Albemarle").
290. PHILIP S. FONER & JOSEPHINE F. PACHECO, THREE WHO DARED 57 (1984).
291. Id. at 69.
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shall come before a court for trial, no person who shall be proved to be a
member of any society instituted for the purpose of emancipating negroes
from the possession of their masters, shall be admitted to serve as a juror
in the trial of said cause. ' 292 The desire to maintain the powerlessness of
Virginia's slaves thus encroached upon one of the most important privi-
leges of a citizen-to serve on a jury and decide the fate of fellow citizens
or residents. When the drafters of the Sixth Amendment wrote that the
accused in all criminal prosecutions was entitled to "an impartial jury of
the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," pre-
sumably they did not envision a partisan jury stacked solely in behalf of
the slaveholders.
C. White Violence, Black Victims, and the Disparity in the
Punishment of Blacks and Whites
1. General Disparities
Today extensive debate rages over the question whether blacks re-
ceive excessively disproportionate sentences for the same crime as com-
pared to whites.293 The argument is generally predicated, however, on
an extensive statistical analysis of actual sentencing patterns involving
statutes that appear to be race neutral and do not use explicit racial lan-
guage to sanction disparities in sentencing.294 During the colonial and
292. Act of Jan. 25, 1798, ch. 4, § 2, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra
note 102, at 77, 77). One might argue that precluding persons who supported the abolition of
slavery was similar to the equally restrictive practices sanctioned by the current United States
Supreme Court, pursuant to which prospective jurors with conscientious scruples against the
death penalty are excluded as a matter of right. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 510-
32 (1968) (permitting challenges in capital case of all prospective jurors biased against capital
punishment). In both instances, one party ends up with a jury irrevocably stacked against his
best interests. See generally Joseph A. Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death Qualifying a
Jury Prior to the Determination of Guilt: The Fair-Cross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases,
15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 595, 595-617 (1982) (examining the right to be tried by a jury drawn
from a cross-section of society); Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt' End:
Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 68-92 (1986) (reviewing Wither-
spoon doctrine in light of Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985)); Walter E. Oberer, Does
Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair
Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEx. L. REv. 545, 557-67 (1961) (arguing that death-qualified jury
denies defendant due process regarding guilt/innocence determination); Welsh S. White,
Death-Qualified Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Reexamined, 41 U. PIrr. L.
Rtv. 353, 385-405 (1980) (discussing various interests at play in death-qualifying a jury).
293. See, eg., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING INDI-
CATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING]
(collecting and analyzing numerous studies on racial disparity in the imposition of capital
punishment).
294. Dissenting from the United States Supreme Court's conclusion in McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), that statistical evidence showing that the death penalty in Georgia
was disproportionately imposed on black defendants who had been convicted of killing whites
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antebellum periods, one did not have to study sentencing patterns of trial
judges to ascertain whether judges were imposing far more severe
sentences on blacks than on whites for the same crime; most often, the
legislation blatantly required more severe sentences for blacks.
Stroud vividly highlighted the racial disparity in criminal sentencing
in antebellum Virginia.2 9 5 There were sixty-eight crimes for which slaves
might receive the death sentence as compared to only one, first-degree
murder, for which whites could be put to death.2 9 6 One Virginia statute
provided that a slave would be punished with death for any offense that,
if committed by a free person, would be punishable by imprisonment for
not less than three years.2 97 Under an 1836 act free persons convicted of
disturbing or obstructing a railroad were imprisoned for two to five
years, while slaves convicted of this offense were sentenced to death with-
out benefit of clergy.29
could not be used to prove a violation of a particular defendant's Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment rights, Justice Brennan wrote:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his lawyer whether a
jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid reply to this question would have
been disturbing. First, counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details
of the crime or of McCleskey's past criminal conduct were more important than the
fact that this victim was white. Furthermore, counsel would feel bound to tell Mc-
Cleskey that defendants charged with killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times
as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants charged with killing blacks. In addi-
tion, frankness would compel the disclosure that it was more likely than not the race
of McCleskey's victim would determine whether he received a death sentence: 6 of
every 11 defendants convicted of killing a white person would not have received the
death penalty if their victims had been black, while, among defendants with aggra-
vating and mitigating factors comparable to McCleskey's, 20 of every 34 would not
have been sentenced to die if their victims had been black. Finally, the assessment
would not be complete without the information that cases involving black defendants
and white victims are more likely to result in a death sentence than cases featuring
any other racial combination of defendant and victim. The story could be told in a
variety of ways, but McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential narrative line:
there was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in determining if
he lived or died.
Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). A number of studies indicate that
racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty is not limited to the state of Geor-
gia. See DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 293, at 1-2, 5-7 (government report evalu-
ating 23 studies of capital sentencing patterns throughout the nation).
295. STRouD, supra note 17, at 75-78.
296. Id. at 77-80.
297. GUILD, supra note 2, at 167 (citing Act of 1848, ch. XII, § 1, 1847-48 Va. Acts 125,
125).
298. Id. at 164 (citing Act of 1836, ch. 72, § 2, 1835-36 Va. Acts 48, 48). The discrepancies
in the substantive criminal law were abolished by Chapter 17 of the Act of 1866: "All laws in
respect to crimes and punishments, applicable to white persons, shall apply in like manner to
colored persons and Indians unless otherwise specially provided. All acts and parts of acts
imposing on Negroes the penalty of stripes, where the same is not imposed on white persons,
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Such disparities in punishment were not predicated on differentia-
tions as to whether one's status was free or slave. Even free blacks re-
ceived disparate treatment as compared to whites; the statutes provided
for the sale of free blacks into slavery and their banishment from the
United States as punishment for criminal offenses.29 9 Free blacks and
mulattoes were the only groups that could be enslaved as a form of pun-
ishment .3  By an act of 1823 the Virginia legislature provided:
Henceforth, when any free Negro shall be convicted of an of-
fense, now by law punished by imprisonment for more than two
years, such person instead of confinement shall be punished by
stripes at the discretion of the jury, and shall moreover be ad-
judged to be sold as a slave and banished beyond the limits of
the United States. 3°1
Five years later, the legislature amended the law to provide that free
blacks subject to crimes punishable by stripes, sale, and transportation
were thereafter, for the first offense, to be imprisoned for five to eighteen
years and, for succeeding offenses, to life in prison.30 2
Over the following years, the statutes fluctuated with respect to
whether free blacks were to be sold into slavery, executed, or imprisoned.
Although the United States Supreme Court has long declared that the
right to travel is a fundamental privilege and immunity assured by the
Constitution, in 1831 Virginia declared that free blacks who came to Vir-
ginia or free blacks and mulattoes who remained in the Commonwealth
"contrary to law" were to be sold into slavery. 0 3 In 1860 there was a
partial re-enactment of the 1823 statute allowing enslavement as a form
of punishment.3° Such laws demonstrate the precarious status of free
blacks in antebellum Virginia-they walked a tattered tightrope between
slavery and freedom, their "freedom" more an illusion than a reality.
This illusion of "freedom" was dealt a fatal blow in the 1824 deci-
[are repealed]." Id. at 170 (citing Act of Feb. 27, 1866, ch. 17, §§ 2-3, 1865-66 Va. Acts 84,
84-85).
299. See Act of 1801, ch. 43, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102,
at 344, 344-45; Act of Dec. 1800, ch. 70, § 4, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA,
supra note 102, at 300, 300-01.
300. For a discussion of the special treatment of Indians, see HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE
MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 26, at 31.
301. Act of Feb. 21, 1823, ch. 32, § 3, 1822-23 Va. Acts 35, 35-36 (act "farther to amend
the penal laws of this commonwealth"), cited in GUILD, supra note 2, at 101.
302. GUILD, supra note 2, at 103 (citing Act of 1828, ch. 37, §§ 1-2, 1827 Va. Acts 29, 29).
303. Id. at 106 (citing Act of 1831, ch. XXXIX, §§ 4-5, 1830-31 Va. Acts 107, 107).
304. Act of Mar. 29, 1860, ch. 54, § 1, 1859-60 Va. Acts 163, 163 (act "authorizing the Sale
of Free Negroes into Slavery who are sentenced to receive certain punishments and
imprisonment").
1992] 1023
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sion of the general court in Aldridge v. Commonwealth.305 Aldridge, a
free black man convicted of grand larceny, was sentenced under an 1823
statute to receive thirty-nine lashes and to be sold as a slave and trans-
ported and banished beyond the limits of the United States.30 6 Aldridge
challenged the validity of the 1823 act under the Virginia Constitution
and Bill of Rights, asserting that his sentence constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment.30 7
The general court, in an opinion by Judge Dade that is eerily similar
to Chief Justice Taney's later opinion in the infamous Dred Scott case,
3 0 8
held that the Virginia Bill of Rights did not apply to blacks and mulat-
toes, whether free or enslaved:
Can it be doubted, that [the Bill of Rights] not only was not
intended to apply to our slave population, but that the free
blacks and mulattoes were also not comprehended in it? The
leading and most prominent feature in that paper, is the equal-
ity of civil rights and liberty. And yet, nobody has ever ques-
tioned the power of the Legislature, to deny to free blacks and
mulattoes, one of the first privileges of a citizen; that of voting
at elections, although they might in every particular, except
color, be in precisely the same condition as those qualified to
vote. The numerous restrictions imposed on this class of people
in our Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, both of this State and of
the United States, as respects the free whites, demonstrate, that,
here, those instruments have not been considered to extend
equally to both classes of our population. We will only instance
the restriction upon the migration of free blacks into this State,
and upon their right to bear arms. 09
The court concluded that the ninth section of the Virginia Bill of
Rights, which prohibited cruel and unusual punishment, had no bearing
on the enslavement of a free black, and affirmed Aldridge's conviction. 10
2. Murder, Manslaughter, and Brutality
Scholars have noted the intensely harsh, and often wantonly violent,
atmosphere of colonial Virginia.31' Thomas Jefferson spoke eloquently,
305. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447 (1824).
306. Id. at 448-49.
307. Id. at 447.
308. See id. at 447-48; supra note 4.
309. Aldridge, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) at 449.
310. Id.
311. T.H. BREEN & STEPHEN INNES, MYNE OWNE GROUND: RACE AND FREEDOM ON
VIRGINIA'S EASTERN SHORE, 1640-1676, at 105-06 (1980).
[Vol. 701024
RACIAL POWERLESSNESS
and accurately, of the "perpetual exercise of the most boisterous pas-
sions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part [the masters], and
degrading submissions on the other [the slaves]" that characterized slave
society in revolutionary Virginia.312 The extent of murder and man-
slaughter may never be known fully because the killing of slaves by
whites rarely reached the courts, particularly in the colonial era.313 Simi-
larly, murders of whites by slaves may often have been dealt with at the
level of plantation justice.314 Nevertheless, those cases that did reach the
courts reflected the deep racial disparity of a criminal justice system in
which the law was, for blacks, an enemy315 before which they remained
powerless.
Within the Virginia criminal justice system, courts confronted sev-
eral decisive variables: Was the perpetrator white or black? If white,
was the perpetrator an owner, a hirer, or a stranger? If black, was the
perpetrator a slave or a free black? Was the victim white or black? If
white, was the victim an owner or hirer? Was the victim a white inden-
tured servant? If black, was the victim the perpetrator's slave or a hired
slave or a free black?
In the following sections, we compare the consequences of black-on-
white crime with white-on-black crime by juxtaposing the offenses of
murder, manslaughter, assault, and rape according to race. In other
words, we contrast the killing of blacks by whites with the killing of
whites by blacks; assault by whites against blacks versus assault by blacks
against whites; and finally, the rape of black women by whites versus the
rape of white women by blacks. We believe organizing the discussion in
this manner starkly and clearly reveals the drastic racial disparities in
Virginia's substantive criminal code. We begin, however, by comparing
the restraints on the master in his treatment of indentured servants with
the total lack of restraint on the master's treatment of slaves.
a. Legal Differentiation Between Cruelty to a Servant and
Killing a Slave
An act of 1661-62 prohibited cruelty by masters upon their ser-
vants.3 16 At that early date numerous white indentured servants worked
312. JEFFERSON, supra note 44, at 155-56.
313. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 79-80, 137-38, 287.
314. Id. at 79, 137-49.
315. See GOODELL, supra note 1, at 309-10.
316. The statute provided as follows:
Crielty of masters prohibited.
WHEREAS the barbarous usage of some servants by cruell masters bring soe much
scandall and infamy to the country in generall, that people who would willingly ad-
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in Virginia.3 17 Because of the presumption that whites were superior, it
is doubtful whether the legislature would have passed such an anticruelty
statute if all servants then had been black, mulatto, or Indian.
The disparity between the statute protecting servants and the one
enacted eight years later to protect masters is dramatic. Whereas in 1661
a servant could file a complaint against his master for cruelty or poor
treatment,31 by 1669 a master was permitted to kill his slaves with impu-
nity. The 1669 Act, entitled "An act about the casuall killing of slaves,"
provided:
[I]f any slave resist his master (or other by his masters order
correcting him) and by the extremity of the correction should
chance to die, that his death shall not be accompted ffelony, but
the master (or that other person appointed by the master to
punish him) be acquit from molestation, since it cannot be pre-
sumed that prepensed malice (which alone makes murther
ffelony) should induce any man to destroy his owne estate.319
Thus, beginning in the early colonial period, an entirely different
standard applied to masters in their treatment of white servants than in
their treatment of black slaves. Morgan observed that
slaves could not be made to work for fear of losing liberty, so
they had to be made to fear for their lives .... [I]n order to get
an equal or greater amount of work, it was necessary to beat
slaves harder than servants, so hard in fact, that there was a
much larger chance of killing them than had been the case with
servants.32o
venture themselves hither, are through feare thereof diverted, and by that meanes the
supplies of particuler men and the well seating his majesties country very much ob-
structed, Be it therefore enacted that every master shall provide for his servants corn-
potent dyett, clothing and lodging, and that he shall not exceed the bounds of
moderation in correcting them beyond the meritt of their offences; and that it shalbe
lawfull for any servant giving notice to their masters (haveing just cause of complaint
against them) for harsh and bad usage, or else for want of dyett or convenient neces-
saries to repaire to the next commissioner to make his or their complaint, and if the
said commissioner shall find by just proofes that the said servants cause of complaint
is just the said commissioner is hereby required to give order for the warning of such
master to the next county court where the matter in difference shalbe determined,
and the servant have remedy for his grievances.
Act of Mar. 1662, Act CIII, in 2 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 117-18.
317. GUILD, supra note 2, at 9; HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATrER OF COLOR, supra note
26, at 34, 392-95.
318. It has been observed that "in the sixteen hundreds especially.., white servants were
cruelly treated, ran away, were hunted down and branded, even as Negroes." GUILD, supra
note 2, at 10.
319. Act of Oct. 1669, Act I, in 2 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 270.
320. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL
OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 312 (1975).
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Thus, the legislature assured masters that they would not be criminally
punished for killing their slaves.
Although under the law a master was presumed not to have in-
tended to murder his slave no matter how direct and severe the killing,
the opposite presumption applied to a slave who killed a white person.
In the latter scenario, intent to murder was presumed.321 One historian
has suggested that, while such a presumption may be attributed to the
inherent racism of Virginia judges, the "presupposition of premeditation
by slaves who killed whites was not necessarily inaccurate." '322 Schwarz
based this claim on his belief that the punishments for slaves who killed
whites were so severe, and the possibility of capital punishment so high,
that few slaves "would fight a white person under these conditions with-
out a strong motivation to resist that person's authority. "323
Certainly a slave was just as capable of acting in the heat of passion
as was a free person. Moreover, the notion of presumed intent to murder
is contrary to the basic notion, taught to first-year law students, that
under the doctrine of mens rea324 such intent cannot be presumed but
rather must be proved by the prosecution. The Virginia legislature thus
succeeded in turning fundamental notions of criminal law on their head.
A 1705 statute required masters to supply wholesome food, cloth-
ing, and shelter to their servants and provided that masters "shall not, at
any time, give immoderate correction; neither shall, at any time, whip a
christian white servant naked, without an order from a justice of the
peace."' 325 Any unauthorized whipping of a naked Christian white ser-
vant resulted in imposition of a fine of forty shillings, to be paid to "the
party injured., 326 Servants were permitted to fie complaints against
their masters for improper treatment.327
What was the comparable rule for slaves? Whereas masters were
prohibited from giving "immoderate correction" to their white servants,
a master who killed his slave in the course of correcting him was immune
from punishment:
321. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 117. Schwarz notes that when "a slave arsonist un-
knowingly killed a white person, that slave was by the slave code's definition guilty of murder
in the first degree: almost any time a slave killed a white person, judges treated that act as
homicide with malice aforethought." Id.
322. Id. at 234.
323. Id.
324. As defined in United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1943), "mens rea"
means "guilty knowledge and wrongful intent." Id at 438.
325. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XLIX, § VII, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 447, 448 (act "concerning servants and slaves") (emphasis added).
326. Id.
327. Id. § VIII, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 448-49.
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And if any slave resist his master, or owner, or other per-
son, by his or her order, correcting such slave, and shall happen
to be killed in such correction, it shall not be accounted felony;
but the master, owner, and every such other person so giving
correction, shall be free and acquit of all punishment and accu-
sation for the same, as if such accident had never happened.328
This statute also made it lawful for any person to kill and destroy run-
away slaves "by such means as may be thought fit," and any runaway
slave who was apprehended could be dismembered or otherwise punished
in "any other way not touching his life." '29
There were limits on the cruelty that the master could impose on the
servant, but few, if any, constrained the master's cruelty to a slave. The
only explanation for this disparity is that the legislature considered slaves
subhuman and not entitled to similar moderation and care. Even horses
and cows were protected from senseless cruelty 30 The slave was
unique-set apart for special treatment. Was it simply, as Morgan pos-
tulated, because of his special status as a lifetime servant?3 31 Or was it
that the color of his skin justified the rule that he could be killed with
impunity, whereas a "christian white servant" could not even be whipped
naked without an order from the justice of the peace? 32
Any servant who resisted his master or became violent was required
to render an additional year or years of service to the master.333 Since
the service of slaves could not be extended, they were whipped instead.
The racial motivation of this statute is demonstrated by the additional
clause stating that if any "negro, mulatto, or Indian, bond or free, shall at
any time, lift his or her hand in opposition against any christian, not
being negro, mulatto or Indian,"-that is, against any white Christian-
that person was to receive thirty lashes on his or her bare back. 3 4
328. Id. § XXXIV, in 3 HENING'S STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 459 (emphasis
added).
329. GUILD, supra note 2, at 50 (citing Act of 1705, ch. XLIX, §§ VII, VIII, XXXIV, in 3
HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 447, 448, 449-50, 459).
330. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678, 689 (1827) (Brockenbrough, J.,
dissenting) (citing Commonwealth v. Leach, 1 Mass. 45, 46 (1804) and Respublica v. Teischer,
1 Dall. 335, 338 (Pa. 1788)).
331. MORGAN, supra note 320, at 312.
332. Id. at 311-13.
333. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XLIX, § XIV, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 451 (act "concerning Servants and Slaves"); see also GUILD, supra note 2, at 39 (citing
Act of 1659-60, Act XIII, in I HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 538 (act
"that no Servant lay violent hands on his Master or Overseer")); id. at 41 (citing Act of 1661-
62, Act CIV, in 2 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 118 (act "Against unruly
servants")).
334. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XLIX, § XXXIV, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
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The racial underpinnings of such laws became even more pro-
nounced in later years. For example, an 1848 law provided that "[s]laves
or free Negroes using provoking or menacing language or gestures to a
white person... are punishable by stripes, not exceeding thirty-nine."1335
Hence, it was not primarily slave status that determined one's standing in
antebellum Virginia; the fundamental determinant was the color of one's
skin. In this racially-based caste system, the laws of the land protected
only white Christians.
It was not until 1792 that Virginia recognized any right of self-de-
fense for blacks. In that year, the legislature provided that
[n]o Negro or mulatto, bond or free, shall lift his hand in oppo-
sition to any person not being a Negro, under penalty of not
exceeding thirty lashes on the bare back, well laid on, except
when it shall appear that such Negro was wantonly assaulted
and lifted his hand in self defense. 33
6
Enforcing that limited right of self-defense from wanton assault, how-
ever, often must have been a "right without a remedy," since by law
blacks were precluded from testifying against whites.337
When reading of these disparities in the law, one must ask: Was
there any significant recognition of the slave as a human being, entitled to
protection by the majesty of the law? In some rare instances the human-
ity of the slave was recognized, not because doing so would benefit the
master but because the slave, as a person, was entitled to protection:
In 1716 Governor Spotswood provoked bitter criticism by di-
recting the Attorney-General to prosecute a woman for the
murder of one of her slaves. According to the Governor's re-
port to the Board of Trade, a healthy negro had died under
correction. A coroner's jury took up the body, which had been
buried secretly, and found a verdict of murder. An attempt
note 42, at 447, 459 (emphasis added) (act "concerning Servants and Slaves"). This statute
further provided:
And also, if any negro, mulatto, or Indian, bond or free, shall at any time, lift his or
her hand, in opposition against any christian, not being negro, mulatto, or Indian, he
or she so offending, shall, for every such offence, proved by the oath of the party,
receive on his or her bare back, thirty lashes, well laid on; cognizable by a justice of
the peace for that county wherein such offence shall be committed.
Id. § XXXIV, cited in GUILD, supra note 2, at 156.
335. GUILD, supra note 2, at 168 (citing Act of 1848, ch. XII, § 6, 1847-48 Va. Acts 125,
125).
336. Id. at 159-60 (citing Act of 1792, ch. 41, in I THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA,
supra note 102, at 122, 122-30).
337. See id at 158 (citing Act of 1785, ch. LXXVII, in 12 HENING'S STATUTS AT LARGE,
supra note 42, at 182-83); supra notes 106-27 and accompanying text.
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was then made to have further proceedings dropped, which the
Governor opposed.
"Yet until your [Lordships] condemn it, I will dare stand
to my Charge given to a Grand Jury here, vizt: that in this
Dominion no Master has such a Sovereign Power over his
Slaves as not [to] be liable to be called to an Account whenever
he kills him; that at the same time, the Slave is the Master's
Property he is likewise the King's Subject, and that the King
may lawfully bring to Tryal all Persons here, without excep-
tion, who shall be suspected to have destroyed the Life of his
Subject., 338
Perhaps motivated in part by sentiments such as those of Governor
Spotswood and in part by the revulsion of some concerned citizens, some
extreme forms of slave torture resulting in death did become punishable
beginning in 1723, when the exemption from punishment for killing a
slave was modified as follows:
Be it enacted, by the authority aforesaid That if any slave shall
happen to die by means of ... dismembring, by order of the
county court, or for or by reason of any stroke or blow given,
during his or her correction; by his or her owner, for any of-
fence by such slave committed, or for or by reason of any acci-
dental blow whatsoever, given by such owner; no person
concerned in such dismembring correction, or accidental homi-
cide, shall undergo any prosecution or punishment for the
same; unless upon examination before the county court, it shall
be proved, by the oath of one lawful and credible witness, at the
least, that such slave was killed wilfully, maliciously, or design-
edly; neither shall any person whatsoever, who shall be indicted
for the murder of any slave, and upon trial, shall be found
guilty only of manslaughter, incur any forfeiture or punishment
for such offence or misfortune.339
Under this law one could be prosecuted for the willful, malicious, or
designed killing of a slave. Yet if found guilty of only manslaughter, no
punishment could be imposed. Of course, manslaughter was a crime-if
the victim was white. The paradox was that in any criminal prosecution,
a conviction for manslaughter in the killing of a white person could re-
sult in years of imprisonment while the law recognized no such crime of
manslaughter in the killing of a slave. The legislature was careful to pro-
338. ScOrr, supra note 27, at 202 (quoting Governor Spotswood).
339. Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § XIX, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 127, 132-33 (act "directing the trial of Slaves, comitting capital crimes; and for the more
effectual punishing conspiracies and insurrections of them; and for the better government of
Negros, Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free").
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vide, however, that this law was not to be construed to defeat a slave-
owner's right to recover damages from persons who killed his or her
slave."34  Thus, the master's property interest remained protected.
Although theoretically a master could be punished for the willful
murder of a slave under this statute, obstacles often prevented the
master's prosecution. The act required the oath of a "credible witness"
that the slave was killed "wilfully, maliciously, or designedly., 34 1 Since
by law blacks were not considered "credible witnesses," whites were
largely immunized from prosecution for the murder of slaves. As Stroud
has observed, although laws against murdering slaves were on the books,
they were not enforced:
The evil is not that laws [concerning murder of one's own slave]
are wanting, but that they cannot be enforced; not that they
sanction crime, but that they do not punish it. And this arises
chiefly, if not solely, from.., the exclusion of testimony, on the
trial of a white person, of all those who are not white.342
Moreover, even in those instances when "credible witnesses" were
willing to testify against the slaveowner, it was difficult to prove that the
punishment of a slave for some infraction, real or imagined, crossed the
line from an unintentional killing to willful murder. As discussed below,
deaths from some of the most severe beatings imaginable were treated as
merely accidental. 43
Slaveowners and others enjoyed exemption from criminal liability
for slave manslaughter until 1788 when the legislature repealed the act
declaring the killing of a slave by correction to be only manslaughter. 34
Thus, subsequently all whites were theoretically liable for the killing of
blacks, slave or free, to the same extent as for the killing of whites. Nev-
ertheless, only a few whites were ever even prosecuted for killing
blacks.345
340. Id. § 20, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 133. Regarding a
slaveowner's right to recover damages against one injuring his slave property, see infra notes
371-73 and accompanying text.
341. Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § XIX, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 132-33 (act "directing the trial of slaves").
342. STROUD, supra note 17, at 20.
343. See infra text accompanying notes 359-68.
344. Act of Oct. 1788, ch. XXIII, in 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at
681 (act "to repeal part of an act, directing the trial of slaves"); see GUILD, supra note 2, at 156
(citing Act of 1748, ch. XXXVIII, § XXII, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note
42, at 447, 455 (providing that slave manslaughter is not punishable)). It continued to be
lawful for anyone to kill and destroy any "outlying Negro" by any means without accusation
or impeachment of any crime. GUILD, supra note 2, at 156 (citing Act of 1748, ch. XXXVIII,
§ XXI, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 447, 454-55).
345. The legislature did not provide an explanation for its repeal of the law making slave
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b. Cases Involving the Killing of Slaves
The earliest cases involving prosecution for slave homicide did not
appear in the reports. In the 1729 case of Andrew Bourne, an overseer
who had killed a slave in a fit of passion was convicted of willful murder
and sentenced to death. Governor Gooch granted Bourne clemency.
The Governor felt that the verdict of the jury in the general court was
unjust: "[T]he executing of him for this offence may make the slaves
very insolent, and give them occasion to contemn their Masters & over-
seers, which may be of dangerous Consequences in a Country where the
negroes are so numerous and make the most valuable part of the People's
Estates." 346
In what appears to have been the first instance in which a white
person was punished for killing a slave, the Virginia Gazette reported the
following case under the headline "Hung for Negro Murder": "1739-
Charles Quinn, an overseer, and David White, an accessory, from Essex
County, for the murder of a negro belonging to Colonel Braxton by
whipping him to death in a most cruel and barbarous manner." 347 How
does one explain the prosecution in this case? First, it should be noted
that it was not the owner who was being prosecuted for the killing of his
slave; instead, the defendants were an overseer and an associate-persons
of lower status. Possibly the fact that the slave belonged to a colonel
helped to arouse the public sentiment against the murderers. Presuma-
bly, Colonel Braxton did not sanction the cruel and barbarous assault on
the slaves, the defendants probably did not have the funds to reimburse
the colonel, and the colonel could not be reimbursed by the state for his
losses.
In May 1742, William Lee, an overseer, was examined by the Rich-
mond County court, which found sufficient evidence to send Lee on to
Williamsburg for trial.34 Lee was committed to the county jail for "Fe-
loniously Killing Will a Man Slave Belonging to Thomas Barber Gen-
tleman. ' 349 Barber, it appears, was a justice of the peace who the
manslaughter a nonoffense. One proffered explanation for the change in the law is that some
of the revolutionary notions of liberty and humanity engendered by the American Revolution
carried over into the treatment of slaves. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 24. Schwarz also
notes that "the problem was that all these apparent reforms effectively perpetuated bondage.
They were intended to prevent another revolution." Id. at 25.
346. HUGH F. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL COURT OF
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 113 & n.60 (1965) (citing Letter from Gov. William Gooch to Secretary
of State, June 29, 1729).
347. See SCOTT, supra note 27, at 202-03, 203 n.33 (citing VIRGINIA GAZETTE, Nov. 23,
1739).
348. RICHMOND COUNTY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 138, at 218.
349. Id.
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governor sometimes commissioned to preside at the court of oyer and
terminer. 35 ' At the conclusion of the testimony, which indicated that
Lee may have whipped and beaten the slave to death, the court con-
cluded that just cause existed for trying Lee.31 The court granted Lee's
request for bail.352 It is worth asking whether the fact that a respected
justice of the peace owned the deceased slave had anything to do with
Lee's examination and trial. There is no record, however, to reveal the
outcome of Lee's trial.
In another case referenced in the Virginia Gazette, a slaveowner was
convicted of murdering his own slave:
William Pitman, being found guilty by the jury, received sen-
tence of death from the General Court for beating his negro
boy to death.
"This man has justly incurred the penalties of the law, and we
hear will certainly suffer, which ought to be a warning to others
to treat their slaves with moderation ......
- April 21, 1775353
It is not known whether the sentence was actually carried out.
The next recorded prosecution for malicious slave killing was
Thomas Sorrell's Case,354 in which Sorrell was charged with murdering a
slave for whom he was an overseer.355 After a series of procedural ap-
peals and motions raising the question whether the overseer could be
prosecuted for manslaughter, he was put on trial and acquitted. 35 6 Ac-
cording to the court reporter, St. George Tucker,35 7 this verdict of not
guilty was "directly contrary to evidence. 3 58  Thomas Sorrell's Case il-
lustrates the distinction drawn by the Virginia courts and legislature be-
350. Id. at 219, 222, 224-26, 228-34.
351. Id. at 219.
352. Id.
353. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 203 n.34 (citing VIRGINIA GAZETTE, April 21, 1775).
354. 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 16 (1821).
355. Id. at 17.
356. Id. at 17-18.
357. St. George Tucker was a professor of law at the College of William and Mary (1800-
03), a judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia (1803-11), and a judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Virginia (1813-28). See Chris Levin, St. George
Tucker, Race and the American Legal Process (1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors). Levin notes the inconsistencies of Tucker's significant efforts to secure gradual
emancipation for Virginia's slaves and his personal actions as a slaveholder who made no
provision for the manumission of his slaves. See id at 5; see also WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE
OVER BLACK: AMERICAN A'rITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 555-60 (1968)
(discussing Tucker's attempt to find "'some middle course between the tyrannical and iniqui-
tous policy' of slavery 'and that which would turn loose a numerous, starving, and enraged
banditti, upon the innocent descendants of their former oppressors' ").
358. Thomas Sorrell's Case, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) at 18.
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tween slave homicide committed by a master as compared to that
committed by a hirer or overseer.
Souther v. Commonwealth 3 9 is the most dramatic case involving the
murder of one's own slave. It is not clear why the prosecution was even
initiated; at one point, the prosecutor joined in the defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not a crime to kill one's
own slave. 3" The facts as described in the indictment and in detail by
the court as to the "manner, means and duration"361 of the beating in-
flicted on the slave read more like the savagery one would expect in fic-
tion than in a civilized society:
The indictment contains fifteen counts, and sets forth a case of
the most cruel and excessive whipping and torture. The negro
was tied to a tree and whipped with switches. When Souther
became fatigued with the labour of whipping, he called upon a
negro man of his, and made him cob Sam with a shingle. He
also made a negro woman of his help to cob him. And after
cobbing and whipping, he applied fire to the body of the slave;
about his back, belly and private parts. He then caused him to
be washed down with hot water, in which pods of red pepper
had been steeped. The negro was also tied to a log and to the
bed post with ropes, which choked him, and he was kicked and
stamped by Souther. This sort of punishment was continued
and repeated until the negro died under its infliction. It is be-
lieved that the records of criminal jurisprudence do not contain
a case of more atrocious and wicked cruelty than was presented
upon the trial of Souther.362
The court earlier had held in Commonwealth v. Turner363 that a
master could not be indicted for the malicious, cruel, and excessive beat-
ing of his own slave.364 The Souther court reasoned, however, that it did
not necessarily follow from the holding in Turner that a master also was
immune from prosecution when an excessive beating resulted in the
death of the slave:
It is the policy of the law in respect to the relation of master
and slave, and for the sake of securing proper subordination
and obedience on the part of the slave, to protect the master
from prosecution in all such cases, even if the whipping and
punishment be malicious, cruel and excessive. But in so in-
359. 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 673 (1851).
360. Id. at 676.
361. Id. at 675-76.
362. Id. at 679.
363. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827).
364. Id. at 685-86.
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flicting punishment for the sake of punishment, the owner of
the slave acts at his peril; and if death ensues in consequence of
such punishment, the relation of master and slave affords no
ground of excuse or palliation. The principles of the common
law in relation to homicide, apply to his case, without qualifica-
tion or exception; and according to those principles, the act of
the prisoner, in the case under consideration, amounted to
murder.3 65
While the Souther court was unanimous in holding that under cer-
tain circumstances a slaveowner could be convicted for murdering his
slave, the judges disagreed as to whether the defendant was guilty of first-
or second-degree murder.366 Judge Field, delivering the opinion of the
court, referred to the Sessions Acts of 1847-48, which provided that
murder committed by "wilful and excessive whipping [or] cruel treat-
ment" was murder in the first degree, which was to be punished with
death.367 Hence, it was obvious to Judge Field that Souther was guilty of
first-degree murder, not manslaughter. Judge Leigh, on the other hand,
believed that excessive whipping of a slave did not necessarily constitute
first-degree murder; in order to be so characterized, there must have been
an intent to kill.368
The opinion does not indicate whether the court ultimately ruled
that Souther was guilty of first- or second-degree murder. The court up-
held the five-year sentence which the jury imposed, however, which indi-
cates that Souther was found to have committed second-degree murder,
since the 1847-48 statute made first-degree murder punishable with
death.369
Souther was an important ruling because the court refused to give
slaveowners total immunity from the laws punishing the murder of
slaves. Nevertheless, the disparity in legal treatment when blacks were
the victims is revealed when one considers the sentence Souther received.
Regardless of whether he committed first- or second-degree murder, he
received only a five-year sentence. That a man could receive so inconse-
quential a sentence for such a brutal crime indicates how little value was
placed on the humanity of slaves. Had the defendant tortured, whipped,
beaten, choked, and killed a white person the way he did his slave, it is
inconceivable that a jury would have imposed, and the court would have
accepted, a mere five-year term of incarceration for such a killing.
365. Souther, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) at 680.
366. See id. at 674-86.
367. Id. at 681-82.
368. Id. at 686 (Leigh, J.).
369. Id. at 687.
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It also is important to emphasize that if by some twist of fate a slave
managed to survive such a ferocious attack, the master was completely
immune from prosecution.37 0 He could beat his slave with impunity and
without limits so long as the slave did not die from the assault.
"The numerous civil suits that masters brought against overseers
and hirers for severely wounding or killing slaves indicated that gross
abuse was all too common. 371 By law an owner could bring an action to
recover against another for killing or dismembering his slave.372 In ef-
fect, slaveowners had a choice of remedies-they could collect a fine or
press criminal charges-which depended on the ability of the defendant
to pay the fine, as well as his social and economic status.373
This tradition of racial disparity in sentencing carried on well into
the twentieth century. According to Schwarz, "[a]lmost 87 percent of
the men and women executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia between
1908 and 1962 were black. ' 374 The Virginia data are not dissimilar to
other findings which suggest that in the administration of criminal laws
juries and judges have shared consistently the perception that blacks are
less valuable than whites.37 ' As Schwarz has stated:
370. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 98-103.
371. Id. at 76 (endnote omitted).
372. Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § XX, in 4 HFNING'S STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 126, 133 (act "directing the trial of Slaves, committing capital crimes").
373. With regard to civil actions involving the fatal shooting of a slave, see Kennedy v.
Waller, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 415 (1808). In that case the plaintiffs obtained a verdict for
$450, representing the value of the slave. Id. at 418. The issue the court addressed was
whether the plaintiffs as trustees of the slave had a sufficient ownership interest in the slave to
maintain the cause of action. Id. at 417. Judge Tucker commented: "I lament that a case
originating possibly in moral turpitude should go off upon such grounds. But we must decide
according to law, and not according to our private feelings. I am therefore of opinion that the
judgment must be wholly reversed." Id. at 418.
In Brown v. May, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 288 (1810), May brought an action of trespass against
the defendants "for breaking and entering his close, and beating several of his slaves. . . 'so
that he was deprived of their service for a long time.'" Id. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff for $150 in damages. Id. The general court, observing that the bill of exception failed
to state that the slaves were found to be acting improperly, affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiff. Id. at 291-93.
In Harris v. Nicholas, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 483 (1817), a hirer's overseer, "so unlawfully,
cruelly, and excessively beat and whipped the said slave... that the slave afterwards died."
Id. at 484. One counsel stated that "the facts pleaded bring it within the definition of murder
in the first degree." Id. at 488. The general court held that the hirer was not liable for failing
to return the slave "well cloathed," since the act of the overseer was a willful and unauthorized
trespass. Id. at 483, 489-90. There is no indication that the overseer was ever prosecuted for
causing the slave's death.
374. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 320.
375. There is clear evidence from one former slave state, Georgia, that white lives continue
to be valued more highly than black lives when determining the punishment in murder cases.
In the Chattahoochee, Georgia judicial district (which includes the city of Columbus), 65% of
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It is no accident that black people faced the kinds of laws,
courts, or mobs they did for many decades after 1865. Whites'
perception of Afro-Virginians not only as black but also as for-
mer slaves or descendants of slaves has had everything to do
with the way the majority of whites have perceived and tried to
control black people.3 76
c. Black Defendants and White Justice
In the slavery system no crime was more serious than the murder of
a master by a slave or servant. Such a murder was known as petit trea-
son.3 77 If male, the defendant was to be hung, quartered, and beheaded;
all murder victims between 1973 and 1990 were black, and 35% of the victims were white. In
those cases in which the death penalty was sought, however, only 15% of the victims were
black, while 85% of the victims were white. See David Margolick, In Land of Death Penalty,
Accusations of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at Al, A12. The same article includes
a statement by George Kendall of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund noting that
"[t]he tradition of the black codes and slave codes, which provided different harsher punish-
ments for offenders who harmed whites than blacks, remains today in places like Columbus."
Id. at A12; see also supra note 294 (discussing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
376. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 321. A compendium of studies released by the General
Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, reveals that the race of the victim contin-
ues to be a significant factor in determining who receives the death penalty in this country. See
DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 293, at 5-7. In 1991 a bill entitled the "Racial
Justice Act" was introduced in Congress that would have allowed death-sentenced individuals
the opportunity to demonstrate that death sentences in the particular jurisdiction or state in
which he or she was sentenced are imposed more frequently upon persons of one race, or for
crimes against persons of one race. S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 207 (1991). If such dis-
crimination were shown the defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment instead of
death, unless the state were able to demonstrate that the disparity was explained by a nonracial
factor. Id.
377. As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, petit treason was, "[i]n old English law, the
crime committed by a wife in killing her husband, or a servant his lord or master, or an
ecclesiastic his lord or ordinary." BLACK'S LAW DIcTiONARY 1501 (6th ed. 1990). High
treason, in contrast, was, "[i]n English law, treason against the king or sovereign, as distin-
guished from petit or petty treason, which might formerly be committed against a subject."
Id. Although most slaves were convicted of petit treason, there were a few instances in which
they were tried for high treason. In 1710, for example, two slaves, Salvadore, an Indian, and
Scipio, a black, were convicted of plotting a slave insurrection. The need of the authorities to
maintain order throughout the colony is evidenced by the punishments the two slaves received:
To the end therefore that their execution and exemplary punishment may have a due
effect for deterring other Slaves from entering into such dangerous Conspiracys It is
ordered that Salvadore be executed... at the Court house of Surry County on the
first Tuesday in May, and that his body be disposed of as follows viz. his head to be
delivered to the Sherif of James City County and by him sett up at the City of Wil-
liamsburgh. Two of his quarters likewise delivered to the Sherif of James City one
whereof he is to cause to be sett up at the great guns in James City and the other to
deliver to the Sherif of New Kent County to be sett up in the most publick place of
the said County, and the other two quarters to be disposed of and sett up as the
Justices of the County of Surry shall think fitt to direct.
SCOTr, supra note 27, at 161-62 (quoting Act of Oct. 1710, ch. XVII, in 3 HENING'S STAT-
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if female, the defendant could be burned at the stake.378 In the seven-
teenth century several cases of servants convicted and executed for petit
treason were tried, but the race of the defendants is unknown.379 In
eighteenth-century Virginia, however, all recorded cases of petit treason
involved slaves.380 In an effort to deter others from committing this of-
fense, the heads and quarters of executed slaves were displayed promi-
nently either at specified crossroads or on buildings or other public
places.38' One such public place was the chimney of the Alexandria
courthouse where the heads of four slaves, convicted of poisoning their
overseers, were mounted in 1767.382 A more symbolic demonstration of
the judicial system's role in perpetuating the powerlessness of Virginia's
slaves is hard to imagine. In an earlier case, a slave who had killed his
master and then had escaped by stealing a horse was "captured, tried
promptly, and sentenced to death.... The said Negro was executed ac-
cordingly and it is Ordered by the Court that the Sheriff cut off his head
and put it on a Pole near the Courthouse to deter others from doing the
UTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 539-40). Scott further notes that "Scipio was to be exe-
cuted in Gloucester County, and his head and quarters were to be exhibited in various parts of
Gloucester, Lancaster, and King and Queen counties." Id. at 162.
Following the Declaration of Independence, the Virginia Assembly redefined high treason
as "levying war against the commonwealth, or giving aid and comfort to its enemies." Id. at
163. Virginia revolutionaries clearly feared the prospect of a war on two fronts: against a
British king who sought, or so they believed, to enslave them, and against those very individu-
als whom they had enslaved. At least one black, Bob-his status as slave or free is not clear-
was convicted of high treason and executed, and his body was displayed in public, in 1778.
SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 188-89. Three years later another slave, Sancho, was found guilty
of spying for the British and was hung. Id. It is interesting to note that one slave, Billy,
obtained a reprieve from a conviction of treason following a dissent by two oyer and terminer
judges and an appeal for executive clemency by the executor of the estate of Billy's owner, a
prominent landowner named Mann Page. Id. at 189. The governor, Thomas Jefferson, ac-
cepted Page's claim that a slave could not commit treason, as a slave was not a citizen. Id.
378. One historian has noted that "[t]he custom in England was to strangle the victim into
insensibility before the fire was lighted, and presumably this was done in Virginia also."
Scotr, supra note 27, at 197. In one well documented case from 1745, a slave, Eve, was found
guilty of poisoning her owner's milk. Following an illness that lasted several months, the
owner died, and Eve was duly sentenced to be "carried upon a Hurdle to the place of Execu-
tion and there to be Burnt." SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 92; see also ScoTr, supra note 27, at
197 (relating the same story, but dating it to 1747). Slave women convicted of arson were not
burned at the stake, but they could be hung and decapitated. For example, Violet, a slave who
set fire to her owner's property in 1780, was hung, and her severed head was placed on display
on a pole near the village of Staunton. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 115; SCOTr, supra note
27, at 196-97.
379. At least one of the men sentenced to death for petit treason in the seventeenth century
was an English indentured servant. See ScoTT, supra note 27, at 195.
380. See id. at 194-97 & nn.2-12.
381. Id. at 196 & nn.8-9.
382. Id. at 309-10 & n.65.
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Like." 383
The quartering, beheading, and public display of the condemned
was also the penalty inflicted for high treason, a crime that presumes the
defendant is a citizen who owes fidelity to his government.38 4 Slaves
were deemed to owe allegiance not to the country, but only to their white
masters.
In 1894 a dispute arose between certain Virginia historians as to
whether colonial Virginia had a practice of hanging and quartering
blacks.385 In answer to the dispute, P.G. Miller, the deputy clerk of
Goochland County, Virginia and "a gentleman learned in Virginia his-
tory,' 386 revealed the following account: In 1733 a commission of oyer
and terminer assembled in Goochand County to try six slaves accused of
murdering a man named Robert Allen.3 7 The slave Champion con-
fessed and was sentenced to be hanged.388 Three other slaves were ac-
quitted. The slave Valentine pleaded not guilty but was found guilty and
sentenced to be hanged.3 9 The last slave, Lucy, was acquitted of the
murder but was sentenced to receive twenty-one lashes because she knew
of the murder but did not report it.390 The final order of the court read:
"Ordered that the heads & quarters of Champion & Valentine be set up
in severall parts of this County. '391 Hence, the deceased, Robert Allen,
may well have been the slaves' white master since they were punished in
accordance with the offense of petit treason.392
383. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 196 (quoting VIRGINIA GAZETTE, June 3-10, 1737). One
report of this case noted that "'it was expected that four more would soon meet the [s]ame
[hate.' Id. (quoting BOSTON CHRON., Jan. 11-18, 1768). Poisoning, which by its very nature
was "[h]ard to predict, hard to control, and hard to prove," increasingly came to be used by
slaves as a weapon of resistance to a slaveowner's authority. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 94.
For an extended discussion of the role of poisoning in colonial and antebellum Virginia, see id.
at 92-113.
384. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1501 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "treason" as "[a]
breach of allegiance to one's government").
385. See Hanging and Quartering, 1 VA. MAG. HIM. BIOGRAPHY 328, 328 (1894).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 328-29.
388. Id. at 329.
389. Id.
390. The court's exact words were that "she is supposed to have known of the murder after
it was committed & did not discover the same." Id. (quoting minutes of Goochland County
Ct., June 25, 1733).
391. Id. at 330 (quoting minutes of Goochland County Ct., June 25, 1733). The court
ordered reimbursement to be made "for providing Tarr, burying the trunk, cutting out the
quarters[,] a Pott, Carts & horses, carrying and setting up the heads & quarters of the two
Negros at the places mentioned by order of Court." Id. (quoting minutes of Goochland
County Ct., June 25, 1733).
392. Id. at 329.
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The first recorded conviction of a slave for the murder of his master
did not occur until 1732. 393 According to one estimate, there were only
twenty-four recorded cases of whites murdered by slaves between 1740
and 1785. 394 At least seventeen slaves were convicted for the murder of
fellow slaves in this same period,"'5 and another 116 slaves were con-
victed and sixty-one slaves acquitted of the separate crime of poisoning,
which often, but not always, led to the death of the victim. 96 Of the
thirty-five slaves sentenced to hang for poisoning, twenty-three of their
victims were white while only seven victims were black. 97 In five in-
stances the race of the victim was not identified.398
The more complete records of slaves convicted of murder in the an-
tebellum period suggest a similar correlation between the race of the vic-
tim and the punishment of the perpetrator. While there has been some
debate among historians as to how many slaves were convicted of murder
in antebellum Virginia,3 99 the general consensus is that the murder of a
white by a black was punished with greater severity than the murder of a
black by another black.4°° In four Virginia counties between 1785 and
1831, for example, eighteen slaves were convicted of murdering whites,
and fourteen slaves were found guilty of the murder of fellow slaves: all
of those convicted of killing whites received the death sentence, but only
seven of those who murdered slaves were so punished." 1
Despite this obvious disparity in sentencing, slaves were more in-
clined to kill owners, overseers, and other whites than they were to mur-
393. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 81. Of course, some slaves who had murdered their
masters or members of their masters' families may never have been put on trial, but punished
privately, particularly in the early colonial period. See id. at 79-82.
394. Id. at 142. Schwarz is aware of the incomplete nature of Virginia's criminal trial
records in the eighteenth century. He suggests that a more complete figure would be approxi-
mately 53 to 68 slaves convicted of murdering at least 64 to 88 whites between 1740 and 1785.
Id at 144. Schwarz's figures are based upon his assumption that he has uncovered 60% of all
slave trials ever held in Virginia. Id n.18.
395. Id. at 152-54. The overwhelming majority of those slaves killed (15 out of 17) did not
belong to the same owner as their attacker, and so the victims' owners were forced to use the
courts to recoup their loss of property. Id. at 154.
396. Id. at 96.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. In 1915, Ulrich Phillips accounted for 346 slaves convicted of first-degree murder
between 1780 and 1865, a figure also accepted by the more recent study of Daniel Flanigan.
Phillips, supra note 193, at 336; Flanigan, supra note 59, at 404. Schwarz contends that 376
slaves were convicted of murder in this period. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 233. These
figures deal with first-degree murder only and do not account for insurrections such as Nat
Turner's rebellion.
400. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 230-35; Flanigan, supra note 59, at 50, 413-14.
401. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 231. The counties were Essex, Henry, Spotysylvania, and
Southampton, the last of which was the site of Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831. Id.
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der fellow blacks. °2 Several cases reveal some of the motives behind
slaves' murders of their white masters. Revenge was often a factor:
A Virginia Slave murdered her mistress in 1827, apparently be-
cause the mistress had denied the slave the right to marry the
man she wanted. In the same year a husband and wife, who
were the property of different owners, conspired to poison her
master because he refused to allow her husband to see her.
Two years later a slave conspired to murder a white man who
was preparing to sell the slave's wife and child." 3
Slave conspiracies to murder their masters were reactions to the treat-
ment the slaves received:
Such conspiracies usually resulted from habitual cruel treat-
ment by a master or overseer. A Virginia lawyer asked the gov-
ernor to transport certain slaves because the crime had been the
consequence of "the severity and privations which they en-
dured under the discipline of a most rigid master, .. ." In an-
other case six slaves dispatched a master who had chained a
slave who was also his daughter because she refused to have
sexual intercourse with him.'
In another case,
[a] slave had accidentally allowed a tree that he was cutting to
fall on a white man's dog. The white approached the slave
threatening to give him 500 lashes, but the slave struck first,
with his axe. Though the slave might intend originally to keep
the master from beating him, pent-up hatred might cause him
to kill the white who had dominated him for so many years. A
Virginia slave told a white witness that his master was "such a
rascal and has treated me so mean," and that "when he first
struck he did not intend to kill him, but something, he could
not tell what, had induced him to repeat the blows." Another
402. Flanigan suggests that around two-thirds of victims murdered by slaves between 1790
and 1864 were white. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 404. Schwarz contends that 55.6% of the
victims of slave murders were white in this period, but also notes that high murder rates of
whites coincided with periods of slave resistance and insurrection. SCHWARZ, supra note 25,
at 232, 246-47. For example, in the years from 1795 to 1799, which immediately preceded
Gabriel's Plot in 1800, 77.3% of the murder victims of slaves were white. Id. at 233. Simi-
larly, three quarters of the murder victims of slaves were white in the five years prior to Nat
Turner's rebellion in 1831. Id.
403. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 54 & n.70 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Common-
wealth v. Judy, Aug. 25, 1827 (Sept. 21-30 folder); id., Commonwealth v. Billy, Sept. 27, 1827
(Sept. 21-30 folder); Id., Commonwealth v. Frederick, Jan. 26, 1829 (Feb. 10-20 folder)).
404. Id. at 54-55, 55 n.71 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Letter from Richard K.
Craler to Governor, Apr. 2, 1827; id., Commonwealth v. Petty, Sept. 10, 1830 (May-Sept.
folder) ("In this case the female slaves involved were transported, but the male slaves were
hanged.")).
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slave "rejoiced as he dug his master's grave, 'I have killed him
at last.' "o
Despite the unrelenting punishments and beatings that a slave might
receive at the hands of an overseer, an owner, or another white, there
were only rare instances in which a slave might claim self-defense in the
killing of a white person. Such cases generally involved whites of low
socioeconomic background." 6
Slaves killed their own children more often than white children. 4°7
Was it mercy killing?4 8 When white children were the victims, most
often the murderess was the child's nurse.4 9 In one case a slave
poisoned a white child because she was tired of having to get up with him
405. Id. at 57 & n.76 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Commonwealth v. Ben, Feb. 9,
1835 (1835 folder); id., Commonwealth v. Allen, Oct. 19, 1827 (Oct. 12-30 folder); JOHNSTON,
supra note 199, at 28).
406. Consider, for example, Schwarz's discussion of a slave, Jacob, who in 1818 was found
not guilty on grounds of self-defense of stabbing a white man. Those who had testified against
Jacob did not themselves own slaves or land, and the victim, James Miller, was himself of
relatively low social status. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 240-41.
407. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 51, 404.
408. An earlier article by one of the authors discusses the prosecution of a mother for the
murder of an infant child. Though the case arose in a different jurisdiction, we think it exem-
plifies the distraught condition of many slave mothers in Missouri and Virginia. In Jane (a
slave) v. State, 3 Mo. 45 (1831), Jane was convicted of the murder of her infant child,
Angeline.
She was charged with "knowingly, willfully, feloniously and of her malice afore-
thought" mixing "a certain deadly poison" and giving it to her infant child to drink
on December eighth and ninth. The indictment alleged that On December eleventh,
so "that she might more speedily kill and murder said Angeline" with "malice afore-
thought" she wrapped and covered Angeline in bed clothes and then "choked, suffo-
cated and smothered" her, and that, as a result of the poisoning and the smothering,
the infant died.
Thus, the state prosecuted the mother vigorously for taking the life of her slave
child. Did the state prosecute because it cared about the dignity and life of a child
born into lifetime slavery with the concomitant disadvantages of Missouri's law? Or
did the state prosecute because Jane's master was denied the profit that he would
have someday earned from the sale or exploitation of Angeline? Was the state fearful
that if mothers started to kill their slave infants it might jeopardize the potential
wealth of slave masters?
... Perhaps the mother recognized that someday her daughter would be
snatched from her and put on the auction block and that a master would use Ange-
line as a breeder to increase his economic wealth. Perhaps the mother anticipated
that someday her daughter's body would be laced with scars from whips of brutal
overseers and masters, with the type of vengeance that Missouri law sanctioned
against blacks. Perhaps the mother felt that the taking of her daughter's life was an
act of mercy compared to the cruelty she might confront in Missouri's jurisprudence.
Higginbotham, Missouri Jurisprudence, supra note 12, at 694-95 (citing Jane, 3 Mo. at 45-49
(citations omitted)); id. at 694-96 (discussing Jane in the context of Missouri jurisprudence).
409. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 51, 52 n.68 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Common-
wealth v. Nelly, May 30, 1834 (July folder)).
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at night.410
According to Flanigan, case law from other states indicates that the
crime of poisoning was a favorite among female slaves.411 Slaves were
known to poison their masters under the guise of giving them
medicine. 412 Any slave caught administering medicine of any kind, un-
less by order of the master, was guilty of a felony without benefit of
clergy.41 3 Only if the slave could prove she did not intend to injure her
master would she be eligible for benefit of clergy.414 Flanigan describes a
rather amusing account of the various poisons used by slaves when such
common poisons as arsenic and strychnine were unavailable: "'Pow-
dered scopions [sic] ashes, four snake heads, and spiders beaten together
in buttermilk,' 'rat's bane,' 'mixtures of leaves and heads of reptiles,'
powdered glass and even crushed puppies comprised part of the
menu."
415
Ironically, slaves could strike terror in the hearts of their masters
despite the masters' absolute dominion over them. In one instance, a
slaveowner named John Dosewell urged the governor to execute his slave
rather than transport him.416 The slave had attempted to poison his
master.41 7 Dosewell wrote that slaveowners
are in a great degree in the power of their slaves, who cook and
prepare all their food .... The owners of slaves must abandon
them entirely, or live in a condition almost worse than death, if
their slaves shall once find out that they may improve the op-
portunity of their malignity, which is twice, and sometimes
thrice every day presented, at the hazard only of exchange of
residence.41 8
Dosewell's comments reveal the degree to which a frightened slave-
holder could lose sight of the far greater misery and terror the slave suf-
fered. To declare that masters "are in a great degree in the power of
their slaves" is to dramatize how distorted a slaveowner's perception
could become. While masters may indeed have feared their slaves, the
most obvious solution-to "abandon them entirely"-apparently was not
410. Id.
411. Id. at 53 (citing State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57, 58 (1847); Jane v. Commonwealth, 59
Ky. (2 Met.) 30, 31 (1859); Josephine v. State, 39 Miss. 613, 615 (1861)).
412. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 310-11.
413. Id. at 311.
414. Id.; see id. at 311 n.67 (discussing prosecutions for this offense).
415. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 53; see also JOHNSTON, supra note 199, at 27 (same).
416. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 52.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 52, 53 n.69 (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Letter from John D. Dosewell
to Governor & Executive Council, Aug. 9, 1828 (Aug. 1-10 folder)).
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seriously considered. Furthermore, Dosewell's claim of fear is rather
suspect when one considers that he chose to live in this "condition almost
worse than death. 419 He speaks as if he had no choice in the matter.
Perhaps most ironic, this slaveowner viewed living in fear of his slaves,
rather than slavery itself, as a condition worse than death.
3. Assault and Battery
a. White Assaults, Black Victims
The cases involving whites assaulting blacks reveal a great deal
about the values of antebellum judges and legislators and their percep-
tions concerning the human status, or lack thereof, of blacks. A recur-
ring question that arises in the study of slavery is whether white Virginia
judges regarded slaves primarily as human beings and only secondarily
as chattels, or whether slaves were perceived primarily as property whose
human qualities and suffering were irrelevant considerations for the
courts. In his vigorous dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford,42 Justice
MacLean emphasized that "[a] slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the
impress of his maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and
he is destined to an endless existence." 21 MacLean's position was that
federal jurisprudence should be predicated on the assumption that blacks
were human beings, and that these human factors must be taken into
consideration both when adjudicating property claims and when constru-
ing the United States Constitution.
Likewise, in 1823 Chief Justice John Louis Taylor of North Caro-
lina wrote that courts must "keep pace with the march of benignant pol-
icy, and provident humanity, which for many years has characterized
every legislative act, relative to the protection of slaves, and which Chris-
tianity by the mild diffusion of its light and influence, has contributed to
promote." 22 In the adjacent state of Virginia, however, the appellate
cases do not reveal any of the benign policy or "provident humanity" of
which Chief Justice Taylor and Justice MacLean spoke. Instead, with at
most one possible exception, in assault cases the Virginia appellate courts
were concerned primarily with the status of the offender rather than with
the egregiousness of the harm or injury to the slave.
Assault and battery of a slave, free black, or mulatto went largely
unpunished. As already noted, by statute and case law the assault of a
419. Id. (citing Va. Archives, supra note 134, Letter from John D. Dosewell to Governor &
Executive Council, Aug. 9, 1828 (Aug. 1-10 folder)).
420. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 529-64 (1857) (MacLean, J., dissenting).
421. Id. at 550 (MacLean, J., dissenting).
422. State v. Hall, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582, 583 (1823).
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slave was not recognized as a criminal offense in the eighteenth cen-
tury.42 3 Between 1800 and 1860 there were eight reported appellate cases
involving the indictment of whites for either the murder or assault of
blacks.424 It is unknown how many whites were prosecuted or acquitted
in the trial courts; if acquitted, there would have been no appeal and
thus, no appellate record of the case. The dearth of appellate cases and
the courts' frequent sanction of assaults on slaves by white hirers and
masters suggest, however, that criminal prosecutions were rare.
In those sporadic instances when a prosecution did occur, the
records suggest that most often its impetus was primarily to protect the
slaveowner's property rights and to serve as a warning to others that
slave property should not be damaged by persons who were neither the
owner nor his designee.425
The first appellate case dealing with an assault on a slave was Com-
monwealth v. Chapple,426 in which a woman, Dolly Chapple, was in-
dicted and convicted by a jury under the general mayhem statute
prohibiting the malicious stabbing of a slave.427 Her race was not speci-
fied in the opinion and there was no reference as to whether she owned
the slave; given the extraordinary authority of the master over the slave,
however, the court undoubtedly would have stated that she was the
423. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678, 685-86 (1827). For further dis-
cussion of Turner, see infra notes 449-85 and accompanying text.
424. Retrieval of the original appellate cases is extremely difficult; we have therefore relied
on Helen Catterall's listing of cases. See 1-4 CATrERALL, supra note 169 (listing all known
cases discussing slaves and slavery in America). After reading the original records of all of the
reported cases in Virginia in which whites were indicted for murdering or assaulting blacks, we
have been able to identify only eight. These cases are: Souther v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7
Gratt.) 673 (1851); Commonwealth v. Howard, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 661 (1841); Brooks v. Com-
monwealth, 31 Va. 721, 4 Leigh 669 (1833); Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678
(1827); Commonwealth v. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660 (1827); Commonwealth v. Booth, 4
Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 394 (1824); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 158 (1819); Com-
monwealth v. Chapple, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 184 (1811).
425. A civil case from 1792 indicates the proprietary (as opposed to humanitarian) concern
of the master for the well-being of his slave. In Hoomes v. Kuhn, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 274 (1792),
Kuhn suspected a slave belonging to Hoomes of robbing his store, and he whipped the slave
severely. Id. at 274. Upon hearing of the whipping Hoomes confronted Kuhn, and a fist fight
ensued. Kuhn sued Hoomes for assault and battery and had the slave prosecuted for theft. Id.
The slave was acquitted. Id. Hoomes then brought an action against Kuhn for whipping the
slave and recovered 17 pounds. Id. Kuhn's counsel noted that Hoomes had "recovered com-
pensation for the personal affront received by whipping the slave, without his knowledge." Id.
at 277. For this "personal affront," a jury awarded Hoomes "vindictive damages, there being
no actual loss of service sustained." Id. at 278.
426. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 184 (1811).
427. Act of Jan. 28, 1803, ch. 4, § 2, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra
note 102, at 405, 405.
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owner if that were the case, just as they did in other cases.428 On the
other hand, if the assailant, Chapple, were black, it is unlikely there
would have been any prosecution.
The statute under which Chapple was indicted provided that the
victim was entitled to receive three-fourths of a fine levied against the
perpetrator of the crime.429 Chapple argued that since a slave could not
legally hold property, the legislature could not have intended to make the
stabbing of a slave a punishable offense.430
The argument of Chapple's attorney is typical of the specious rea-
soning that so often was set forth to "prove"-as Chief Justice Taney
later asserted-that blacks "had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect."431 The attorney general argued on behalf of Virginia
that there is nothing in the law which shews clearly that an
injury to a slave was not intended to be made punishable: that
there were no words of exclusion, or exception, and that a slave
in this country has been frequently decided to be legally and
technically a person, on whom a wrong can be inflicted; that
the giving a portion of the fine to the party grieved was in-
tended to benefit him, and that his incapacity to take, ought not
to skreen the prisoner from punishment.432
Chapple's argument that it was not a crime to stab a slave because the
slave could not receive compensation may have struck a perilous doctri-
nal fear in the court, because such an argument could be applied tofemes
covert-married women-who under Virginia law could not own prop-
erty in their own names.433 The attorney general stressed that
femes covert could not take the fine, and it would be monstrous
to contend that the act did not include injuries to them: and
that there was no difficulty in rendering judgment against the
accused for the whole fine assessed by the jury, although the
person grieved might not be able to obtain his portion.434
The court held that under section 3 of the Act of 1803, a malicious stab-
bing of a slave was indeed indictable.435
428. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678, 685-86 (1827), discussed
infra notes 449-85 and accompanying text.
429. Chapple, 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) at 185 (citing Act of Jan. 28, 1803, ch. 4, § 2, in II THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 405, 405).
430. Id. at 184-85.
431. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
432. Chapple, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 185.
433. Id. at 185-86.
434. Id. at 185.
435. Id. at 186; see Act of Jan. 28, 1803, ch. 4, § 3, in II THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 405, 405-06.
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Chapple was an important case because, at least obliquely, it recog-
nized some semblance of humanity in the slave by holding that the legis-
lature intended to make it a crime to maliciously stab a slave. Yet while
some might call Chapple a humanitarian decision, one also could ask
whether it was based more on a desire to protect the master's property
than on humanitarian concerns. Subsequent Virginia case law confirmed
this latter view, clearly rejected any humanitarian inferences attributable
to Chapple, and emphasized that the slave's protection was for the benefit
of the master.
In Commonwealth v. Booth,43 6 for example, Richard Booth was in-
dicted for aggravated assault upon a hired slave, Bob, belonging to Rob-
ert Fenn. 37 While Bob was under his control, Booth allegedly "did
violently, severely and cruelly beat, bruise, wound and exceedingly ill
treat [him], so that [Bob's] life was thereby greatly endangered, and...
to the great damage of the said Robert Fenn, his owner and proprietor,
to the evil example of all others in like cases offending."43 The jury
found the defendant guilty and assessed a sixty dollar fine, subject to the
court's decision on two questions:
1. Can the Defendant be indicted and punished for the exces-
sive, cruel and inhuman infliction of stripes on the slave
Bob, while in his possession, and under his control as a
hired slave, for the space of one month, permanent injury
having resulted to the said slave from such infliction?
2. Can the Defendant be punished under the Indictment
found in this Case?439
The court declined to answer the first question because it involved "a
grave and serious [issue], as well as delicate enquiry into the rights and
duties of slave-holders, and the condition of their slaves."'  Concerning
the second question, the court found the indictment inadequate in failing
to specify the relation of the parties and to charge "that it is the excess of
the punishment which is complained of, and not, that the right to punish
at all, is questioned."" 1 The court held that by proving that, as an em-
ployer, he had temporary ownership of the slave, the defendant was enti-
tled to a judgment of acquittal in his favor.' 2 In declining to decide the
first certified question, the court was particularly reluctant to grant a
436. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 394 (1824).
437. Id. at 394.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 396.
441. Id. at 395.
442. Id. at 396.
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hirer of slaves any immunity when the owner claimed civil damages-
particularly when, as noted in the first question, there was permanent
injury to the slave.
Three years after Booth, the issue of the criminal liability of stran-
gers assaulting slaves arose in Commonwealth v. Carver."3 The defend-
ant, William Carver, was indicted for "feloniously, maliciously, and
unlawfully shooting, with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, and kill, a
negro man slave of the name of Armistead, the property of Andrew
Houston." 4  The indictment was brought under the general mayhem
statute of 1819. 44' Upon being convicted by a jury, Carver moved to
arrest the judgment on the ground that it was not a felony for a free
white man to shoot a Negro slave.4
The superior court judge "adjourned" the case to the general court
to decide whether a slave was someone on whom a free person could
commit the offense of mayhem under the 1819 act." 7 Judge Brocken-
brough, speaking for the court, held that a Negro slave was indeed a
person on whom a free white person could commit the offense of may-
hem. The opinion, however, is bereft of any sympathy for the injury the
slave endured. Instead, the court conceded that the case was prosecuted
for "the benefit of the master" and that the conviction was sustained
solely on that basis:
[T]here appears no reason, arising from the relative situation of
master and slave, why a free person should not be punished as a
felon for maiming a slave. Whatever power our laws may give
to a master over his slave, it is as important for the interest of
the former, as for the safety of the latter, that a stranger should
not be permitted to exercise an unrestrained and lawless au-
thority over him. It is for the benefit of the master, and consol-
ing to his feelings, that a third person should be restrained
under the pains and penalties of felony, from maiming and disa-
bling his slave." 8
In one of the most devastating decisions to emerge from the high
court of Virginia regarding the rights of blacks, the general court drew a
443. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660 (1827).
444. Id. at 660-61.
445. "'Mayhem' at common law is defined as the unlawful and violent deprivation of an-
other of the use of such of his members as may render him less able in fighting to defend
himself .. " 57 C.J.S. Mayhem § 1 (1948).
446. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 661.
447. Id. The superior court judge believed that the slave was not a person under that act,
but the judge felt constrained by the general court's earlier decision in Chapple. He therefore
adjourned the question to the general court. Id.
448. Id. at 665.
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clear and sharp distinction between the right of a master to assault a
slave maliciously and the right of a mere stranger to do so. In Common-
wealth v. Turner,' 9 decided in 1827 (the same year as Carver), Turner
was indicted for cruelly beating his slave, Emanuel, "with certain rods,
whips and sticks."4 5 The defendant demurred"' to the indictment, and
the superior court certified to the general court the issue of whether a
master may be indicted and punished by fine and imprisonment "for the
malicious, cruel, and excessive beating of his own Slave." '452
The court sustained the demurrer, ruling that an owner could not be
criminally liable for excessive battery of his slave.453 Judge Dade, writ-
ing for the majority, concluded that while no statute precluded indict-
ment of the master for such conduct, the common law could not be
applied to punish it.454 Judge Dade obviously was concerned about the
immorality of the decision that he was rendering. Nevertheless, he pro-
tested a bit too much. He introduced his opinion by saying:
In coming to a decision upon this delicate and important
question, the Court has considered it to be its duty to ascertain,
not what may be expedient, or morally, or politically right in
relation to this matter, but what is the law. It is its duty to
expound and declare the actual law; and not to make, or amend
it.455
After this protestation he launched into one of the most lengthy exe-
geses on slavery and biblical law ever written in a slavery case. Judge
Dade observed that when slavery was first introduced into Virginia,
neither English common law nor early colonial legislation provided any
guidance concerning the treatment of slaves.4 56 He said "[t]he rules were
to be established, either by the positive enactments of the lawmaking
power, or to be deduced from the Codes of other countries, where that
condition of man was tolerated." '457 Judge Dade then embarked on a
lengthy discourse on the history of slavery; he first discussed the systems
of slavery that existed among the Jews, the ancient Greeks, and the an-
449. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827).
450. Id.
45 1. In the common-law system of pleading, the "demurrer" was a responsive pleading by
the defendant in which he admitted the facts alleged in the indictment or complaint but dis-
puted the legal sufficiency of those allegations. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 432-33 (6th
ed. 1990).
452. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 678.
453. Id. at 680-81
454. Id at 684-86.
455. Id. at 678.
456. Id. at 680.
457. Id.
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cient Romans.458 He found no support for the indictment from these
sources, concluding that "[tlhe uncontrolled power of the captor over the
life of his captive might be readily understood to imply every inferior
power."459 He noted further'that under the system of villeinage in Eng-
land, the master could be indicted for maiming his villein because, ac-
cording to Lord Coke, the villein was a subject of the King. 6 Judge
Dade surmised that punishment for this brutality was not based on any
concept of "the rights of the villein, the cause of humanity, or the good
order and manners or morals of society," but rather on the fact "that the
villein was, by the maiming, less serviceable to the King in his wars. '"461
Similarly, Judge Dade opined that when the courts have held a
slaveowner criminally liable for violently beating his slave in the open
market place,
it is not because it was a slave who was beaten, nor because the
act was unprovoked or cruel; but, because ipsofacto it disturbed
the harmony of society; was offensive to public decency, and
directly tended to a breach of the peace. The same would be
the law, if a horse had been so beaten. And yet it would not be
pretended that it was in respect to the rights of the horse, or the
feelings of humanity, that this interposition would take
place.46 2
Judge Dade found no support for the indictment in Virginia statutory or
common law. He observed that no statute criminalized slave assault.463
He then noted that from 1669 to 1788, the slaveowner was expressly ex-
empted by statute from criminal liability for killing his slaves in the
course of correcting them.4' Hence, the master could not be punished
for inflicting any lesser injury on the slave during correction.465
Judge Dade conceded that "[s]ince 1788, the life of the slave is pro-
tected by the laws equally with that of the freeman. And the statutes for
punishing maiming extend as well to the protection of the bond as the
free, from this high and aggravated degree of personal injury. ' 46 6 He
nevertheless concluded that the common law provided the slave no pro-
tection from "minor injuries" (i.e., anything less than maiming) which
the master inflicted, and that even if it did, such law was "nullified" by
458. Id. at 681.
459. Id. at 682-83.
460. Id. at 683-84.
461. Id. at 684.
462. Id. at 680.
463. Id. at 684-85.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 685.
466. Id.
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the statutory scheme that had existed from 1669 to 1788.467
Judge Dade reasoned that to criminalize a cruel slave battery would
be to create new common law, which he ruled the court had no power to
do.4 65 He referred to two earlier cases in which the court had held that it
lacked the power to criminalize conduct not penalized expressly by stat-
ute.469 In his words, "great changes are not to be made by the courts. It
is only silent, and almost imperceptible changes, which are recognized,
and in due time, confirmed, and established by the judicial tribunals."470
Judge Dade felt obliged to comment, "It is greatly to be deplored
that an offence so odious and revolting as this, should exist to the re-
proach of humanity."47 1 Nevertheless, he concluded that the courts were
powerless to protect the slave from cruel, malicious, and excessive beat-
ings by his master, and he deferred to both the "tribunal of public opin-
ion" and the legislature to criminalize this conduct.472
In an impassioned and well-reasoned dissent, Judge Brockenbrough
found full support in the common law for the indictment.47 (Judge
Brockenbrough, it must be remembered, authored the opinion in
Carver.474) Whereas Judge Dade had emphasized that slave killing,
when committed by a master, was not punishable from 1669 to 1788,
Judge Brockenbrough countered that from 1620 to 1669, and from 1788
to the present, it was a felony for a master to kill his slave.47 Otherwise,
he reasoned, there would have been no need for the 1669 statute about
the "casuall killing of slaves" that decriminalized this conduct.476 When
"this ferocious and sanguinary system of legislation was abolished...
[in] 1788," he continued, "[b]y that repeal, the common law was ex-
467. Id.
468. Id. at 685-86.
469. Id. at 679 (citing Anderson v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. 803, 805, 5 Leigh 740, 741-42
(1835); Commonwealth v. Isaacs, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 634, 637 (1826)).
470. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 686.
471. Id.
472. Id. These words were echoed in large part by Judge Thomas Ruffin two years later in
State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 268 (1829). In holding that the master must retain
absolute power over his slaves, even to the extent of being allowed to shoot them if necessary,
Judge Ruffin stated: "I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this proposition; I feel
it as deeply as any man can; and as a principle of moral right every person in his retirement
must repudiate it. But in the actual condition of things it must be so. There is no remedy."
Id. at 266.
473. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 688-90 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
474. See Commonwealth v. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660, 661 (1827), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 443-48.
475. Id. (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
476. Id. at 687 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
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pressly revived." 77
Judge Brockenbrough essentially engaged in a balancing of interests
between the master's property rights and the state's interest in punishing
excessive and unnecessary infliction of pain. He reasoned that the de-
struction of slave property was not necessary to the master's full enjoy-
ment of his property rights. 78 Under the common law
[t]he slave was not only a thing, but a person, and this well-
known distinction would extend its protection to the slave as a
person, except so far as the application of it conflicted with the
enjoyment of the slave as a thing. Upon this ground, was [the
slave] protected .... I see no incompatibility between this de-
gree of protection, and the full enjoyment of the right of
property.479
Judge Brockenbrough remarked that if a person could be indicted
under Massachusetts law for poisoning a cow, or under Pennsylvania law
for killing a horse, then similarly an indictment could be sustained under
Virginia law for the malicious and inhuman beating of a slave.480 He
quite astutely observed, moreover, that adoption of his position would
not have negative consequences for society:
When it is recollected, that our Courts and Juries are composed
of men who, for the most part, are masters, I cannot conceive
that any injury can accrue to the rights and interests of that
class of the community. And with respect to the slaves, whilst
kindness and humane treatment are calculated to render them
contented and happy, is there no danger that oppression and
tyranny, against which there is no redress, may drive them to
despair?481
Judge Dade's majority opinion in Turner was a diminution of the
spirit and substance of Chapple and Carver, in which the court had been
willing to protect the slave under the mayhem statute despite there being
no affirmative protection of the slave in the language of the statute.482 In
declining to adopt Judge Brockenbrough's view that there should be lim-
its on the master's power to beat a slave, the general court's majority
adopted the uncompromising view that the master must have absolute
477. Id. at 689 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
478. Id. at 688 (Brockenbrough, ., dissenting).
479. Id. at 688-89 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
480. Id. at 689 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
481. Id. at 690 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting).
482. See Commonwealth v. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660, 661-65 (1827), discussed supra
notes 443-48 and accompanying text; Commonwealth v. Chapple, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 184, 185-
86 (1811), discussed supra notes 426-35 and accompanying text.
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power and the slave must be powerless.4" 3 The implication of Turner is
that a slave in Virginia had fewer protections than a cow in Massachu-
setts or a horse in Pennsylvania.
An interesting contrast can be made between Judge Dade's observa-
tion that the English villein, as a subject of the King, was protected from
maiming, and Governor Spotswood's view, a century earlier, that a slave
was the King's subject and thus could not be willfully destroyed.48 4
Judge Dade apparently did not take the view that the slave was a citizen
who could be rendered "less serviceable" to his country by maiming. In
comparing the American system of slavery to the English villeinage sys-
tem, Judge Dade did not draw the conclusion one might have pre-
dicted-that just as a villein was less serviceable to the King, so was a
slave rendered less serviceable to his country.485
In the 1841 case Commonwealth v. Howard4 8 6 the general court
held that a white person could be indicted for knowingly and willfully
injuring a female slave "by violently and inhumanely assaulting and beat-
ing her to the great injury of the slave, and to the great damage of [the
owner]. 48 7 What was notable about the court's decision, however, was
not so much the fact that it sustained the indictment, but the court's
basis for doing so. The statute upon which the indictment was founded
was one that protected trees "or any other timber, or property, real or
personal, belonging to another" from being cut down, destroyed, or in-
jured.488 The court sustained the indictment under this statute based on
the slave's status as property rather than as a person.48 9 The same stat-
ute had been interpreted in 1834, in Commonwealth v. PercaVil490 to pro-
tect "living domestic animals," not just inanimate objects.491 Hence,
while the court in Howard was willing to punish brutality toward the
slave, it did so by treating the slave as property under a willful trespass
483. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829), discussed supra note 472.
484. See supra text accompanying note 338.
485. See GUILD, supra note 2, at 191 (citing Act of 1782, ch. VIII, § III, in 9 HENING'S
STATUTEs AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 352-53). This Act notes that "[d]uring the Revolu-
tionary War, many slaves were enlisted by their owners.... Because such slaves have contrib-
uted towards American liberty and independence, they are all deemed free and may sue, in
forma pauperis, and may recover damages if detained." Id.
486. 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 661 (1841).
487. Id. at 661-62.
488. Act of Feb. 14, 1823, ch. 34, § 1, 1822-23 Va. Acts 36, 36-37 (act "to provide for the
more effectual punishment of certain offenses").
489. Howard, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) at 661-62.
490. 31 Va. 740, 4 Leigh 686 (1834).
491. Id. at 741, 4 Leigh at 687.
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statute, thereby protecting the master's interests rather than the slave as
a human being.
The views of the Virginia courts on assaults of slaves may be sum-
marized by noting that the courts' humanitarian concerns were directly
related to the master's advantage. While humanitarian concerns may be
inferred in cases involving strangers who assaulted slaves, such concerns
were less evident when hirers of slaves were involved, and the humanita-
rian concern for the slaves evaporated when the master was the defend-
ant. The assault cases demonstrate that even for those who considered a
slave a human being, the slave, nevertheless, was at the bottom of the
barrel of humanity. One judge stated in Carver that "an alien enemy" is
entitled to all of the protection of the mayhem statute and that "whilst he
is permitted to remain in the country, yet he cannot maintain an action
during the war: it cannot for a moment be supposed that he may be shot,
stabbed, disfigured or disabled, without subjecting the offender to the
other pains and penalties of the act." '4 92 In antebellum Virginia, slaves
had a lower status even than alien enemies loyal to a foreign government.
b. Black Assaults, White Victims
Virginia statutes aimed at free blacks offer the most telling evidence
that the state's criminal law governing assaults was racially motivated
rather than based on status as free man or bondsman. A free black found
to have assaulted a white would be punished by whipping,493 whereas no
such penalty existed for whites assaulting a black. Such punishments
served to degrade blacks, free or slave, to cast them as inferior beings,
and to bring them closer to the lowly status of the slave. There was no
pretext for laws such as these; they simply reflected the white man's con-
tempt for the black man.
Any aggressive gesture toward a white by a black was punishable,
and blacks received a heavier penalty than whites did for assaulting
whites. One of Virginia's earliest laws provided that if a black, mulatto,
or Indian "lift[ed] up his hand" against a Christian white, he was to re-
ceive thirty lashes.494 Prohibited actions included "provoking language
or menacing gestures" directed at a white person.495
492. Commonwealth v. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660, 664 (1827), discussed supra notes
443-48 and accompanying text.
493. Act of Oct. 1748, ch. XXXVIII, § XX, in 6 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 104, 110 (act "directing the trial of Slaves committing capital crimes").
494. Act of June 1680, Act X, in 2 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 481,
481-82 (act "for preventing Negroes Insurrections").
495. Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. XII, § 6, 1847-48 Va. Acts 125, 125 (act "to reduce into one
the several acts concerning crimes and punishments, and proceedings in criminal cases").
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In 1728 Sambo, a black slave, was convicted of theft and striking a
white man.496 The court ordered the sheriff to give him thirty-nine
lashes "and then sett him in the pillory and naile both his Ears, therefore
to stand one hour and at the Expiration of the same to cut them both
off."' 4 9 7 It is not clear from the record whether the slave received this
penalty because he had committed theft or because he had struck a white
man.
Punishment for assaults on whites became increasingly severe. An
1823 law provided that any black or mulatto punished for this offense
was to be whipped and "banished from the United States forever. If such
convict at any time shall return, he shall suffer death without benefit of
clergy."498 In 1832, in the aftermath of the August 1831 Nat Turner
rebellion, the punishment was changed to death.4 9 9 In 1846 the punish-
ment was changed again to imprisonment for five to eighteen years.Sc °
And finally, in 1848, the punishment was death or, at the jury's discre-
tion, imprisonment for one to five years.51 It was obvious that the sever-
ity of one's punishment depended on race. Whites who assaulted free
blacks or other whites with intent to kill were subject merely to imprison-
ment for one to ten years.502
4. Rape or Attempted Rape
a. Rape of Black Women
If the murder and assault of blacks were rarely prosecuted in ante-
bellum Virginia, the situation with respect to the rape of black women
was even worse. Legislation provided that "[i]f any free white man do
ravish a woman over the age of ten years, when she did not consent
before nor after,... the person so offending, his aiders, counsellors and
abettors shall be adjudged felons. 5 °3 Since the statute refers to women
in general, rather than to white women, presumably the rape of a free
496. RICHMOND COUNTY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 138, at 111.
497. d
498. Act of Feb. 21, 1823, ch. 33, § 1, 1822-23 Va. Acts 36, 36 (act "to provide more
effectually for the punishment of slaves, free negroes and mulattoes, found guilty of assaulting
and beating, with intention to kill, a white person, and for other purposes").
499. Act of Mar. 15, 1832, ch. XXII, § 6, 1831-32 Va. Acts 20, 21 (act "to amend an act
entitled, 'an act for reducing into one the several acts concerning slaves, free negroes and
mulattoes, and for other purposes' "); see SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 27.
500. GUILD, supra note 2, at 115 (citing Act of 1846, ch. 94, § 1, 1845-46 Va. Acts 66, 66).
501. Act of Mar. 14, 1848, ch. XIII, § 2, 1847-48 Va. Acts 126, 126 (act "to reduce into
one the several acts concerning crimes and punishments, and proceedings in criminal cases").
502. Id. cl. XI, § 12, 1847-48 Va. Acts 121, 123.
503. CHAPMAN JOHNSON & ROBERT G. SCOTT, REVISION AND DIGEST OF THE CRIMI-
NAL CODE OF VIRGINIA 36-37 (1846).
1992] 1055
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
black woman would have been a punishable offense. We have found no
reported cases, however, in which a white was prosecuted for the rape or
attempted rape of a black woman, free or slave. The only two eight-
eenth-century cases involving the prosecution of black slaves for raping
slave women date from 1783; in one case the defendant was acquitted
and in the other the charges were dropped." 4 Statistics on slaves con-
demned to death indicate that in two instances, a slave was sentenced to
death for the rape of a mulatto woman. 5
In the nineteenth century the government prosecuted the rape of a
black woman in only a handful of cases. 6 In 1829 a slave, Lewis, was
found guilty of the rape of Amey Baker, a free black, and executed.50 7 In
1850 a slave named John was sentenced to be transported out of the
Commonwealth for raping a slave woman, but this case seems to be the
only instance in which the rape of a slave incurred such a penalty.50 8 As
for the treatment of female slaves by their masters, it seems to have been
understood that a master had the right to do whatever he wished with his
property, so long as she did not die from the abuse.5 9
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not address directly the
question whether a slave had any personal rights that could be violated
by rape, but the other slave states that debated this issue decided that no
such rights existed. Mississippi 5 10 and Missouri,51 1 for example, decided
that the rape of a slave woman was simply not a crime, even when com-
mitted by a slave. When it involved the prosecution of black slaves for
the rape of black slave women, Virginia, unlike other states, did not de-
clare that such rapes were not a crime. But no declaration was neces-
sary, because "[t]he law simply did not criminalize the rape of slave
504. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 156 n.45 (citing trial of Toby, Dec. 2, 1783, Norfolk
County Ct. Minute Book 1782-83, at 222; cancelled trial of Kitt, July 29, 1783, Westmoreland
County Ct. Order Book 1776-86, at 148).
505. See Phillips, supra note 193, at 337. No date is given for these cases.
506. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 205-10.
507. Id. at 207.
508. Id. at 293 (citing trial of Coleman, Nov. 17, 1856, Mecklenburg County Ct. Order
Book 1853-58, at 353).
509. For a discussion of fornication laws, see Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex, supra note 12, at 1989-2007.
510. See George v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 318-20 (1859) (holding that rape of a female slave
under the age of ten by a slave was not a crime because English common law did not recognize
slavery and thus recognized no rights of slaves, and because Mississippi extended no such
rights through legislation; all rights in slave rested with master).
511. In State v. Celia, Vol. 2 Index to Ct. Cases of Callaway County, File No. 4,496 (1855),
the Missouri Supreme Court held that a slave woman could not kill her master in resisting his
sexual assaults. See id. at 13. (The Clerk of Callaway County paginated only the front of each
page; thus, citation to page numbers may include either the front or the back of that page.)
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women." 512 This is not to suggest that slave women in Virginia were
distinctly better off than slave women elsewhere. What is significant is
that there was not one reported prosecution of a white man for the sexual
assault of a black or mulatto woman in either colonial or antebellum
Virginia. This fact provides one of the most telling illustrations of black
women's complete and utter powerlessness before the criminal laws of
Virginia.
513
b. Rape of White Women
Compared to the rape of black women, the rape of a white woman,
particularly by a black man, was one of the most serious offenses an indi-
vidual could commit in Virginia. For most of the colonial era Virginia
did not formally recognize any differences in punishment of whites and
blacks convicted of the rape of a white woman; men of both races faced
the death penalty for this crime." 4 The evidence is at best fragmen-
tary-historian Arthur Scott uncovered only ten cases of rape and two
cases of attempted rape prior to 1774."1 In these cases, however, signifi-
cant differences may be discerned in the patterns of prosecution against
blacks and whites accused of raping white women. Six white men were
accused of rape.516 In three of the cases, the men were acquitted,5 17 and
in one a servant convicted of attempted rape was given thirty-nine lashes,
was made to wear an iron collar, and was required to serve several addi-
tional terms.5"' Two of the white men were found guilty and condemned
to death, one in 1627 for seducing four girls under the age of consent 19
and one in 1774, although there is no record of the crime or an execution
in this case.520 In contrast, three of the five blacks accused of raping
white women were found guilty and executed while two were found not'
guilty of rape but convicted of the lesser offense of assault.521 In a sixth
case, the general court recommended "[s]trong measures to... appre-
512. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 159.
513. The "slave woman [was] at the mercy of the fathers, sons or brothers of her master."
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 60 (photo. reprint 1968) (1855).
Regarding the consequences of fornication between a white man or woman and a slave, see
Higginbotham & Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex, supra note 12, at 2003 (discuss-
ing Commonwealth v. Jones, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 555 (1845)).
514. See Scorr, supra note 27, at 207-09 & nn.45-55.
515. For a list of these cases, see id. at 207-08 & n.53.
516. Id. at 207.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 208 n.53.
519. Id. at 207.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 208.
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hend Robin[,] a negro who had ravished a white woman. 5 22 There is no
record of whether he was captured or tried.
By the end of the colonial period, however, de facto racial bias gave
way to an explicit racial codification of the laws concerning the rape of
white women. In the nineteenth century, according to Flanigan:
Whites were far more concerned about the chastity of white
women than the physical security of slaves. Statistics from Vir-
ginia indicate that whites considered rape more serious even
than attempted murders and assaults on whites. For actual as
opposed to attempted rape a larger percentage of convicted
slaves suffered the death penalty than for murder of whites
523
As discussed above, there are no recorded prosecutions for the rape of a
black or mulatto woman by a white man. 2 4 But a number of cases in-
volving the prosecution of slaves for the rape or attempted rape of white
women were tried.5 25 Punishments for such crimes were severe, and at
various times legislation required that blacks convicted of rape or at-
tempted rape of a white woman be castrated. 26 Although a law of 1769
concluded that castration was too severe a penalty and would no longer
be imposed upon whites for certain offenses, castration for attempted
rape of a white woman continued to be permitted for blacks.5 27 The Act
of 1769 stated that "whereas dismembering is often disproportionate to
the offense, and contrary to the principles of humanity, it shall not now
be lawful to direct castration of any slave, except on conviction of an
attempt to ravish a white woman. '5 28 In 1823 the law was amended to
provide that slaves or free blacks who attempted to rape a white woman
were to "suffer death by hanging by the neck."5s29 Legislation enacted in
522. Id. n.51.
523. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 68 (citation omitted).
524. See supra text accompanying note 513.
525. Phillips notes that 73 slaves were convicted of rape and 32 slaves were convicted of
attempted rape between 1774 and 1864. Phillips, supra note 193, at 336-37. Schwarz states
that between 1724 and 1739, the "conviction rate in trials of slaves accused of raping a white
woman was 100[%]." SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 82.
526. GUILD, supra note 2, at 157 (citing Act of 1769, ch. XIX, in 8 HENING'S STATUTES
AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 358, 358-61); id. at 159 (citing Act of 1792, ch. 41, in I THE
STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 102, at 122, 122-30); see SCHWARZ, supra note
25, at 162-63, 206, 208.
527. Act of Nov. 1769, ch. XIX, § 1, in 8 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 358, 358 (act "to amend the Act, intituled an Act to amend the Act for the better govern-
ment of Servants and Slaves").
528. GUILD, supra note 2, at 157 (citing Act of 1769, ch. XIX, in 8 HENING'S STATUTES
AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 358, 358-61 (act "to amend the Act, intituled an Act to amend
the Act for the better government of Servants and Slaves")).
529. Id. at 163 (citing Act of 1823, ch. 34, § 1, 1822-23 Va. Acts 36, 36).
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1837 stipulated that blacks convicted of raping (as opposed to attempting
to rape) a white woman were to be sentenced to death without benefit of
clergy.5 3
0
Although slaves continued to be subject to the death penalty for
rape, an 1848 statute provided that free blacks convicted of rape or of
abducting a female with intent to defile could be subject either to the
death penalty or, "at the discretion of the jury confinement of five to
twenty years. '5 31 In contrast, whites guilty of rape were subject to im-
prisonment for ten to twenty years, and whites guilty of abduction with
intent to defile were subject to a three- to ten-year term of
imprisonment.5 32
The discrepancies in punishment were blatant. Whereas a white
man convicted of raping a white woman would receive ten to twenty
years imprisonment, a free black convicted of the same offense could re-
ceive death or imprisonment for five to twenty years.533
These numerous revisions in the slave criminal code reveal the
growing paranoia of the white male elite in nineteenth-century Virginia
towards the threat of black male sexuality. Despite a "downward statis-
tical trend'5 3g in the number of slaves who actually raped white women
in the last forty years of slavery, the perception of Virginia whites was
that black rape of white women "was on the increase and ought to be
severely guarded against. 5 35
It was also in this era that "[flor the first time, threats or instances
of lynching slaves suspected of raping or otherwise sexually assaulting
white women began to occur regularly.153 6 The myth of the black rapist
and the desire of southern white men to protect the virtue of southern
white womanhood had been integral catalysts for the myriad laws that
sought to control black sexuality. The emergence of extra-legal lynching
would perpetuate whites' attempt to render black Virginians powerless
even after emancipation. In fairness, it should be noted that lynching of
black men accused of rape seems to have occurred less often in late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century Virginia than in other states.5 37 Nev-
530. Act of Mar. 29, 1837, ch. 71, § 1, 1836-37 Va. Acts 49, 49 (act "amending the act,
entitled 'an act to provide for the more effectual punishment of certain offenses' ").
531. GUILD, supra note 2, at 165 (citing Act of 1848, ch. XIII, 1847-48 Va. Acts 126, 126).
532. Id.
533. See STROUD, supra note 17, at 78.
534. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 292-93.
535. Id. at 293 (quoting Gov. Henry A. Wise).
536. Id. at 291-92.
537. Id. at 295. For discussions of the sexual dynamics of lynching in the South, see JAC-
QUELYN D. HALL, REVOLT AGAINST CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMES AND THE WOMEN'S
CAMPAIGN AGAINST LYNCHING 145-57, 322 n.87 (1979) (containing biography describing
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ertheless, between 1908 and 1962, every man executed for rape in
Virginia was black. 38
In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia,539 the United States Supreme Court
held it unconstitutional to execute a defendant for the rape of an adult
woman. 5" That decision was based upon the majority's view that the
penalty of death was disproportionate to the offense of rape, and thereby
violative of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.5 41 The Coker decision could just as easily have been
based on the notion that the imposition of capital punishment for the
crime of rape in this country was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Of the 455 men who have been executed in this country for rape,
405 were black.542
IV. THE DISPOSITION OF CONDEMNED SLAVES
In all cases in which the Virginia courts of oyer and terminer sen-
tenced a slave to death, the justices were required to set a value for the
slave and order the master's reimbursement from the public purse. 43 In
1723 this law was amended to provide for reimbursement to the master
for slaves sentenced either to death or to sale and transportation. 544 A
1748 statute, however, provided that no legal remedy would exist for an
owner of a slave killed by court order.5 45
In eighteenth-century Virginia, a voucher system developed
whereby a slaveowner would be reimbursed for slaves sentenced to death.
Ulrich Phillips' study of this system is a valuable source of informa-
tion. 1 Due to the lack of lower court records, it is impossible to deter-
Jessie Daniel Ames and the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching);
IDA B. WELLS, ON LYNCHINGS: SOUTHERN HORRORS; A RED RECORD; MOB RULE IN
NEW ORLEANS 122-34 (1969).
538. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 320.
539. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
540. Id. at 592.
541. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Id.
542. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., NATIONAL PRISONER STATIS-
TICS-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 18 (1979), reprinted in HuGo A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN AMERICA 60-61 (3d ed. 1982).
543. Act of Oct. 1705, ch. XLIX, § XXXVIII, in 3 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 447, 461 (act "concerning Servants and Slaves").
544. Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § XVI, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 126, 131-32 (act "directing the trial of Slaves, committing capital crimes").
545. Id. § XXV, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 111-12.
546. All of the information discussed in this section with respect to the statistics on slave
crimes was collected by Phillips. See Phillips, supra note 193, at 336. Schwarz notes that
Phillips used only the files of the Auditor's Office, which contained information on condemned
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mine what offenses slaves committed and what punishment they
received. The vouchers reveal vital information, however. The earliest
recorded voucher was paid in 1774. 511 In the 1780s, 66 convictions were
entered; in the 1790s, 112; in first decade of the 1800s, 179; in the 1810s,
185; in the early 1850s, 168 (the records for 1856-59 are missing); in
1860, 26; in 1861, 28; in 1862, 15; in 1863, 6; and in 1864, 7.548
According to Phillips the total number of slaves sentenced to death
was 1,418, only 91 of whom were women. 49 Of slaves condemned, 301
were convicted of either a felony or a crime not specified by the record.
The remaining 1,117 are broken down as follows: For murder, 346;550
for rape, 73;51s for attempted rape, 32.552 Two of the victims were white
children-one an infant, the other under the age of ten. Two of the vic-
tims were mulatto women. 5 3 No slave women were reported as the vic-
tims of rape by slaves.5 4
Fifty-five victims (mostly whites) suffered poisoning and attempted
poisoning. Women committed 15 of the 55 crimes. Other assault and
violent crimes totalled 11, with 2 of the victims being black.555
The number condemned for insurrection and conspiracies was 91;
for arson, 90; for burglary, 257; for highway robbery, 15; for horse theft,
slaves. See SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 55. Schwarz has substantially supplemented Phillips'
study with lower court records and private correspondence. Id. at 55-57.
547. Phillips, supra note 193, at 336.
548. Id. at 336-37.
549. Id. at 337. For a comment on the limitations of Phillips' study, see SCHWARZ, supra
note 25, at 55.
550. The murder victims are identified as follows:
Master 56
Overseer 7
White Male 98
Mistress 11
White Female 13
White child 9
Free black male 7
Male slave 59
Female slave 14
Slave child 12 (all murders by slave women of their own children)
Undescribed 60
Phillips, supra note 193, at 337. For a discussion of infanticide by slaves, see SCHWARZ, supra
note 25, at 252-54.
551. Phillips, supra note 193, at 337.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 338.
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20; for theft, 24; and for forgery, 1.556 At least one slave was sentenced
to death in 1839 for "causing to be printed certain writings denying the
right of masters to property in their slaves."5" 7 It is difficult to ascertain
how many of the slaves condemned to death were actually executed.58
Daniel Flanigan, who has interpreted the significance of these statis-
tics, observes that between 1790 and 1864, 194 whites were murdered at
the hands of slaves, whereas only ninety-two blacks were killed by
slaves.55 9 From 1827 to 1830 and 1833 to 1835, slaves killed thirty-four
whites and twelve blacks. 5 ° Flanigan notes that some slaves may not
have been tried for murdering other slaves, "since whites did not con-
sider it as serious a crime for a slave to commit murder or manslaughter
on another slave as to kill a white. '5 61 This is yet another example of
what little value whites placed on the life of a slave. Flanigan concludes
that, even accounting for this gap, the statistics evince a disproportionate
number of white victims over black victims-a result he found all the
more remarkable because of the frequent interaction of slaves with each
other and the severe sanctions imposed for slave attacks on whites.562
V. PLANTATION AND EXTRAJUDICIAL JUSTICE
Because prosecution of slaves was time-consuming and expensive
most enforcement of the law took place on the plantation. Although
masters were responsible for seeing that breaches of the law by their
slaves or servants were reported,563 the law actually sanctioned the
master's private law-enforcement authority over the slave. Most often
the master or overseer meted out the punishment rather than a public
official, but city ordinances also permitted the slaveholder to send his
slaves to the workhouse or to jail to be punished.5
One historian has argued that this system of publicly regulated pun-
ishment may have benefited the slave because "[c]ity ordinances limited
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. According to Schwarz, after the institution of sale and transportation, between 1801
and 1865, only 454 slaves were executed. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 29.
559. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 49-50.
560. Id. at 50.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. ,See, eg., Act of Feb. 1727, ch. VII, §§ III-IV, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 42, at 209-10 (act "for the ... restraint of Slaves or Servants"); see also Sco'rr,
supra note 27, at 52 ("Particular laws sometimes imposed special obligations, as when masters
were made responsible for seeing that breaches of law by their slaves or servants were
reported.").
564. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 77.
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the number of stripes that could be administered while the master's rage
might know no bounds. '5 65  But abolitionist William Jay viewed it this
way: "The public arm, instead of protecting the slave against the master,
assists the master in the exercise of his irresponsible despotism over the
slave., 566 As such, the master "becomes ex officio, in virtue of his being
a slaveholder, a judicial functionary himself, with the powers of a court
of justice to award sentence, and order a public officer to put it in
execution."567
The informal system of plantation justice that developed was created
in the interests of efficiency and for the protection of the master's prop-
erty rights. As Flanigan noted:
Often this system included minor offenses such as thefts, tres-
passes, and assaults on other slaves committed on neighboring
plantations. For depredations of this character the planters
might simply get together and agree on a punishment, usually a
specified number of lashes administered by the master of the
offending slave. The law not only sanctioned this system but
encouraged it.5 68
As Professor Schwarz observed,
This combination of private and public power appears starkly
in Robert "King" Carter's action against two of his slaves,
Bambara Harry and Dinah, in 1710. According to Carter, they
were "incorrigible"-no punishment could control them. So
Carter successfully petitioned the Lancaster County Court for
permission to amputate their toes. Carter or his agent would
perform the actual dismemberment....s 69
Because so many crimes against slaves, free blacks, and mulattoes never
reached the courthouse, there is no way to know how many were actually
lynched or otherwise punished.
565. Id. The thesis that flogging a slave, whether by a master or by a public official, was in
any way beneficial to the person being flogged is highly questionable. The main beneficiaries of
the urban system of publicly regulated beatings were the slaveowners themselves who were
"saved ... [the] trouble" of inflicting punishment and also were spared a "slight wear and tear
of feeling." See RICHARD C. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE CITIES: THE SOUTH, 1820-1860, at 95-
96 & n.47 (1964) (citing Louis HUGHES, THIRTY YEARS A SLAVE, FROM BONDAGE TO
FREEDOM 9 (Milwaukee, South Side Printing Co. 1897)). Frederick Douglass, among others,
noted that the attempts of urban slaveowners to maintain a public appearance of decorum
facilitated a less arbitrarily cruel system of slave correction. "He is a desperate slaveholder,"
Douglass claimed, "who will shock the humanity of his non-slaveholding neighbors, by the
cries of the lacerated slaves. . . ." Id. at 95 & n.45 (quoting FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY
BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM 148 (1855)).
566. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 76-77 (citing GOODELL, supra note 1, at 167).
567. Id. (citing GOODELL, supra note 1, at 167).
568. Id. at 74.
569. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 80.
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Various statutes also permitted the extrajudicial capture and punish-
ment of runaway slaves. Slaves that had been outlawed (runaway slaves
who had committed other offenses or who had wrought havoc)570 could,
upon recapture, be penalized "either by dismembering or any other way
not touching his life, as may be thought fit, for reclaiming such incorrigi-
ble slave, and terrifying others from like practices. 5 71 Due to the appar-
ent overzealousness of certain whites, however, the legislature amended
the law in 1723 to provide that slaves notoriously guilty of running away
could be dismembered when they could not be captured by ordinary
means.5 72 The law was later amended in 1769 to prohibit castration of
runaway slaves because such punishment was "disproportioned to the
offence, and contrary to the principles of humanity. 5 73 As already
noted, castration continued to be permitted for slaves convicted of at-
tempting to ravish a white woman. 7"
Masters sometimes offered more reward money for killing a run-
away slave than for taking him alive. 75 Slaves would sometimes commit
suicide just to avoid capture. One case that exemplifies the plight of run-
away slaves and the vehemence with which they were pursued was re-
ported in the Journal of Virginia Burgesses in 1755:
The petition of George Mason set forth that a negro Dick had
run away, and committed felonies; he was outlawed, captured,
and delivered to a man named James; while being taken to a
constable he tried to escape; he was injured, and then tied with
a rope to a horse's tail, and then dragged to a house, where he
expired. A committee of burgesses found that the negro had
run away, and had committed some crime for which the
County Court had cut off one ear; he ran away again, was duly
outlawed, captured by some soldiers on the march to Ohio, de-
livered to Daniel James, who took him to a constable; the slave
pulled James off his horse, and tried to escape, saying he had
been outlawed, and would be hanged if he went to prison;
James struck him several blows; soon afterward the slave fell,
and would not or could not go on; James dragged him at the
570. See Scorr, supra note 27, at 301.
571. See GUILD, supra note 2, at 51 (citing Act of 1705, ch. XLIX, § XXXVII, in 3 HEN-
ING's STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42, at 447, 460-61).
572. See Act of May 1723, ch. IV, § XVIII, in 4 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra
note 42, at 126, 132 (emphasis added) (act "directing the trial of Slaves, committing capital
crimes").
573. Act of Nov. 1769, ch. XIX, § 1, in 8 HENiNG'S STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 42,
at 358, 358 (act "to amend the Act, intituled an Act to amend the Act for the better govern-
ment of Servants and Slaves").
574. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 526-28.
575. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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horse's tail; coroner's jury found no bruises sufficient to cause
death; James said he believed the slave had taken poison as he
saw him swallow something, after which he vomited .... 5 7 6
It is not known how many slaves committed suicide to free them-
selves from their miserable existence. But the threat of suicide was a
constant reality. In Chapman v. Campbell5 77 a man who had just
purchased a slave inquired as to "whether there was any thing in the jail
with which [his] negro [slave] could inflict an injury on himself. '5 7 The
new owner was concerned "that the man might do some violence to him-
self."'5 7 9 The slave, Gilbert, was to be transported out of the state within
a short time. Rather than taking his life, however, he broke out of jail
and successfully made his escape.58 0 In another instance, the legislature
ordered that a master be given $1325 for the value of his slave who had
been condemned to die, but who hung himself prior to his execution.5 8 '
As a direct result of laws allowing the capture of runaway slaves and
the enticement of reward money, a system of organized patrols developed
as an arm of the militia and an extension of private law enforcement. 8 2
The patrols were appointed by the county court whenever it was deter-
mined that extra men were needed, usually when an uprising was
suspected. 5
83
Slave patrollers were, according to J. Winston Coleman, considered
the lowest of the low,
"'the offscouring of all things, the refuse, the ears and tails of
slavery, the wallet and satchel of polecats, the exuvial, the
meanest and worst of all creatures. Like starved wharf rats,
they are out at night, creeping into slave cabins to see if they
have an old bone there; they drive out husbands from their own
beds and take their places.' "584
This system of "plantation justice" and private law enforcement,
which included the master's authority to kill a slave and yet escape pros-
576. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 309-10 n.65 (quoting J. VA. HousE OF BURGESSES 253, 259
(May 5 & 16, 1755)).
577. 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 105 (1856).
578. Id. at 107.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 108. The case arose from the slaveowner's demand for payment from the man
who had agreed to purchase the slave, but who refused to pay after the slave escaped.
581. GUILD, supra note 2, at 92-93 (citing Act of 1864, ch. 98, § 1, 1863-64 Va. Acts 74,
74).
582. Flanigan, supra note 59, at 79.
583. Id. at 80.
584. Id. at 80 (quoting J. WINSTON COLEMAN, SLAVERY TIMES IN KENTUCKY 98 n.30
(1940) (quoting Lewis Clarke)).
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ecution, insured the slave's total dehumanization. With no laws to pro-
tect the slave from his keepers and an equally harsh system of public law
enforcement, the circle of injustice was complete.
Even when laws for the protection of blacks theoretically existed,
the reality of race hate often demonstrated the impotence of the legal
right. This reality was poignantly illustrated in Grayson v. Common-
wealth,85 in which a free negro, William Grayson, was indicted for the
murder of David W. Miller, who was white.586
In 1848, Grayson had become indebted to two local merchants, Set-
tle and Miller, in the amount of two or three dollars.58 7 In retaliation,
one of the owners took Grayson's spade and shovel "and told the pris-
oner that he could not have them until he had paid all that he owed."5 '
On the evening of the murder, Grayson went to the store and requested
his spade and shovel, but was "peremptorily refused."5 9 He later re-
turned to the store, paid off his account, and retrieved his spade and
shovel. 59 ° "[A]bout an hour and a half after night" he went to a friend's
cabin, where he stayed all night; 91 he claimed he lost his spade and
shovel" en route to the cabin.592
That evening, Miller was murdered: He "was killed by several
blows on the head, inflicted by a dull-edged instrument.5 -93 When
found, the murder weapon-Grayson's shovel-displayed "marks of
blood and one human hair. ' 594 The following day, when Grayson ap-
peared at the store, he had on the same clothes that he had worn the
night before, and "there was no appearance of blood on his clothes or
person, [which] ... were carefully examined. 59 5 At his first trial, the
jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree and the court sen-
tenced him to be hung.596 On appeal the general court reversed the judg-
ment and remanded the case for a new trial. 97 The court noted "that
there is no evidence which connects the accused with the homicide.., at
585. 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 712 (1849).
586. Id. at 713.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 713-14.
589. Id. at 714.
590. Id. at 717.
591. Id. at 721-22.
592. Id. at 717-18.
593. Id. at 715-16.
594. Id. at 719.
595. Id. at 722.
596. Id. at 713.
597. Id. at 724.
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most, it amounts only to a suspicion that he had some hand in it." '
Grayson v. Commonwealth was again before the general court in
June of 1850.199 The evidence presented at the second trial was substan-
tially similar to that introduced at the first trial, but revealed one new
twist. The general court noted that "[a]fter the inquest had been taken
and signed," Grayson
was directed to be committed to jail, when it was proposed-
the certificate of facts says-by a gentleman present, as a means
of finding out where the spade and shovel were to be found,
that the prisoner should have his hands put into a vice, and by
torture compelled to confess. His hands were put into a vice
and the force of the screw applied; but he persisted in the state-
ment that he had before made, that he was drunk, had lost his
spade and shovel, and did not know where they were.1
Grayson was again "found guilty of murder in the first degree, and sen-
tenced to be hung.""6 1 The general court again reversed the conviction
and ordered a new trial. The court concluded:
[W]e are again unanimously of opinion, that [the evidence] ...
is wholly insufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment.
... Declarations of persons accused are not much to be
relied on; but in this case the truth of the declarations was per-
sisted in under peculiar circumstances;-under severe torture,
which we are sorry to say the bystanders, under the great ex-
citement of the movement, forgetful of the mild spirit of our
law, thought themselves at liberty to inffict.... [T]he testimony
... is hardly sufficient to raise a suspicion against him.6 2
The last entry by the court reporter reads: "After the decision of the
Court granting to the prisoner another trial, an armed mob in the day-
time, took him from the jail and hung him: And thus to punish a man
whom they suspected of murder, they committed murder themselves. '""°s
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The criminal justice system for free and enslaved blacks in colonial
and antebellum Virginia was designed to keep blacks as powerless and
submissive as possible to insure the preservation of slavery and the domi-
598. Id.
599. 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 613 (1850).
600. Id. at 614.
601. Id. at 613.
602. Id. at 615-19.
603. Id. at 619 (court reporter's note).
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nation of the white race over the black. A master's authority over his
black human beings was total-he could beat, maim, torture, and in
many circumstances even kill the slave. Legitimized cruelty was the nat-
ural consequence of such a system. It was a system which explicitly de-
manded that for the slave there be no choice but total submission, and
little or no remedy for the master's cruelty.
A criminal justice system that assured masters almost unlimited dis-
cretion in controlling or disposing of their "property" reflected what
Frederick Douglass observed on the Fourth of July, 1852. Speaking
from the perspective of blacks and slaves rather than that of whites and
slaveholders, Douglass said:
This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must
mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated
temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous an-
thems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony. I say it
with a sad sense of the disparity between us. I am not included
within the pale of this glorious anniversary!... The blessings in
which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common.-The
rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence,
bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The
sunlight that brought light and healing to you, has brought
stripes and death to me.'
Under this legalized system of "stripes and death," blacks had the
worst of both worlds: they received almost no protection from cruelty
and slaughter and were punished far more severely than whites. They
were treated as less than human whenever it benefited the economic in-
terests of the white master or the white power structure. Yet, when it
came to punishing them, blacks were held to a more rigorous standard
than whites. Not only were they punished more harshly for the same
offenses whites committed, but they also risked execution and dismem-
berment for conduct that was legal for whites.6°s Referred to as igno-
rant, immoral, and savage, they were expected to conform to a system of
laws that legitimized cruelty and rendered them powerless. William
Goodell was correct when he stated that the slave "is under the control of
law, though unprotected by law, and can know law only as an enemy, and
not as a friend. ' ' 6
What is the relevance of this history to our nation today? Should we
ponder over our treatment of the weak, the poor, and the dispossessed of
604. Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, in 2 THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, at 189 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950).
605. See STROmD, supra note 17, at 78.
606. GOODELL, supra note 1, at 309.
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all races? How far have we really come in recognizing the equal value of
every human being? Should we wonder whether future generations will
find parallels between today's system of justice and national policy and
the cruelty imposed upon powerless blacks and slaves during the colonial
and antebellum period?"o7
In accepting his nomination for a second term, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt said: "There is a mysterious cycle in human events. To some
generations much is given. Of other generations much is expected. This
generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny.' ' 608 It is up to
those of us in the twilight of the twentieth century and the beginning of
the twenty-first to determine whether in our generation's rendezvous
with destiny, we, as others have attempted before, will move our nation
toward a society that is more just and fair for all of its citizens.
607. One of the authors has written elsewhere:
It would be ideal [if studies on blacks in colonial and antebellum Virginia]...
were merely an exploration of historical events that have no relevance to America
today. It would be gratifying if one could conclude that the tragic oppression of free
blacks in colonial and antebellum Virginia was an episodic matter that does not affect
the present state of black Americans. Thus, our present study would be the
equivalent of displays of dinosaur skeletons in museums. It would be merely an in-
teresting perspective of history that is not in any way being replicated in the present.
However, most thoughtful scholars recognize the extraordinary interrelationship be-
tween the centuries of oppression that both slaves and free blacks endured during the
colonial and antebellum periods and today's racial balance sheet in America. In
short, some aspects of the legacy of our past still live on and haunt us. This legacy
dilutes our present attainments and diminishes our future potential.
In 1987 Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams expanded Myrdal's analysis
by describing the "unfinished agenda of a nation still struggling to come to terms
with the consequences of its history of relations between black and white Ameri-
cans." In many ways this history has left what they call "a legacy of pain" including
the "continuance of conditions of poverty, segregation, discrimination, and social
fragmentation of the most serious proportions."
The events which occurred 125 to 250 years ago in Virginia and elsewhere...
have a nexus with the social and economic studies of the last half century.
Higginbotham & Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free," supra note 6, at 63-65; see also GERALD
D. JAYNES & ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, A COMMON DESrINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCI-
ETY 3-32 (1989) (measuring the change in status of black Americans over 50 years from a
number of perspectives and concluding that "the great gulf that existed between black and
white Americans in 1939 has only been narrowed; it has not closed"); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 997-1024 (1944)
(identifying common elements in the political and social status of blacks in America in the
context of the Revolutionary, Civil, and First and Second World Wars); Evelyn Brooks Hig-
ginbotham, Beyond the Sound of Silence: Afro-American Women in History, 1 GENDER &
HIST. 50, 62-63 (1989) (emphasizing the importance of recognizing, for purposes of historical
assessment, the role of black women).
608. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of Acceptance of the Presidential Nomination for a
Second Term, in FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: SELECTED SPEECHES, MESSAGES, PRESS CON-
FERENCES AND LETTERS, at 151 (Basil Rauch ed., 1957).
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More than twenty-three years ago, the Kerner Commission6' 9 con-
cluded its powerful report by noting that the history of our country has
not been "the realization of common opportunities for all within a single
society" and that the alternative for the future was to stop "the continu-
ing polarization of the American community and, ultimately, the de-
struction of basic democratic values."61" It concluded that "[f]rom every
American it will require new attitudes, new understanding, and above all,
new will. The vital needs of the Nation must be met; hard choices must
be made."61 ' For this generation, we must ascertain whether we have
the ability to acquire "new attitudes, new understanding, and above all,
new will" to sever the legacy of the past and to build a better world for
all Americans where no one should view the law or the system of govern-
ment as an enemy.
609. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
610. Id. at 1.
611. Id
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